

04/28/1952 was transferred to the Japanese government, then a legal basis was required to create American bases, i.e. a separate agreement, which was signed on 09/08/1951 between the United States and Japan ("Security Treaty"). Stalin "lured" the Americans into the war in Korea, Soviet pilots shot down American planes. But apparently that wasn't enough for him. To conduct a "big" war, a large theater of operations is also needed. And it must be painstakingly prepared, and for this it is very useful to maintain the state of war with Japan, which, thereby, will be forced to agree to the American military presence at home. At the same time, the Soviet media may claim that Japan is "occupied" by the United States. From these points of view, it is impossible to sign a peace treaty, which was done.

At the end of the same 1951, another interesting event took place in Soviet-Japanese relations. In December, Kiishi Iwamoto, editor-in-chief of the Japanese Kyodo agency, asked Stalin to send New Year's greetings to the Japanese people. Stalin agreed. It was published on January 1, 1952 both in Japan and in the USSR in the Pravda newspaper. In addition, many newspapers around the world printed it in full or in summary form. In connection with our topic, it is useful to read it in full: "Soviet leaders do not have such a tradition

that the prime minister of a foreign state turns to the people of another state with his wishes. However, the deep sympathy of the peoples of the Soviet Union for the Japanese people who are in trouble due to foreign occupation forces please convey to the Japanese people that I wish them freedom and happiness, that I wish them complete success in their courageous

struggle for the independence of their homeland. The Japanese imperialists also participated in. Therefore, they fully understand the suffering of the Japanese

people, deeply sympathize with them and believe that they will achieve the revival and independence of their homeland, just as the peoples of the Soviet Union achieved in their time.

I wish the Japanese workers to be freed from unemployment and low wages, the elimination of high prices for consumer goods and success in the struggle to maintain

peace. I wish the Japanese peasants to free themselves from landlessness and lack of land, the elimination of high taxes and success in the struggle to

preserve peace. I wish all the Japanese people and their intelligentsia the complete victory of the democratic forces of Japan, the revival and upswing of the country's economic life, the flourishing of national culture, science, art, and success in the

struggle to preserve peace. Sincerely, I. Stalin,

1951, December 31. "From the point of view of logic, this is a strange message. At first, sympathy is expressed about the fact that Japan is occupied by someone. But where does the press agency come from in "occupied" Japan? For example, could something like this happen in Poland in late 1940 - early 1941? It couldn't, it's completely out of the question! There are no national agencies in the occupied countries.

Or is this not an occupation! And who should improve the lives of Japanese workers, peasants and intelligentsia? The occupiers? Or the Japanese themselves should arrange the

same as was done in the Soviet Union? And who is the "occupier"? To answer this question, in the next issue of the newspaper "PRAVDA" (January 2, 1952), an editorial was published under the heading: "IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE

PRESERVATION PEACE". In particular, it says: "The consequences of the adventurist policy of the ruling circles of the United States - the policy of aggression, the preparation and unleashing of a new predatory war - are becoming more and more distinct. The frenzied arms race in the United States of America and other countries of the aggressive Anglo-American bloc is bringing unprecedented hardships to the working masses... Particularly great are the sufferings of the peoples experiencing the horrors of American occupation in West Germany, Japan and other countries that have fallen under the yoke of the occupation of the American imperialists, the broad masses working people are doomed to the torments of unemployment, half-starvation or starvation. The peasantry suffers

high taxes and other hardships caused by foreign occupation..."
For a long

time, even after Stalin's death, the concept of "ideological orientation" was used in Soviet propaganda. It is quite possible that his refusal to sign a peace treaty with Japan (and the failure to prepare a peace treaty with Germany) was associated with the need to apply such an "ideological attitude": Japan (and West Germany) are occupied by the Americans, the US is an occupier and aggressor. At the same time, the reasons for which the Americans ended up in these

countries were completely hushed up. Thus, since the summer of 1950 in the Far East, The USSR is formally at war with one country (Japan), US troops are stationed in it, and a natural war is organized in a neighboring country (Korea), in which one of the main participants is the same US, which, moreover, is accused of a policy of aggression. In other words, international tensions in the Far East have intensified since the summer of 1950. Moreover, Soviet propaganda placed all the blame for this on the United States. In reality, the main culprit was the USSR itself. After all, if Korea had not been divided at the Potsdam Conference, then there would have been no war for unification. If there had been no war in Korea and the Soviet Union had signed a peace treaty with Japan, then it would have been problematic for American military

bases to appear in it. Incidentally, Western and Japanese historians sometimes accused the USSR of pursuing a policy of "bloody" division of other countries and creating local conflicts on this basis. This, for example, was mentioned in the article "Landing on Hokkaido CANCEL!" ("VIZH", No. 3, 1994). But its authors tried to prove the inconsistency of such accusations and cited as an example Stalin's failed attempt to divide Fr. Hokkaido in August 1945: "... the rejection of the planned landing in accordance with the plan of war against Japan on the island of Hokkaido and its occupation ... was no less convincing evidence that the Soviet state did not seek to "bloody division" of foreign territory, which some Japanese and Western historians and officials are trying to accuse him of ... "A strange conclusion

they forgot the division of Korea, which, unlike the Japanese territory, was carried out at the insistence of the USSR!

Moreover, in the article about the island of Hokkaido, it is confirmed that in the last days of the Potsdam Conference, the line of delimitation of the zones of military operations of the Soviet and American armed forces was agreed upon. And it passed north of the island (but how it was located in Korea is silent in the article).

As mentioned earlier, Stalin's attempt to divide Fr. Hokkaido can be traced in documents - in his correspondence with Truman. Stalin made this proposal for the first time on 08/16/45. In a telegram dated 08/18/45, the US President refused to change the demarcation line between American and Soviet troops in northern Japan. However, the VIZH article says that the preliminary order to prepare for the landing of Soviet troops on one Japanese island was given by Stalin even before the start of hostilities (that is, before 08/09/45).

But the authors of the article write that such actions of Stalin did not contradict the agreements with the allies, because, depending on the situation, the border of the Soviet zone of responsibility could be changed in agreement with the command of the US armed forces.

Stalin tried to coordinate the problem with Fr. Hokkaido 16-19 August 1945. Truman refused. But on August 20, Stalin CONFIRMED the instruction to prepare the 87th Rifle Corps for participation in the landing on about. Hokkaido! And only on August 22, he ordered Marshal Vasilevsky to suspend training. And by August 27, he categorically forbade sending troops to the Japanese islands.

In the article, this is explained by the strong resistance of the Japanese in South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, which the Soviet troops had to overcome. And the capture of the northern half of about. Hokkaido was planned to be completed only if the fighting ended by the end of August. In other words, it is possible that Stalin thought to justify the landing in Japan by the combat situation, which required an operational landing, as it were, to the rear of the defending Japanese, who turned out to be Fr. Hokkaido.

Such an explanation might well be plausible. It remains unclear what Stalin thought to do next? Truman refused to change the line. Therefore, the troops would have to withdraw. Such

the situation developed in Germany and Austria, where there were mutual withdrawals of allied troops to the borders of the agreed demarcation line.

Why did Stalin really want to share Fr. Hokkaido? It can be assumed that he was not sure about the "necessary" development of events in Korea. And for some reason, he really needed to destabilize the international situation in the Far East in the future. Therefore, to the last opportunity, he, apparently, tried to organize additional potential tensions. But in the Far East there was successful in another country in which Stalin was more source pursuing a policy

of division and creating a local conflict on this basis - this is China, in which, by the time the Second World War ended in 1945, there were actually two state entities:

- in the territory controlled by the official Kuomintang government of Chiang Kai-shek, where about 70% of the country's population lived; - and

"liberated" areas ruled by people's governments led by the Communist Party of China (CCP) (hereinafter information from "SVE", vol. 5, Moscow, "Voenizdat", 1978, pp. 501-503).

Between the Kuomintang troops and the people's armed forces (since 1947 - the People's Liberation Army - PLA) hostilities did not stop. Since 1945, the armies of the USSR and the USA have been in China. The Soviet Union withdrew its troops by May 3, 1946, the American troops remained. The Soviet command transferred to the PLA the

weapons, military equipment and equipment of the former Japanese Kwantung Army captured by the Soviet troops (over 3.7 thousand guns, mortars and grenade launchers, 600 tanks, 861 aircraft, about 12 thousand machine guns, more than 2000 vehicles, etc.). d.). And later on, the USSR supplied the PLA with a significant amount of Soviet-made weapons and military equipment.

In the general course of the civil war in China, which Soviet historians called the "People's Liberation War", there were two periods. The main content of the first (June 1946 - June 1947) is the offensive of the Kuomintang troops and the defense of the PLA, the second - (July 1947 - December 1949) the strategic offensive of the PLA troops. TO

By the end of 1949, the liberation of the entire mainland China from the power of the central government was basically completed (only Tibet remained). The Kuomintang fled to the island of Taiwan (Formosa) under the protection of the US armed forces. On October 1, 1949, the formation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) was proclaimed. Friendly relations were established between the USSR and the PRC and a new treaty of friendship and cooperation was concluded. Why

new? It turns out that from June 30 to August 14, 1945, with a break for the Potsdam Conference in Moscow, negotiations were held between the delegations of the USSR and the Republic of China (the government of Chiang Kai-shek). They ended with the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Union between the two countries. The Chinese did not want to recognize the independence of "outer" Mongolia for a long time, but then they agreed.

As a result, it turns out that by the end of 1945, the Soviet Union, having become an ally of the official government of China under the Treaty, immediately armed its internal opponents with a huge batch of weapons. What is it called according to international rules? Answer: interference in internal affairs. Let's imagine for a moment that, for example, several boxes of cartridges and grenades would be dropped from an English plane to the Lithuanian rebels - that would be a noise to the whole world! How dare these presumptuous imperialists interfere in the internal affairs of the USSR! Yes, even in violation of the 1942 Treaty of Friendship !! This is a

provocation of a new war!!! But excuse me, the trophy armament of the millionth Kwantung Army is not a few boxes of cartridges and grenades, there were planes, tanks and heavy guns. And by Soviet standards, it turned out to be quite legal to transfer it to one of the parties to the armed conflict of another state. This was called the "creation of the Manchu revolutionary base", the development of which was the intensification of the civil war

in China. But Soviet propaganda laid the blame for this on the leaders of the Kuomintang and the United States, who, allegedly, did not want to resolve all disputed issues by peaceful means. But the Kuomintang was the official ruling political organization in China. The USSR had a Treaty of Friendship with him. From him were the representatives of China in the UN Security Council. And the truth was that "the Unit

civil war in China, they did not need it and it was harmful. They tried to achieve a settlement of the conflict by political means, by compromise, through the mediation missions of P. Hurley and J. Marshall. The USA invited the Soviet Union to joint participation in this settlement. Nanjing [the Kuomintang capital] asked for the same. Washington and Nanjing believed that with the participation of the USSR, a peaceful settlement in China could be reached in the interests of all Chinese, incl.

Communists... The USSR refused, citing the principle of non-intervention, but actually relied on unilateral support for the CCP. Mao Zedong used this for an irreconcilable confrontation by putting forward demands that were completely unacceptable for Nanjing and Washington" (pp. 10-12 of the Otechestvennaya istoriya magazine N: 4, July-August 1992, article by Andrey Ledovsky "FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF A HISTORIAN AND DIPLOMAT") In general, a strange situation developed in Soviet-Chinese

relations after 1945. The foreign ministers of the USSR and Kuomintang China periodically met at the negotiating table of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and China. The USSR and Kuomintang China were not just members of the UN, but and permanent members of the Security Council. There was a Treaty of Friendship between them, according to which the parties pledged to mutually respect sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs. And at the same time, the USSR actively and widely supports the opponent of the Kuomintang in the civil war! On October 1, 1949, the PRC, the cooperation between Stalin and the communist leadership of China is sharply boosted. Thus, as early as October 2, 1949, diplomatic relations were established between the USSR and the new China. On October 3, the National Peace Committee was established. On October 5, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Society was established. And from December 16, 1949 to February 17, 1950, the visit of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China headed by Mao Zedong to the USSR continued. During it, a new Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and China (PRC) was signed on February 14. Of course, the goal of the war in China for Stalin was

different than in Korea. Stalin most likely needed China as a huge

a source of various resources for the upcoming big war, especially human ones. In addition, Stalin was driven by age (in December 1949 he turned 70 years old). Apparently, therefore, he had to be less choosy in the means of foreign policy (and domestic too).

But in addition to the Far East, it was necessary to prepare a theater of military Action (TVD) and in Europe. This is discussed in the next chapter.

8. "PEACE" POLICY OF THE USSR IN EASTERN EUROPE On the

opposite side of the globe - in Europe, Stalin also pursued a certain active policy. First, it was necessary to ensure the coming of the communists to power in the Eastern European countries. Moreover, in such a way that they fulfill only his will (or, in extreme cases, act with his permission). The second task that had to be solved jointly with the former allies was the legal registration of the results of the Second World War.

Much has been written about how the communists came to power in Eastern Europe. This process has been quite successful. But two difficulties arose. The first is widely known - this is the conflict between Stalin and the Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito. Historians usually do not pay much attention to the second. Perhaps because it did not last long and was resolved by the summer of 1949. We are talking about a high policy INDEPENDENT of Stalin, which the leader of Bulgaria, Georgy Dimitrov, tried to pursue. The problem with Tito was the same - independence from Moscow. But Stalin did not manage to solve it before his death.

In 1991, Yu. Girenko's book "STALIN-TITO" (Moscow, Politizdat) was published, which provides a lot of information about the conflict between them. It turns out that the Yugoslav leadership expressed its first disagreement with Stalin already in 1945, proposing to reduce the salaries of Soviet specialists.

But since 1947, the differences began to intensify. In early February of that year, agreements were signed between the USSR and Yugoslavia on the creation of two joint stock companies for shipping on the Danube and for civil aviation. Subsequently, the Yugoslav side decided that such mixed societies were detrimental to the economy of an independent Yugoslavia.

On April 19, 1947, in a conversation with Stalin, one of the Yugoslav leaders, E. Kardel, actually raised the question of

intervention of Soviet advisers in the internal affairs of the country. Stalin, not hiding his displeasure, said sharply: "Specialists are there to be listened to, and not just to sit idly by."

In the summer of 1947, the government of the FPRYU adopted a decision prohibiting party organizations and state institutions from providing Soviet civilian and military specialists with any information of an economic nature. It was regarded by Stalin as a manifestation of distrust and hostility towards the Soviet representatives in Yugoslavia. During the exchange of views between the leadership of the USSR and the FRRY, the Yugoslav side explained that Soviet specialists "excessively impose their views", "do not take into account our specifics", "ignore the opinion of the Yugoslav partners, which leads to quarrels and friction." From July 30 to August 1, 1947, unannounced Yugoslav-Bulgarian

negotiations took place between I. Tito and G. Dimitrov. They agreed on an indefinite treaty between their countries. And on August 2, the fact of the development of such an agreement was made public in the official protocol. Stalin objected both to the fact of the negotiations themselves

and to the duration of the agreed treaty. In a letter to Tito on August 12, he wrote that both governments made a mistake by concluding a pact (and an open-ended one, too) before the peace treaty came into force and despite warnings from Moscow. (The fact is that on February 10, 1947, peace treaties were signed in Paris between the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition and the allied countries of Germany (Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Finland). They entered into force on September 15, 1947). During the peace negotiations, the USSR helped Yugoslavia in establishing the Yugoslav-

Italian border near the city of Trieste. In addition, the Soviet Union also helped in settling the economic and territorial claims of the FPRY against Austria. But the government of Yugoslavia also turned to England for help. When Stalin found out about this, on August 5, 1947, he expressed his dissatisfaction with the "behind-the-scenes negotiations behind the backs of the Soviet

government" and expressed bewilderment at the fact that it was not informed about them.

Due to certain reasons, Stalin could not agree to independent policy of Yugoslavia. And he began to take action.

In the summer of 1947, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks sent a letter to the First Secretary of the Polish Workers' Party (PPR) W. Gomulka, in which it proposed that the PPR take the initiative to convene a meeting of the communist parties of some European countries to discuss the issue of strengthening ties between them, for example, by creating a new informational international (called the "Information Bureau"). The Polish

communists, of course, came up with such an initiative. Other parties agreed, but some leaders expressed doubts about the danger of a return to obsolete Cominter leadership forms and methods. Doubts were expressed by: K. Gottwald, M. Thorez, P. Tolyatti and V. Gomulka. W. Gomulka doubted most of all. (Strange thing: the biggest doubter is the main formal initiator of the event!)

From September 22 to 27, 1947, the first information meeting of representatives of the communist and workers' parties of nine countries took place in the resort town of Szklarska Poręba (western Poland). It was decided to create an "Information Bureau". On Stalin's telephone advice, his residence and the editorial office of the newspaper "For a Lasting Peace, for People's Democracy!" Belgrade was elected, although Prague also applied. Yielding to Stalin's persuasion, the delegates of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia criticized the French and Italian communists "in admiration for parliamentarism, compliance with the Vatican and de Gaulleism." In the book by Yu. Girenko, the idea is expressed that Stalin did this on purpose, so that later the Yugoslav communists could not receive help from the French and Italian Communist Parties during the period when Stalin would carry out an attack against the Yugoslavs themselves (provoking the 1st class!).

But the purpose of the conference was not only preparation for the fight against Tito. D. Volkogonov in the book "TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY" (Kiev, "Political Publishing House of Ukraine", 1990, volume 2) noted that Stalin's envoy Zhdanov delivered a report "On the international situation". It formulated a thesis that for many years will become almost

Central in Soviet propaganda - "the division of the world into two opposing camps." This may have been a response to the anti-communist "Truman Doctrine". The report also expressed a negative assessment of the "Marshall plan" as a "program for the enslavement of Europe" (participation in which the USSR refused to participate at the Paris meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Great Britain and France on June

27 - July 2, 1947). In the West, the creation of the "Information Bureau" was met negatively and was called "Cominform". Subsequently, only two such meetings were held: in June 1949 in Hungary and in November 1949 in Romania. April 18, 1956 it was dissolved. After the meeting in

Szklarska Poręba, the Yugoslav leadership did not stop its actions independent of Moscow. Without agreement with the USSR, on November 27, 1947, Tito visited Bulgaria, where an agreement on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance was signed between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. In addition, Yugoslav economic influence on Albania was increased.

In January 1948, Tito (again without consulting the USSR, which immediately led to another crisis between the countries) asked the Albanian leaders to allow one Yugoslav division to deploy in Albania near the city of Korça.

But the Bulgarian Georgy Dimitrov continued to take independent steps. On January 16, 1948, in Bucharest, he signed the Bulgarian-Romanian Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. And on January 17, at a press conference, Dimitrov announced the possible creation in the future, when conditions are ripe, of a federation or confederation of the Balkan and Danube countries, with the inclusion of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Greece. In the West, this was immediately regarded as a "malicious Soviet invention."

On January 24 of the same year, Stalin sent a telegram to Dimitrov (and a copy of Tito), in which he explained that the proposal concerning the federation or confederation of the people's democracies was harmful, because "it harms the countries of the new democracy and facilitates the struggle of the Anglo-Americans against these countries". Following this, in an effort to prevent further aggravation of relations with the UK

and the United States, Stalin decided to dissociate himself from this proposal in the press (Pravda, 01/28/1948).

And on February 4, 1948, he instructed the Soviet ambassadors in Belgrade and Sofia to bring to the attention of I. Tito and G. Dimitrov the following considerations: "An unsuccessful interview with Comrade Dimitrov in Sofia gave rise to all sorts of talk about the preparation of an Eastern European bloc with the participation of the USSR." On February 10, 1948, a

meeting took place in Moscow of the delegations of the Soviet Union (led by Stalin), Bulgaria (with Dimitrov) and Yugoslavia (with Kardelj, since Tito pleaded poor health and did not go). Relationships were sorted out for a long time. When Kardelj said that

Yugoslavia usually always consulted with the Soviet government, Stalin abruptly cut him off: "It's not true! You don't consult at all! It's not your mistakes, but the principle, yes, the principle!" Molotov, who took the floor, read out a paragraph from the Yugoslav-Bulgarian treaty, which stated that Yugoslavia and Bulgaria would act in the spirit of the UN and support any initiative aimed at protecting peace, against any aggression, no matter which side it came from. To this, Stalin said: "But this is a preventive war! This is the most common Komsomol attack! This is an ordinary loud phrase that only feeds the enemy!" And in response to Dimitrov's proposal to discuss already now some questions of the further development of economic relations, Stalin said: "We will talk about this with the united Bulgarian-Yugoslav government."

On March 1, 1948, an expanded meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPY was held. It noted that the USSR:

- does not want a strong army of Yugoslavia;
- recruits agents; -
- dictates its own directions for the development of the economy of

Yugoslavia; - etc.; - it came to the proposal to create a federation with

Bulgaria. Josip Tito was against the federation, saying that this would allow Stalin to change the leadership of Yugoslavia to a more obedient one and increase the influence of the NKVD. After the meeting, a message was sent to Moscow and Sofia to the effect that Yugoslavia considered it untimely to create a federation with Bulgaria.

On March 18, 1948, Stalin decided to recall all Soviet specialists from Yugoslavia (including the military). On March 27, 1948, their last group flew to the USSR. On the same

day, March 27, 1948, the first letter of Stalin and Molotov with various accusations was sent to the Central Committee of the CPY. On May 4 of the same year, a second letter was sent. His tone was even more categorical and implacable.

On May 20, 1948, a plenum of the Central Committee of the CPY was held. It decided not to participate in the meeting of the Information

Bureau in Hungary. On July 29, 1948, the "Informburo Resolution on the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia" was published. The confrontation between the Stalins and Tito took irreconcilable forms. On September 8, 1948, the Pravda newspaper published an article under the heading "Where is the nationalism of the Tito group in Yugoslavia leading?" Its most likely author was Stalin himself. On May 1 of the following year, 1949, the Pravda newspaper announced the publication of the first issue of the newspaper of the Yugoslav oppositionists, For Socialist Yugoslavia, published in Serbian by Yugoslav communist political emigrants living in the USSR. This newspaper became the organ of the Union of Yugoslav Patriots for the Liberation of Yugoslavia from the fascist yoke of the Tito-Rankovic clique and imperialist slavery, founded in the Soviet Union by the opposition Tito. Mutual accusations grew like a snowball, the parties no longer chose

expressions. On September 28, 1949, the USSR announced the rupture of the Soviet Yugoslav treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and post-war cooperation. On October 25, 1949, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs expelled the ambassador of the FPRY, and in November, the chargé

In November 1949, the resolution of the next meeting of the Information Bureau was published - "The Yugoslav Communist Party is in the power of murderers and spies." It contained a whole set of insinuations and outright lies, as if the Yugoslav leadership had slipped from bourgeois nationalism to fascism, established a fascist-type dictatorship in the country, was a hireling of imperialist reaction, and turned Belgrade into an American center of espionage and anti-communist propaganda. "Fight Against the Tito Clique"

declared the international duty of all communist and workers' parties.
Since the end

of 1949, with the formal preservation of diplomatic relations, all ties between the USSR and Yugoslavia were interrupted. And all other countries of Eastern Europe at the beginning of October 1949, within six days, also broke similar agreements with Yugoslavia. On the Yugoslav borders with Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, the situation sharply escalated, border incidents became more frequent. The Yugoslav government proposed the creation of special mixed commissions with these countries, but they refused (from 07/01/1948 to 09/01/1949 there were 219 armed border incidents). In the autumn of 1949, through the efforts

of both sides, the conflict was internationalized, incl. through the UN, where on October 20, 1949 Yugoslavia was elected a non-permanent member of the Security Council. The pressure on Yugoslavia during the years of the rupture of relations was manifested, using Yugoslav terminology, in "forcing the atmosphere of armed aggression", for which everything was prepared and which at that time was literally "in the air". After Stalin's death, on June

6, 1953, the Soviet government came up with a proposal to exchange ambassadors. In the USSR, the organization of Yugoslav emigration was dissolved, and anti-Yugoslav propaganda was stopped. On May 26, 1955, N. Khrushchev traveled to Belgrade. The conflict was over. As for the leadership of Bulgaria,

headed by Georgy Dimitrov, it did not dare to seriously aggravate relations with the Soviet Union. However, in 1948, Bulgaria signed treaties of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance with Romania (January 16), with the USSR (March 18), with Czechoslovakia (April 23), with Poland (May 29) and Hungary (July 16). All of them were designed for 20 years and they had special articles about non-participation in any actions directed against the other side. The possibility of an attack on one of the sides of Germany or another state was especially noted. In this case, the parties must provide each other with military and any other assistance (source - TSB, articles on the Bulgarian-... treaties).

All of them were signed either only by Dimitrov, or together with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria V. Kolarov.

When reading them, it is precisely the article about the case of attack, primarily by Germany, that catches the eye. Why? Indeed, at that time there was not even a national state on German territory! The country was led by the occupation authorities of the victorious countries of the Second World War! Before the creation of the German government, it was necessary to draw up a peace treaty and hold elections. This process dragged on indefinitely. And in general, things went to the political split of Germany. In addition, neither Bulgaria nor the few countries with which it signed treaties (Hungary and Romania) had common borders with Germany.

Under these conditions, the leaders of Bulgaria could not think about the war with the Germans. And with whom could Bulgaria fight at that time? It bordered on such countries: Turkey (a little), Greece, Yugoslavia and Romania. Greece and Turkey had bourgeois governments and no Soviet troops. In other countries, the communists came to power, who only spoke about the struggle for peace and the prevention of a new war. But Bulgaria urgently concludes agreements at the end of 1947 and in the first half of the next 1948 with the countries where the communists won. Moreover, a paragraph on actions in case of war with Germany or anyone else is necessarily introduced into the text of the treaty. As well as an article on not joining any alliances directed against the other side. Why?

It seems that Dimitrov was afraid of something. We read his brief biography (in "BSE", 3rd edition, volume 8, 1972): born 06/18/1882, died July 2, 1949, having lived 67 years. From 1934 to 1945 he lived in the USSR. From 1935 to 1943 General Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. In 1937-1945 he was a member of the Soviet parliament (Supreme Soviet of the USSR). On November 6, 1945 he returned to Bulgaria. Since November 1946 - Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Bulgaria.

Since December 1948 - General Secretary of the Central Committee of the BKP. Thus, Stalin's pre-war and military policy was carried out in front of Dimitrov. He witnessed the terror of the late 30s. In particular, his associates in the Leipzig trial on the burning of the Reichstag were repressed. And in Dimitrov's apartment for some time he hid from arrest "the future S

ruler of Bulgaria Vylko Chervenkov" (R. Conquest "GREAT TERROR", volume 2, translated from English, Riga, "Rakstnieks", 1991, p. 235)

Dimitrov saw how and whom Stalin sent to the governments of Eastern Europe. And he had to guess about his post-war goals. Moreover, since the beginning of 1945, Stalin began to put forward various demands on Turkey. The USSR and Italy had certain claims. In 1945-1947, with the participation of the Soviet Union, there was a hotbed of tension in Iran. In 1946, in Greece, the communists refused to participate in the elections and began armed struggle. This will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Here it is enough to note that in the event of a proliferation of conflicts in these countries with the participation of the USSR, Bulgaria could not stand aside, being an obedient ally of the Soviet Union. Dimitrov had to understand the situation and, apparently, that's why he tried to show independence. But he could not "break away" from Stalin. It has already been said above that Stalin was dissatisfied with some of Dimitrov's actions. But if we assume that the

"great leader" was planning a new war, then the independent Dimitrov generally became very dangerous. Stalin failed to subdue the Yugoslav Tito, and he had to go to a confrontation with Yugoslavia (on the possibility of a military solution to this problem). But Dimitrov also proved to be very unreliable. However, by the will of fate, Stalin managed to cope with this problem quite quickly. We read Dimitrov's biography further: "he died in Barvikha near Moscow."

It turns out that he fell ill in early 1949. Moreover, I had to go to bed. However, in a separate biographical essay about him ("GEORGIY DIMITROV" (translated from Bulgarian), Moscow, 1973), it is said that even in this state he continued to work, received visitors. But his condition worsened and on March 7, 1949 he was sent for treatment in the USSR to the sanatorium "Barvikha" near Moscow, where he died. The cause of the illness is listed as "liver, diabetes".

And also the fact that he undermined his health in a fascist prison (in 1933). The results of the autopsy were not given. His body was transported to Bulgaria, where the Soviet government delegation headed by K. Voroshilov (at that time falling out of favor with Stalin) also went.

But that is not all. Dimitrov was the chairman of the Bulgarian government. And one of his deputies was the underground hero Traicho Kostov. In December of the same 1949, he and several other former leaders of the country were sentenced to death.

However, these were not the only repressions among the new leadership of the "people's democracy" countries. In May 1949, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior Kochi Dzodz was convicted and executed in Albania. In September of the same year, Foreign Minister Laszlo Raik was convicted and executed in Hungary. (Kostov and Raik were rehabilitated in 1956).

The next wave of trials took place in 1952. In November, Czechoslovakia condemned (in the words of the Soviet mass media of that time) the "gang of Rudolf Slansky" (the former general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia). Vasile Luca, a member of the Politburo of the Romanian Workers' Party, was arrested in Romania. It is interesting to note that in connection with his arrest there were attacks on the "traitorous clique of Marcel Pauker", one of the two main leaders of the Romanian communists before the Second World War. Moreover, both of them were repressed in the USSR at the end of

the 30s (book by R. Conquest, p. 234). At all these trials, the accused were convicted of belonging to "American and British" agents, "of betrayal in favor of Yugoslavia", Tito, who was declared a spy and a long-time agent of all imperialist intelligence agencies, conducting subversive activities against the USSR and people's

democratic states. In R. Medvedev's book THEY SURROUNDED STALIN (Moscow, Politizdat, 1990), in the chapter on A. Mikoyan, it is said that it was he, on behalf of Stalin, who negotiated with K. Gottwald, insisting on the removal and arrest of R. Slansky. Information about this was published in Czechoslovakia during the "Prague Spring".

By the way, it is possible that not everything is so simple in the fate of Klement Gottwald himself. Here is the data about him from TSB, Volume 7, 1972: born on 11/23/1896, died on 03/14/1953, having lived 57 years. Until 1943 he was one of the leaders of the Communist International. Since 1945, the chairman of the Communist Party. After the liberation of Czechoslovakia, he joined the first government of the National Front in Kosice (04/04/1945) as deputy chairman. In 1946 chairman

coalition government. After the February events of 1948, he formed a new government, "purged of bourgeois conspirators." From 06/14/1948 - Gottwald - President of the Czechoslovak Republic. He took a leading part in the development of the general line of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia for building socialism in the country, proclaimed at its 9th congress in May 1949. K. Gottwald survived Stalin

by 11 days. Moreover, at the head of the Czechoslovak delegation, he was at his funeral in Moscow. On the 11th March he left for Prague, and on the morning of the 14th he died. In several March issues of the Pravda newspaper, materials about the two mournings were printed simultaneously. The official report stated that he died on March 14, 1953 at 11:00 am after a short serious illness from acute heart failure (heart collapse).

The information of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the Czechoslovak government and the Central Committee of the National Front said: "The best Soviet and Czechoslovak doctors were at the head of the patient. Heroically, almost until the last minute, he fought death himself, in the full consciousness of Comrade Gottwald. dearest life for us..."

And in the medical report, signed by prominent doctors, there are the following words: "... since 9-00 I was in a deep unconscious state ..." (both of these messages were published in the same issue of the newspaper "PRAVDA" for March 15, 1953). As in the case of Dimitrov, no autopsy data was given.

And it is not specified whether the initial diagnosis was confirmed or not.

Of course, Stalin could no longer influence the death of Gottwald (in the sense of giving an order). And according to medical data, heart failure can occur at a young age. Unfortunately, there is still very little data for a larger analysis. And one can only note the almost simultaneous end of the fate of the two leaders of the international communist movement. But if the course of the illness of one of them (Stalin) was covered in sufficient detail in the press, then there are even discrepancies in the reports of the death of the other. Accident? Or the result of a very strong rush due to some circumstances? There is information that Gottwald was a doctor by education. Let's imagine: a person with a medical education comes to a funeral. He is read medical

conclusion about death, tell how they treated. He analyzes all this, compares it with how the course of the disease should have proceeded, and also compares it with the appearance of the deceased. And if he does not find any contradictions, then this is one situation, but what if he found and asked a question that was inappropriate for his associates? Or did he not ask, but showed by his behavior that he guessed? How should they have reacted? The hypothesis, of course, is interesting, it explains a lot. However, the problem is too complex and multifaceted. After all, on March 5, 1953, not only the fate of one particular person (I.V. Stalin), but also the fate of all mankind (in connection with the Thunderstorm-2 plan for 1954) was decided. And if Stalin's "leaving" was "helped" by his comrades-in-arms, and Gottwald noticed this, then their act can be assessed in different ways - either as the actions of ordinary murderers or as the actions of heroes-conspirators who fought for peace and the life of all mankind. From the point of view of the survival of all mankind, the death of one or two who stood across the road is not a huge tragedy. But a separate chapter will be devoted to the time

after March 5, 1953, and here it is time to return to the events in Eastern Europe and draw some conclusions. In the countries where the Soviet troops entered, Stalin actively promoted the Communists to power and, as the events in Yugoslavia showed, sent a large number of Soviet advisers who not only indicated the direction of economic development, but also tried to link this process with similar events in the USSR. And the attempts of some countries to do something on their own led to a sharply negative reaction from Stalin. Although, from the point of view of peaceful construction, their certain independence could not pose a particular threat to the Soviet Union. There could be a threat only in one case - if these

countries were considered by Stalin as a REAR TERRITORY for future fronts. I propose to dwell briefly on this idea. In addition to administrative access, the rear area plays a very important role in supplying the army in the field. And an even more enormous role in the preparation of an offensive war. The fact is that after breaking through the enemy's defense, supply distances will increase. And the development of science and technology in the 20th century led to the fact that it is necessary to spend very large resources, amounting to thousands of v

weapons, but which at the time in question was still underdeveloped). An example from the Great Patriotic War: for the Belarusian operation in June 1944, more than 1,430 thousand people from four fronts were involved from the Red Army. By the beginning of the operation, it was necessary to accumulate 4 - 5 ammunition shells and mines. And to transport just one, 13,500 freight cars were required. But in addition to shells, the fronts also needed other supplies: fuel, lubricants, food, etc. All this resulted in the need to use thousands of wagons!

In this regard, it is much more profitable to deploy (build) new factories in areas closest to future front lines. It may be recalled here that in the 1930s, and especially in the last two before June 22, 1941, many new military factories in the USSR were built in the western regions. Moreover, by the beginning of the German offensive, they managed to bring in a large amount of strategic raw materials (which later mostly came to the Germans). From the point of view of defense, this is, of course, a state crime. But in the event of a successful campaign of the Red Army, it had to go further and further to the west, thereby lengthening the supply routes. And in this situation, factories located closer to the western border of the USSR would come in handy. Now let us recall

that after the war, Stalin sent many Soviet specialists to the countries of "people's democracy." And the experience of Yugoslavia showed that they tried to pursue a policy that did not always take into account the interests of the host country. Historians paid little attention to this. But here is what Doctor of Sciences N.V. Zagladin wrote on this issue in his book "HISTORY OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF SOVIET DIPLOMACY" (Moscow, 1990): "In Eastern Europe, metallurgical complexes were built that worked on raw materials and fuel brought from the USSR, and products supplied to the USSR. Such an ugly, deformed development was not mutually beneficial or even unilaterally beneficial to the USSR: it was - a unique case in history - mutually unprofitable. Very slowly, from the exchange of finished products, they moved on to coordinating national economic plans, implementing joint projects "(p. 139) .

So, it was UNFAVORABLE for both sides! But still continued to build and operate. For what?

Yugoslavia tried to discuss this problem even at the moment of its appearance and in response received a complete break with the USSR and accusations of fascism. But Stalin, of course, was afraid not only of economic independence. Behind it, an independent policy was visible in general. And he could not allow this, if he was seriously preparing a new war. In mid-1996,

one of D. Volkogonov's programs from the series "SECRETS OF THE OLD SQUARE" dealt with the Soviet Yugoslav conflict. In it, the general noted Stalin's numerous and persistent proposals to the communist leaders of the Eastern European countries to build military factories. Or at least assembly (and from what to assemble, it will be delivered from the USSR). (Stalin always usually recommended: "You stop asking us for weapons. Create your own factory, an aircraft factory, an artillery factory, we will help. Assembly, we will send engines, and you assemble aircraft and the like" (words by D. Volkogonov)). In particular, he gave an example of how Otto Grotewohl asked Stalin to send an orchestra to some German national holiday. "Stalin chuckled: "Music is good. I thought you were asking for weapons. The army is more important "... Then the symphony orchestra went there, but Stalin said that the music is good, and the army is more important. The words are simple, but very symbolic. Stalin still thought until the end of his days in the Comintern spirit" If the new allies of the USSR would have refused to develop its

economy according to Stalin's plans, then everything necessary for the advancing Soviet troops would have to be imported thousands of kilometers away! This is when every ship and long-range aircraft is registered! Of course, the introduction of an occupation regime could serve as a way out here. Apparently, this was the case with respect to Yugoslavia. The remaining countries of the "peace camp" "voluntarily" became allies of the USSR. But it was necessary to prepare and opponents. This will be discussed in the next chapter. 9. WHO STARTED THE

COLD WAR? For a long time, Soviet propaganda aimed the peoples of the USSR at readiness for a possible war with various imperialists. Wherein

it was said that after the victory in 1945, the Western leaders broke off the policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union and very quickly began to prepare a new war. And only the inhuman efforts of the Soviet people in restoring the ruined economy prevented the inevitable. But in addition, it was explained that the enemies of the USSR did not wait and are not waiting for the start of a new "hot" war with folded hands, they organized and are waging a "Cold" war in order to weaken the Soviet Union as much as possible. Of the same opinion

held by historians. For

example, in the period of August-December 1988 on the pages The Pravda newspaper published several articles by various authors:

- first - L. Bezymensky, V. Falin "Who unleashed the Cold War" (August 29); -
- second - J. L. Geddis (USA) "On the past for the sake of the future" - third - O. Rzheshhevsky (no title) (both on October 31) - the fourth - Bernard Greiner (Germany) "Not all cats are

gray" (December 30) In 1989, all of them were included in the collection "PAGES OF SOVIET SOCIETY (facts, problems, people)".

In the first article, a lot of space is given to the description of the declassified AMERICAN plans for waging war against the USSR, which were developed in the USA in 1944-1949. They are cited as the main evidence of the aggressiveness of the United States and the need for a post-war response by the Soviet Union. Yury Zhukov, a well-known political observer for the Pravda newspaper in the past, writes about this in the book "USSR-USA: A ROAD LONG FOR SEVENTY YEARS, or a story about how Soviet-American relations developed" (M., Politizdat, 1988). Yuri Zhukov notes that post-war American plans for waging war

against the USSR were declassified in the late 70s. In particular, they were published in 1978 in New York by Columbia University Press under the title "CONTAINMENT. DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN POLITICS AND STRATEGY (1945-1960)". In other words, in the period of 1945-1953 the public neither in the USA nor in the USSR knew anything about them! And no "response"

such plans simply could not be! Now, if almost immediately after the adoption of another secret aggressive plan in the United States, it would be published in Soviet newspapers, and if a protest were expressed by the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, then in all subsequent years it would be quite fair to mention such a plan as evidence and "aggressiveness" of the United States, and "retaliatory measures" from the USSR.

But the irony lies in the fact that information about one American secret military plan was still published during the period of its secrecy. But not in the Soviet mass media, but in the AMERICAN magazine "COLIERS" in the famous issue of 10/27/1951. It was a special "fantastic" number, which told and showed in great detail how the United States and its allies intend to use atomic weapons to crack down on communism once and for all, and occupy the USSR. Its cover showed an American soldier in a helmet with a rifle at the ready, against the backdrop of a map of the Soviet Union, which marked the cities that would be subjected to atomic bombing. Yu. Zhukov writes that the description of the war against the USSR was a popular presentation of the Dropshot plan (1949). Only the dates were changed - the magazine said that the war would begin not in 1957, but already in 1952. The editors themselves hinted at the existence of this plan, pointing out that in preparing the issue, materials received from military specialists were used.

Its summary (from an article by L. Bezymensky and V. Falin, as well as from a book by Yu. Zhukov): the Americans planned 200 targets in 100 cities of the USSR for 300 atomic and 29,000 tons of conventional bombs. 75-100 atomic bombs were assigned to disable Soviet strategic aviation at airfields. Aircraft were the main means of delivering charges. Of these, the long-range ones were supposed to fly from bases in the northeast of the United States through about. Greenland. At the same time, it was possible to bombard almost the entire European territory of the USSR up to the western coast of the Taimyr Peninsula. Other long-range bombers from bases in Alaska were supposed to fly to targets in Siberia and the Far East of the USSR up to the meridian along the eastern coast of the Taimyr Peninsula. Medium bombers were planned to be used from bases in Western Europe, North Africa and Japan.

Readiness according to the "Dropshot" ("Day-D") plan was scheduled for Sunday

01/01/1957. This is understandable, because before that time, it was necessary to prepare the "main performers" - the B-52 strategic bombers. And in the chapter on airplanes it was already said that this case was lengthy. And no matter how the American designers, engineers and workers were in a hurry, the serial production of the B-52 began in 1954, and they began to enter the troops from 1955. Moreover, judging by the data from the directory, about 90 pieces were made a year. Those. in 1952, the Americans could not start any war with the USSR. You can also recall that the hasty design of the B-52 in the United States began in 1949 AFTER the explosion of the first atomic bomb in the USSR.

From 1945 to 1955, long-range piston-powered bombers remained the main American means of delivering atomic bombs. And although there were many of them, they could not be used against an enemy with enough jet fighters. Under these conditions, bomber crews turned into suicide bombers. Moreover, most of the aircraft could be shot down long before the planned targets, which was clearly shown by the war in Korea. In other words, until 1957 the United States could not attack the USSR due to technical unavailability. And no matter how many targets for the atomic bombing the Americans chose, no matter what attack plans they created, they could only be carried out if the USSR had no air defense systems and there were very few troops, which was not observed. And this should have been understood not only in Washington, but also in Moscow. There is another historical fact showing that the secret military plans of one country cannot be used by historians

to explain some actions of the leadership of another. These are Soviet-German relations in 1940 and in 1941 until June 22. Did Germany have a secret plan to attack the USSR at that time? - Was (the famous "Barbarossa")! And the Soviet Union at the same time was developing plans for waging some kind of war on its western borders. This is stated in some issues of "VIZH" for 1992 ("DID THE USSR PREPARE A PREVENTIVE STRIKE?" (N: 1, 4-5); "THE STRONG FACTS OF THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR" (N: 2)). And also a former specialist of the General

the headquarters of the Red Army of that time A. Vasilevsky ("THE MATTER OF ALL LIFE").

Was there a Cold War between these countries? - Did not have! There was even a treaty of friendship and a border! There was an active trade, exchange delegations of specialists, etc.

Moreover, by June 13, 1941, the Soviet leadership had a mass of intelligence information proving that German troops would attack any day (not to mention the text of the Barbarossa plan itself). The German ambassador himself announced in advance the exact date of the start of the war! But for some reason, TASS, in its well-known statement of that day, considered that there was no threat to the USSR! Incredible! German tank divisions deployed their barrels on the very Soviet-German border, aerial bombs were laid on the ground, local residents were evicted from the border area, military hospitals were hastily prepared, and the Soviet leadership did not see anything threatening at all! After all, this is not waving paper newspapers with Churchill's speech across the ocean, but preparing a mass of enemy troops on their own border!? And no "Cold War"?! For many years, Soviet historians explained this by the weakness of the Red Army, which was in the process of reorganization, which forced Stalin to delay

the start of hostilities as much as possible. But any competent military man can notice that the reorganization of troops is a constant process. Military equipment is constantly being improved, new types of weapons appear. And the troops must be ready for defense at any moment and with any available weapons. That is what the General Staff exists for, in order to correctly manage the process of reorganization and not weaken the defense, especially at the borders. The real reason for the military defeats in 1941 and the absence of a Cold War with Germany turned out to be something else.

But this is not my topic. In our case from 1941, it is useful to recall the ratio of the readiness of the troops of both future belligerents and the work of propaganda to cover them. At that time, the troops of the potential enemy (the Germans) not only had a secret plan, but also put it into practice (they went to the initial border area and prepared a surprise attack). And Soviet propaganda was FORBIDDEN to say anything about these preparations. (Although,

there is evidence that in the immediate vicinity of the date 06/22/1941, Soviet ideologists sometimes began to hint at the "bad" behavior of the Germans, especially in the army, but this does not change the overall picture).

As shown above, post-war explanations for such behavior are not entirely satisfactory. On the other hand, some researchers insist that the Soviet troops at that time were doing the same thing as the Germans - they were advancing to the border starting areas for a surprise attack. This reason may well explain the passivity of the Soviet ideologists. Otherwise, after all, one could run into mutual accusations: "And you yourself are like that!"

Ultimately, it turns out that the secret plans of one state, declassified after many years, cannot serve as evidence of any "retaliatory actions" of those countries against which they were drawn up. We must look for other explanations.

To do this, it is useful to consider the question: under what conditions can one speak of propaganda about someone's aggressive preparation for war?

These conditions can be one of two things: - the

country does not want to fight, the troops are engaged in planned defense preparations, and the neighbors are deploying their armies, withdrawing them to their original areas, mobilizing them;

- the country's leadership wants to fight, but it is not very convenient to attack first, and the neighbors do not want to start a big war with heavy possible losses and keep their armies in "winter quarters" in peaceful states, while at the same time performing various defense measures.

Post-war Soviet ideologists, and then historians, unconditionally insisted that only the first of them existed for the USSR after 1945: the Soviet Union is the most active fighter for peace, while the bloodthirsty imperialists are preparing a new world war. And in all the works devoted to the "Cold War",

the USA, Great Britain and "their accomplices" were indicated as its founders. And for its beginning, Soviet historians took Churchill's speech in Fulton (USA). For example, the "BRIEF POLITICAL DICTIONARY" (Moscow, Politizdat, 1988, p. 451) says:

- "Cold War" (hereinafter referred to as "H.V.") - the term was used after the Second World War to characterize the policy of the imperialist states towards the Soviet Union and

other socialist countries. Politics "XV" was dictated by the interests of the most reactionary forces in the US and other Western countries... The world of socialism received a speech by the English politician W. Churchill in Fulton (USA) on March 5, 1946, in which, in essence, the XV program was outlined. In 1947, he also came up with a project to create a Western European military alliance against the USSR ... For H.V. characteristic: the threat of the use of force, the desire for diktat, the economic blockade and subversive activities against the socialist states, the all-out forcing of the arms race and military preparations, the desire to use the achievements of science and technology for military purposes, the creation of aggressive blocs and alliances, the fanning of anti-communist propaganda, which is acquiring character "psychological warfare". "X.v." and the foreign policy concepts and doctrines it generated - the policy "from a position of strength", "rejection of communism", "balancing on the brink of war" and others - were dictated by the interests of the most reactionary monopoly circles in the capitalist countries. As a result of the policy of "XV." international tension persisted for a long period, the threat of a new world war ...

For reference: the term "Cold War" was first used by American financier and presidential adviser Bernard Baruch during a debate in the US Congress in 1947 ("THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA", Vol. 3, 15th edition, 1986, p. 444) Churchill delivered his speech on 5 March 1946. But it

turns out that on February 22 of the same year, J. Kennan, an American charge d'affaires in Moscow, sent a "long telegram" of 8,000 words to Washington. L. Bezymensky and V. Falin mention this in their article. They write that J. Kennan "figured out" the intention of the USSR to destroy the harmony of American society and proposed to turn the Soviet Union into a scarecrow, to reduce all relations with it to a minimum. At the same time, however, it is not indicated what served as the source for the "calculations" of the American diplomat. There must have been some reason that led him to

conclusions? It's hard to believe that the chargé d'affaires was "out of his

mind." D. Volkogonov writes about this more frankly in his book "TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY" (pp.

480-481): J. Kennan argued that the Soviet leaders consider a third world war "inevitable" ... Stalin's speech in February 1946 at the election meeting - quite calm and even peace-loving, the West perceived almost as a challenge ... "

After such confessions, objectivity requires familiarization with the original source itself, i.e. with Stalin's speech. He uttered it at the pre-election meeting of voters of the Stalinist electoral district of Moscow on February 9, 1946. It was published in the newspaper Pravda the next day - in the Sunday issue of February 10 (on the day of the elections

themselves). In that election campaign, as usual, several of the most famous top leaders were nominated in many districts, often in tandem with another candidate and for some reason in January 1946, although the elections were scheduled by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR as early as 10/6/1945. But one candidate had to run in only one constituency. Therefore, they had to make a choice, about which an "open letter" was printed in the Pravda newspaper. After him, from the end of January, pre-election meetings began to take place. At the beginning of February, the Pravda newspaper (perhaps in others too) published speeches by candidates from the top leadership of the Soviet Union. And the closer the election day of February 10 came, the higher the place in the state hierarchy was occupied by the one whose speech was printed. Thus, Stalin's speech turned out to be the last and was printed on the day of the elections themselves.

He began his speech with a reminder that 8 years have passed since the previous ones, half of which fell on the war. Stalin then analyzed its causes. He said that, according to Marxist scientific theory, "the capitalist system of the world economy is fraught with elements of a general crisis and military clashes, that in view of this, the development of world capitalism in our time is not taking place in the form of

smooth and even advance, but through crises and military catastrophes." Then Stalin says that there might not have been wars "if it were possible to periodically redistribute raw materials and markets between countries in accordance with their economic weight - in the order of adopting agreed and peaceful solutions. But this is impossible under the current capitalist conditions for the development of the world economy. "Having put forward such an idea,

Stalin reinforced it with facts from history. First, he recalled the first crisis of the capitalist system of the world economy, which resulted in the First World War. And then he recalled the second, which led to World War II. After that, Stalin moved on to the results of the war for the Soviet Union.

The main of them he noted simply victory. But then he listed its components. He attributed to them: - the victory of the Soviet social system, which turned out to be "a

completely viable and stable form of organization society"; - the fact that "the Soviet social system turned out to be more viable and stable than

the non-Soviet social system, that the Soviet social system is a better form of organizing society than any non-Soviet social system"; - a complete solution of the national question in the USSR, where " the national question and the problem of the cooperation of nations is solved better than in any other multinational state";

- the power of the Red Army.

But victory could not be achieved without preliminary preparation of the entire country for active defense, i.e. without the necessary level of economic development. To this, Stalin attributed the industrialization of industry and the collectivization of agriculture. Then he solemnly listed how much of what weapons had been produced, after which he moved on to plans for the future. The main task of the

new five-year plan for 1946-1950, he called the restoration of the affected areas with the overlap of the pre-war level of production. And in the future it is necessary to surpass the pre-war level three times. "Only under this condition

we can assume that our Motherland will be guaranteed against any accidents" (Stormy applause). As you

can see, Stalin did not directly call for war. He only reminded, as it were, the "scientific conclusion of scientific" Marxism about the periodic crisis of the "worst non-Soviet" social systems, which "necessarily" lead to world wars. And then he simply listed the crises that had already taken place (the first and second), the result of which was precisely the world wars, the last of which had just ended. And then he reminded that such "bad" states still exist, thus hinting that the next crisis is not far off (with a corresponding continuation in the form of a world war). From this statement, Stalin quite naturally deduced the main task of the

development of the Soviet economy - "to guarantee the country against any accidents." More understandably, this means the priority development of the military-industrial. There can be no other understanding, and the speech did not mention any improvement in the well-being of the citizens of the country of the Soviets. This goal, as it were, was relegated to the distant future, at a time when there would be no "bad" capitalist countries left on Earth. On the other hand, the idea is quite clearly traced that as long as there are "non-Soviet" countries on the planet, the main task of the USSR is to produce many tanks, aircraft, guns, machine guns, millions of cartridges for them, etc. Thus, Stalin's pre-election speech can be called

"rather calm", but it is difficult to attribute it to "peace-loving". And what could the American envoy J. Kennan distort when he asserted that the Soviet leaders consider a third world war "inevitable"? Yes, they do. Stalin spoke about this almost directly, formulating this idea, however, not with his own opinion, but with the "scientific theory of Marxism."

And how could the West accept the proposal of the first head of a major power to triple its industry, especially the military? How completely peaceful? Indeed, Stalin's speech was

printed in huge circulation in the main Soviet newspaper. Diplomats of other countries could read it not only in Moscow. There should have been comments. And they appeared. In "PRAVDA" for February 17 (there was no speech yet

Churchill in Fulton!) was placed "International Review", signed "Observer". It first cites the commendable opinion of the American columnist Steele, who said:

"Stalin's speech showed that the goals of the Soviet Union were industrial development and peace. Despite the distortions of Stalin's statement by American newspapers, this speech reflects the intentions of the Russians to restore the economy for peaceful purposes." And then the

review says the following: "One cannot ignore

the reference contained in Steele's statement, confirmed in the Christian Science Monitor, about the distortion by some American newspapers of Comrade Stalin's speech. However, we have to state that the notorious Walter Lippman, whom the prominent American publicist Willard aptly called "their own big business ex-socialist", slipped into the same path of distorting Comrade Stalin's speech.

Walter Lippmann distorted and distorted the speech of Comrade. Stalin. He declared that no measures would supposedly be taken in the USSR to raise the standard of living of the population and that the industrial construction program of the USSR was nothing but a "program of rearmament."

Lippmann distorts the facts in order to justify his position as the herald of a new arms race directed against the USSR. Not only does he call on the United States to start an intensified arms race, he recommends that, under the auspices of the United States, the countries of Western Europe and Asia be involved in this adventure, because "the United States alone cannot provide the main armies of democracy" ... imperialist plans All these should serve to "resist the Soviet Union"..." By the way, Churchill, in his speech in Fulton, also analyzed Stalin's

actions. D. Volkogonov in his book "TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY" writes about it this way (pp. militant... Churchill warned that the "Red Menace" hung over the Western democracies... [that] "from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended over the European continent." Here is the former prime minister

was close to the truth. Immediately after the war, Stalin took a number of energetic steps aimed at reducing all contacts with the West. "Soviet historians

for a long time practically did not remember Stalin's speech. But here is what is written about it in the journal "History of the USSR", N: 1 for 1991, p. 161 (in the article by M. Belousov "M. M. LITVINOV ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE USSR AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR"): - In the USA, the statements of J. V. Stalin in his election speech on February 9, 1946 were extremely negatively perceived that "the capitalist system of the world economy is fraught with elements of a general crisis and military clashes" ... As follows from the notes of J. Forrestal, then the Secretary of the Navy of the United States, even a member of the US Supreme Court, W. Douglas, known for his liberal reputation called Stalin's speech "a declaration of a third world war", and Forrestal himself repeatedly referred to it in support of his idea that "the coexistence of democracy and communism is impossible."

However, after Churchill's speech in Fulton, the interaction between the leadership of the United States, England and France with the USSR did not stop. The international tribunal in Nuremberg continued. Meetings of the Ministerial Council of Foreign Affairs - the Council of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA, England and France were being prepared to develop peace treaties with Germany's former allies. The US has been reducing its military and defense spending. JL Geddis (USA), in his article "On the Past for the Sake of the Future" (PRAVDA, October 31, 1988), notes that President Truman "was optimistic about the prospects for concluding agreements with Stalin."

The fact that Churchill's speech in Fulton could not be the beginning of the Cold War is directly noted by N.V. Zagladin, Doctor of Historical Sciences, in his book "HISTORY OF SUCCESS AND FAIL IN SOVIET DIPLOMACY":

"Of course, Churchill's speech evoked a great response in the world. Nevertheless, it seems not entirely accurate to define it as the beginning (or official announcement) of the Cold War. The ex-premier spoke in Fulton, who, neither before the war nor after it, did not hide his antipathy towards the USSR ... It was necessary to take into account that the views of Churchill

back in the 1945 elections, the majority of the British rejected it, and Truman, who was present in Fulton, did not agree with the assessments of the former British prime minister. The British Labor cabinet also distanced itself from them" (p. 141). Zagladin

further hints that Stalin himself played an important role in Churchill's speech and cites his statements from the March issues of the Pravda newspaper for 1946, for example: "Undoubtedly, Mr. . Churchill is setting for war, a call for war with the USSR. "And only in September 1946,

Truman's opinion changed to the point that" his hopes for cooperation finally collapsed. "At the same time, Truman ordered the report of his assistant for naval affairs Clark to be classified Clifford "with a very critical assessment of how the Soviet Union treated its obligations under wartime agreements" (this information is given in J. L. Geddis's article "On the Past for the Name of the Future")

In the book "USSR-USA..." Clifford's report is described in more detail. It turned out that he, too, was declassified and published in the already mentioned book "CONTAINMENT. DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN POLICY (1945-1960)". Yu. Zhukov writes:

- Of particular interest is the report "American Relations with the Soviet Union" cited in this collection, presented to the President on September 24, 1946, prepared by a specially created council headed by Clark M. Clifford. This report has been tentatively approved by the Secretary of State, the War and Navy Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Counterintelligence, and other officials and agencies. How was the question of the development of relations with the USSR after the war raised in this report? The authors begin by lamenting the supposed threat posed by the Soviet Union to the United States. As if the leaders of the Soviet Union believe that "war with the United States and other leading capitalist nations is inevitable", and therefore "increase their military power", expand the sphere of Soviet influence, preparing for the "inevitable" conflict. And then the authors of the report, with the utmost frankness, set out the developed by them

the concept of preparing and waging war against the USSR as a "response to the Soviet threat". The fact

that Stalin himself announced the inevitability of another crisis in the capitalist countries with a subsequent war has already been mentioned above. But he said it on February 9th. Churchill spoke at Fulton on 5 March. In February, comments on Stalin's speech were printed in the Western press. And Truman's hopes for cooperation with the USSR for some reason "collapsed" only in September! Did anything happen in international life between March and September 1946? Happened! And not even from March 1946, but from 1945!

First, there were complications in the relations of the USSR with Iran, Turkey, Greece and Italy. Secondly, in 1946, meetings of the Ministerial Council were held (from April 25 to May 16 and from June 15 to July 12 in Paris), and from July 29 to October 15, a peace conference was held there in Paris with the participation of delegations from 21 countries.

Problems in relations with Turkey arose at the beginning of 1945, when on March 19 the Soviet government denounced the treaty of friendship and neutrality with this country dated 12/17/1925, "as not corresponding to the new situation and in need of serious improvement." I must say that this is a strange

wording. If any new problems arise in relations between countries, then a joint commission is usually created to solve them, which develops proposals either to improve the existing agreement (for example, through the method of additional protocols), or may propose a version of a new agreement. No denunciation of the old is required. If it was used, then this can be considered as a provocation of the 1st class. And any first-class provocation assumes that the opposite side must take some steps in the direction necessary for the provocateurs. And so it happened.

The Turkish side, naturally, got worried, wanted to know the reasons for such an attitude and offered to start negotiations. They were held in Moscow in June 1945. The question was about the conclusion of a new treaty of friendship. The Soviet side, as a preliminary condition, offered Turkey to return to Georgia and Armenia their territories in the Caucasus (regions of Kars, Artvin and

Ardagan). In addition, the Soviet side proposed to revise in the direction of strengthening the rights of the Soviet Union the convention on the Black Sea straits, concluded in 1935 in the Swiss city of Montreux. And only after that Stalin was ready to sign a new friendship treaty with Turkey. But the Turkish government did not agree and complained to England to Churchill. Naturally, these issues became the subject of

discussion at the Berlin (Potsdam) conference in the summer of 1945. But on it, Stalin did not seek a final decision on Turkey, but at least the consent and support of England and the United States to his "fair" demands. Including for the transfer of these issues to the decision of the Ministerial Council (Council of Foreign Ministers).

The British and US delegations were first explained the Soviet territorial claims to the southern neighbor by the need to conclude a new treaty of friendship. Then Stalin tried to draw an analogy with Western Belarus and Western Ukraine. But the allies declared that there was no "Curzon Line" in the Caucasus. Then Stalin explained that these lands were lost in 1921 due to the weakness of the Soviet Union. But it was a FALSE! And Churchill and Truman are
knew.

On the contrary, Türkiye in 1921 was in a very desperate situation. In 1919-1922, the little-known Greco-Turkish War was fought. The Entente countries promised the Greek government significant territorial gains at the expense of its eastern neighbor. In this regard, the Greek troops landed in Izmir and by the summer of 1921 moved deep into Anatolia (central Turkey) to the Sakarya River, almost to Ankara. Istanbul, of course, was also occupied. Under these conditions, power changed in the country, which was taken over by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, headed by Kemal Atatürk. It needed help, which it could only try to get in Moscow, since all other European countries were either its opponents or were in a state of defeat, like itself. Moscow provided assistance - a significant amount of weapons, ammunition, equipment and money (over 10 million rubles in gold). On March 16, 1921, an agreement between the RSFSR and Turkey

"On Friendship and Brotherhood" was signed in Moscow, and on October 13, 1921,

treaties between Turkey and the Soviet republics of Transcaucasia. And as everyone can understand, getting acquainted with that situation in detail, at that moment anything could be demanded from her government in payment. Why Lenin did not take advantage of this is a special question, we will not consider it here.

Somehow a very long time ago, in the early 70s, I happened to be next to a map of the USSR in the presence of a school history teacher. After running my hand along the border in the Caucasus and just asking about the loss of Kars, I suddenly heard from him a strange opinion that Lenin himself gave away the Kars region. And he argued this idea with something, but I don't remember the details, but I

remember the main idea. Be that as it may, having received help and stopped the Greek armies in 1921, the Turkish troops went on the offensive and by the end of 1923 liberated the country (10/23/1923 they entered Istanbul). And in December 1925, a new treaty "On Friendship and Neutrality" was

concluded between the USSR and Turkey. Knowing such history, it is not serious to say that in 1921 Turkey took advantage of someone's weakness. This is reminiscent of a provocation. And the question arises: why did Stalin need to complicate relations with her in 1945? Soviet ideologists did not want to answer him. Moreover, on May 30, 1953 (already after the death of the tyrant), the Soviet government abandoned its demands on Turkey. Including about the straits (by

recognizing the Montreux Convention). And what did Stalin not like about it? The convention allowed only Turkey to control the passage of ships through the straits. At the same time, civilian ships could freely pass at any time. And the Soviet Union could conduct military freely only in peacetime. In case of war, it depended on the decision of the Turkish government.

After Stalin's death, such conditions suited the Soviet Union quite well, but during his life after 1944, for some reason, this order turned out to be unacceptable. Stalin compared it with the rights of the Japanese emperor and sought a revision, including through the deployment of Soviet troops on the straits. The Western allies did not agree to such a decision. And the persistent claims of the USSR on these issues then resulted in the creation of American military bases in Turkey, which, in turn, served as a reason for

US accusations of aggressive actions against the Soviet Union. So who provoked whom? In addition,

it turns out that at the Potsdam Conference, Stalin also tried to consider the issue of Tangier, a city and port in northwestern Africa, at the entrance to the Strait of Gibraltar. In 1940, he was captured by Spain. Stalin proposed making the Tangier zone international by taking it away from Spain. A good reason for this would be to accuse the Franco government of complicity with the Nazis. But the Western allies in Potsdam did not agree to this. They admitted that the USSR might have claims against Franco for sending the "Blue Division" to the eastern front. But they stated that he had not committed any hostile actions against the Anglo-American forces. And also, at the Potsdam

Conference, the Soviet delegation repeatedly raised the issue of "trust territories", which meant Italy's colonies in Africa. By that time they were all occupied by England (as a result of fighting). Moreover, Churchill specifically emphasized that ALL the colonies of Italy were liberated precisely by Her Majesty's troops, to which he received a sarcastic remark from Truman with a clarifying question: "ALL?" (apparently, remembering the American aid to England). But then the US president showed no interest in this topic. Churchill was surprised that this situation was of interest to anyone else present and refused to discuss it in detail. In the end, the issue of the Italian colonies was referred to the peace talks that took place in 1946 (and in which the USSR "fought" with Italy for the longest time!). If you connect the Black Sea straits, the north of Libya and Tangier with one line, then Stalin's concern for free access to the

Atlantic Ocean is visible. But why did he need it after a cruel war? For prestige? What is there to argue about, if there were no problems for civilian ships - swim wherever you want. Problems could only arise with warships and in wartime.

But you can also get into the Atlantic Ocean from the Baltic Sea (but also through a number of straits). Did Stalin care about this path? At the Potsdam Conference, the situation with the northern straits was not considered, but there is a two-volume book "ECONOMIC LIFE

USSR", volume (book) one, 1917-1950 (M., 1967). It gives a brief list of various events, including the dates of signing various treaties. Looking through some articles about 1946, I came across a message about the signing in July-August of two treaties between the USSR and Denmark (on trade and navigation). By themselves, of course, this information does not say anything. But they were followed by a TASS report on September 3 about the protest of the Soviet government against attempts by the US government to interfere in trade negotiations between the USSR and Sweden on the conclusion of a long-term trade agreement (signed on October 7, 1946) "Aha!" - I thought - "apparently, Stalin is working on ensuring access to the Atlantic Ocean from the Baltic Sea! But then there should also be an agreement with Norway!" And exactly, the book is followed by information about the signing on December 27, 1946 of an agreement between the USSR and Norway on trade and payments ... So what bothered Stalin in the mid-40s? Establishment of a long and lasting peace on earth?

The next significant event in international life after Potsdam was the Paris peace talks, which Soviet historians did not like to recall. The head of the Soviet delegation to them was

Molotov, the United States - Secretary of State Byrnes, Great Britain - Bevin, France - Bidault. Roy Medvedev's book **THEY SURROUNDED STALIN** (Moscow, Politizdat, 1990) cites an interesting memoir by the diplomat Charles Bohlen: "... Molotov was an excellent bureaucrat...

the eyes of other foreign ministers. Once in Paris, when Molotov was delaying the agreement because he stumbled over procedural questions, I heard him repeat for four hours one phrase: "The Soviet delegation will not allow the conference to be turned into a rubber stamp" - and rejected all attempts by Byrnes and Bevin to bring

positions.

Roy Medvedev adds: "In

the sense that he tirelessly pursued his goal, he can be called a skilled diplomat. He never pursued his own policy, Stalin made a policy; Molotov put it into practice."

Yuri Zhukov was then at these meetings in Paris as a special correspondent for the Pravda newspaper. In his book, he does not list in detail what issues were discussed, what was proposed by different delegations; only notes that the negotiations were "extremely slow. Literally,

sharp disagreements flared up on every article of the draft peace treaties under discussion ... The Vois de Paris newspaper reported that the United States intends to base its policy on the idea of "dividing the world into two camps" - one they will lead a group of states, and the USSR will lead the other. People are well aware that the division of the world into two camps is fraught with the most dangerous consequences, up to the unleashing of a third world war with the use of atomic weapons ... Someone behind the scenes is again trying to disrupt the negotiations in order to further open the way to separate agreements between the Western powers and their dependent states on a post-war settlement, which would mean a break in cooperation with the Soviet Union and a return to the tense international situation that existed in the 1920s and 1930s...

In the course of the discussion at the meetings [of the peace conference] and in the procedural commission, a disengagement takes place: who is with whom and who is against whom. On one side of the delegation of the USSR, Ukraine, Belarus, Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, ... on the other - the USA, England, France and countries that sent military contingents to the Western Front September 23, 1946 was to resume work in New York, the first session of the UN General Assembly. It had to be postponed ... In the Luxembourg Palace, the commissions charged with considering draft peace treaties worked tensely, sometimes all day long. Only on October 7, 1946 [they], with numerous amendments, clarifications and additions, were submitted to the plenary sessions. The final stage lasted another 8 days. It took place in the same tense atmosphere of confrontation between the United States and its supporters, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and the delegations supporting it, on the other... The conference failed to reach an agreement only on a peaceful settlement with Italy. This was done at the third session of the Foreign Ministers in New York (4.11-12.12.1946). As a result, peaceful

treaties with all the former allies of Nazi Germany in Europe were signed in Paris on February 10, 1947.

By the way, about Italy. Of course, in connection with the participation of Italian troops in the eastern campaign of the Germans, the USSR could have different claims to this country. But judging by the above description, during the negotiations there was something that the West could not agree to. This apparently concerned the fate of the Italian colonies in Africa. Zagladin confirms in his book that back in 1945, at a conference in Potsdam, Stalin made a proposal to establish a guardianship regime over the colonial possessions of Italy in Africa (which did not exclude the provision of the corresponding territories to the USSR). And he notes that Soviet diplomacy, despite the more than cool reaction of the West, repeatedly turned to this issue later. The "consequence" was precisely the negotiations on a peace treaty with Italy. Why

did Stalin need colonies on the southern coast of the Mediterranean? It is possible that, among other things, to increase pressure on Turkey to agree to the deployment of Soviet troops on the Bosphorus and in the Dardanelles (with the rationale for a more guaranteed supply of Soviet troops in Libya).

However, Stalin did not receive a colony in Africa. But at the beginning of 1946, a conflict situation arose around Iran, in the northern half of which Soviet troops had been stationed since 1941. A brief review of these events is given by Zagladin in his book on pp. 140-141.

The fact is that the Soviet and British troops that were in Iran to prevent its capture by the Axis powers had to be withdrawn. When the threat had passed, there was no reason to delay them. If the Soviet Union had not planned something in this region, then no complications could have arisen. But in December 1945 (still in the presence of Soviet troops) a national government was formed in Iranian Azerbaijan, which proclaimed autonomy and readiness to recognize only those measures of the central Tehran government that did not contradict its laws. In addition, reforms of the people's democratic type began to be carried out, including the partial transfer of landlord and state lands to the peasants. Simultaneously and

unexpectedly, Iranian Kurdistan proclaimed national autonomy, where similar reforms began. I draw your attention

to the similarity of the situation in Iran during this period to the future situation in Korea. This is clearly visible! What kind of world peace are we talking about if already in 1946 Stalin was eager to create a hotbed of tension! Fortunately, he did not manage to develop it then. The Western powers assessed the possible consequences in time, correctly seeing behind them the preparation of the USSR for the dismemberment of Iran through the "reunification" of Azerbaijan and the creation of an independent Kurdish state allied with the Soviet Union. Considering that the Kurds lived both in Turkey (to which the USSR had territorial claims) and in Iraq, which was then in the sphere of influence of England, London regarded the policy of the USSR as creating a threat to the main oil production areas in the Middle East. The question of Iran was raised by Western diplomacy at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in December 1945, and then submitted to the UN for consideration. From the United States, through secret channels, followed the first ever threat to use nuclear weapons if the USSR did not respect the territorial integrity of Iran. For reference: On July 9, 1945, the Transcaucasian Military District was divided into two: Baku (Azerbaijan SSR and Dagestan ASSR) and Tbilisi.

The crisis around Iran reached its peak in March 1946 (when Churchill's speech was made). But then the Soviet troops began to withdraw from there. However, the complete abandonment of the planned plans did not happen. In April, the USSR signed an agreement with Iran on the creation of a mixed Soviet-Iranian society for the exploration and exploitation of oil fields in northern Iran for a period of 50 years. In June, the central government of Iran signed an agreement with representatives of the democratic government of Iranian Azerbaijan on granting local autonomy to this province. (05/06/1946 Baku and Tbilisi military districts were again united into one Transcaucasian military district). "The West was not

slow to launch a counterattack. In August, large forces of British troops were transferred to Iraq, which deployed along the border with Iran to provide moral support. The United States urgently provided the central government of this country

military assistance. At the end of 1946, Iranian troops entered Iranian Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, liquidating their autonomy. As a result, in 1947, Tehran terminated the agreement concluded with the USSR on the joint exploitation of oil resources "(Zagladin's book, p. 142). But the escalation of

tension, during which the front lines of the third world war were actually outlined, continued. USSR with Turkey. In a note dated August 7, 1946, the Soviet Union no longer proposed, but demanded from it a revision of the regime of the Black Sea straits on the basis of agreements only between the Black Sea powers. The Turkish government once again rejected the clause on

joint defense. In response, Soviet diplomacy increased pressure. On September 24, 1946, the government of the USSR demanded to expedite the revision of the regime for the passage of ships through the Black Sea straits.

Naturally, such actions of the Soviet Union strongly resembled the policy of the USSR towards Finland on the eve of the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939. In addition, the ruling circles of the Western countries were concerned about the events in Greece, where the communists, refusing to take part in the elections organized under the control of the British and Americans, began an armed struggle for power at the end of 1946. It was well known that the insurgent forces were receiving aid from Soviet allied Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. To consider this issue in December 1946, a commission of the UN Security Council was created, but it did not come to any results. Thus, the aggravation of the world situation

immediately after the war occurred not so much because of the "crisis of capitalism" as because of the participation of the USSR in them, because the Soviet Union "pushed" them. But this could only be done on purpose. And the main "architect" of such a policy was Stalin. However, his bet on crises in the capitalist world with subsequent world wars was not a post-war invention. It has been the core of the entire policy of the Soviet leadership since the 1920s. It began to take on special significance from the mid-1930s, by the end of which it became generally the determining condition for the activity of the USSR both within the country and on the world stage.

In 1991, in the journal "KNOWLEDGE-POWER" (N: 6 and 7), an article by the candidate of legal sciences M. Buromensky "AUGUST 1939: THE TURN WHICH DID NOT EXIST" was published. In it, the author explains that in August 1939 there was no change in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union (due to the signing of the Soviet-German treaty):

"... In fact, the non-aggression pact of 1939 was not the result of some unexpected turn in the foreign policy of the USSR... To look for a turn means to look for a different policy. The treaty was a natural continuation of the foreign policy of the USSR of the two previous decades and is significant only because that, starting with him, she became frankly immoral. After there was an agreement with Germany on friendship and borders, there were joint military parades with the Wehrmacht on the occupied lands, congratulations to Hitler on the capture of European capitals. Only June 22, 1941 put an end to all this ..

Buromensky writes that Stalin generally denied the peaceful way of carrying out socialist revolutions. And the emergence of revolutionary situations was necessarily associated with wars, especially world ones. Accordingly, the entire foreign policy of the USSR consisted in "balancing over the abyss." Moreover, it was continued in domestic policy to prepare its own population for possible participation in the coming battles.

So, already in the "SHORT COURSE OF HISTORY OF THE CPSU(B)", first published in the fall of 1938, it was stated that the world war had already begun! The fascist ruling circles of Germany, Italy and Japan fought in it against the capitalist interests of England, France and the USA. Including it was explained that the Spanish war was waged by the fascist states against England and France!

And how much has changed in this matter in 1945? One group of aggressive states suffered defeat. But the capitalist system remained. Moreover, the main industrialized countries continued to be capitalist: England, France, the USA, Italy, Japan, most of Germany. Those. the task that Stalin wanted to solve, at least in Europe, was never solved. Therefore, there was no reason to change the pre-war foreign and domestic policy.

And for this it was necessary to CONSCIOUSLY abandon the policy of cooperation with the United States and other Western allies, established during the war. Which is what has been actively done. Moreover, even then there were people in the USSR who were able to draw just such a conclusion. For example, Maxim Litvinov, former People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR in the 1930s and former Soviet Ambassador to the United States in 1941-1943, who in June 1946 was still

listed as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. In the already mentioned article by M. Belousov "M. M. LITVINOV ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE USSR AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR" (in the journal "History of the USSR", No. 1, 1991) it is said that on June 21, 1946 Union W. Smith sent a top secret telegram N: 861.0016-2146 to the Secretary of State of the United States. In it, he reported that on June 18, a correspondent for the American Columbia Broadcasting System agency, Hotellett, interviewed Litvinov. But since Litvinov was very frank, Hotelett did not use the information received for publication, but passed it on to the American ambassador. Here are some quotes from this telegram:

"Discussing the international situation, Litvinov said that there was nothing good in the future, and, in his opinion, the differences between East and West had gone too far and could not be reconciled. When asked about the reasons, he replied that, from his point of view, in based on the ideological concept that prevails here [in the USSR] that war between the communist and capitalist worlds is inevitable... He said that he was an outside observer and was pleased with his non-participation... Hotellett asked if there would be less suspicion that, seems to motivate Soviet policy to a greater extent if the West unexpectedly gave in and agreed with all the demands of the Russians, say, on the issue of Trieste, Italian colonies, etc. [at the Ministerial Council talks and the peace conference], would it lead this is to ease the tension. He said that this would lead the West to then face the next series of demands ... Litvinov, on his own initiative, suggested that nothing could be done within the totalitarian state to change it ... At the end of the conversation, Litvinov emphasized that he was

a private person and expresses his personal views." [In July 1946 he was released from work in the Foreign Ministry].

Thus, by September 1946, US President Truman already had enough information both about the direction of the USSR's foreign policy and about the practical actions of Soviet leaders and diplomats. But several more months passed before he openly presented his assessment of the actions of the Soviet Union in his message to the US Congress of March 12, 1947 (which then became known as the "Truman Doctrine" and which Soviet propaganda has long used as evidence of US aggressiveness and the need for "retaliatory measures " THE USSR). Truman devoted the main place in his "Message" to the situation around Greece and Turkey

and described it as creating a threat to US security. He stated that inaction on the part of Washington would have far-reaching consequences in both East and West. The president asked for congressional approval for the allocation of aid to Greece and Turkey, including sending American civilian and military personnel to these countries. Thus, for the first time, it was recorded that US security interests required the "containment" of the USSR and its allied forces. At the same time, the course towards the split of Germany and, apparently, Austria was also visible. In particular, the United States, England and France proposed dividing Germany into separate regions -

"lands", which then were to form a federation of German states. And the USSR was categorically against this idea and insisted on the restoration of a single German state. At the same time, negotiations on the German and Austrian issues dragged on. Subsequently, the policy of intractability of the Soviet Union led to the fact that peace treaties with Germany and Austria were never prepared during Stalin's lifetime, and the United States was forced to conclude a separate agreement with West Germany. Here

it is appropriate to recall that Stalin refused to sign the peace treaty that had been drawn up with Japan. Did he really not understand that such actions serve only one cause - the cause of whipping up international tension? Really it was impossible to agree on compromise variants? After all, everyone recognizes that any signed agreement, even if it is not

fully satisfies the signatory parties, is still many times better than the absence of an agreement, especially on important unresolved multilateral issues! The actions of the USSR in the

international arena after the death of Stalin show that there could not have been a post-war confrontation in the negotiations on peace treaties. This is proved by the Soviet Union's attempts to put its signature on the peace treaty with Japan. But the United States, after all the "mockery" of international politics, declared a categorical refusal, because of which the Soviet government was forced to sign a truce, which turned out to be worse than it would have been in the case of the treaty.

Moreover, I had to "caress" the Japanese, promising to return the two southern Kuril Islands to them. In addition, after the death of Stalin, a peace treaty with Austria was developed and signed. This shows that before March 1953, most of the

international proposals from the United States and its allies for some reason turned out to be unacceptable to the USSR. And after that date, many of them became quite suitable, although the arms race intensified and the confrontation of the superpowers continued.

By the way, in March 1953, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A. Vyshinsky was demoted to Deputy Minister of this department and Permanent Representative of the USSR to the UN. And after his death on November 22, 1954 (in New York during the dictation of his speech for a scheduled meeting of the General Assembly), another diplomat was appointed to the UN from the USSR (Moreover, there was a slight embarrassment that day. An American was hidden in the chair of the Soviet mission to the UN microphone. The Americans determined that something happened to the Soviet delegation, called by phone and offered help. The Soviet mission was surprised, assured that help was not needed, but they could not save Vyshinsky - his heart gave out). V. Molotov was again appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union in 1953. The removal of Vyshinsky from the post of head of the Foreign Ministry can be regarded as a step by the USSR towards reducing international

Vyshinsky was a proven conductor of the most odious steps of Stalin's policy. In addition, he could deliver long propaganda speeches. He became Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1949, replacing Molotov, who was also a proven guide

Stalinist policy. However, in 1949, Stalin, for some reason, needed a very good propagandist as head of the Foreign Ministry.

Vyshinsky coped with this task. His speeches at the UN General Assembly were so long that they did not fit in one issue of the Pravda newspaper, they had to be printed in several issues (with a continuation). But if you

take a closer look at the foreign policy steps of the Soviet Union at that time, then the emergence of such a need is quite understandable. Indeed, when the countries of the West made not entirely frank international actions (for example, the creation of NATO), their diplomats did not feel very comfortable if they had to give intelligible explanations about this. On the other hand, the Soviet leadership, headed by Stalin, also took steps that were not entirely clear: they refused to sign an agreement with Japan, disrupted negotiations on the preparation of peace treaties with Germany and Austria, openly assisted the Chinese Communists in the civil war in China, and established an "iron curtain" in Europe, etc. And also it was necessary to somehow distort the attack of the DPRK on South Korea. Under these conditions, a master propagandist was needed just right for the post of head of the USSR Foreign Ministry. At present, few

people are already familiar with Vyshinsky's role in the events of Stalin's time, so it makes sense to dwell on some stages from his biography (according to TSB, third edition, volume 5, 1971 and A. Vaksberg's book "QUEEN OF EVIDENCE. VYSHINSKY AND HIS VICTIMS", M., 1992). He was born on December 10, 1883 in Odessa. From 1903 he joined the Mensheviks. Even before the revolution of 1917, he graduated from the law faculty of Kyiv University. In 1920, on Stalin's recommendation, he was accepted as a member of the RCP(b). In 1925 (not without the participation of Stalin) he was "elected" rector of the Moscow State University. On December 25, 1927, an outstanding neurologist, psychiatrist and psychologist, academician V. M. Bekhterev, suddenly died, being healthy, vigorous and full of strength before his death.

Subsequently, assumptions about his murder were published, based on circumstantial evidence. The funeral was entrusted to the rector of M

In 1928, Stalin appointed him to the post of chairman of the Special Judicial Presence (and not the court, since Vyshinsky was not a judge, but for some time was fond of the practice of law). Stalin needed this body to conduct the first openly orchestrated "Shakhtinsky" trial with execution sentences (although there were still few executed at that time - five of the 53 defendants). Then Vyshinsky for some time became Lunacharsky's deputy in the People's Commissariat of Education (Ministry of Education). In the autumn of 1930, he participates in a new falsified trial of the Shakhtinsky type. Then 8

people were judged, the main of which turned out to be a prominent scientist, professor at Moscow Higher Technical School, one of the developers of the first Soviet economic plan (GOELRO) - Leonid Ramzin (he was also the main provocateur). For Vyshinsky, this trial turned out to be a kind of exam, which he successfully passed.

In May 1931, Vyshinsky moved to new positions - the Prosecutor of the RSFSR and Deputy People's Commissar of Justice of the RSFSR. In June 1933, after the establishment of the All-Union Prosecutor's Office, he became Deputy Prosecutor of the USSR.

The clever and cunning Vyshinsky figured out Stalin's tactics: to advertise democratic legal institutions in words and on paper, but in reality to do the opposite under their cover. Stalin was convinced of his insight and devotion - this was the key to their union. Stalin really needed a legal justification for his lawlessness. Vyshinsky readily responded to the social order and helped him not only in deed, but also became the greatest theoretician of the "legality of the class struggle." It was he who actively introduced into investigative and judicial practice (especially extrajudicial "triples") the idea of substantiating the guilt of the defendants by the testimony of the accused themselves ("the queen of evidence"), and how to get them - this already turned out to be a matter of technology, for example, by keeping the defendant for many hours in sitting on a stool without a top cover or lowering the head of the person under investigation into a spittoon filled to the brim (these and many other examples of methods for obtaining "confessions" are shown in detail, for example, in Robert Conquest's book "GREAT TERROR"). Moreover, new ideas

Vyshinsky expounded in his books and textbooks on issues of state and law ("JUDICIAL STRUCTURE IN THE USSR" (1939), "THEORY AND PRACTICE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE IN SOVIET LAW" (1941), etc.). However, the authors of the third edition of TSB believe that "Vyshinsky's theoretical works contain serious errors that ... led to serious violations of socialist legality" (Vol. 5, p. 574).

But sorry, lawbreakers are usually criminals. So Vyshinsky was a theoretician of criminals? But his ideas could not be introduced into the practice of investigative and judicial bodies without the consent of the highest state leaders, in particular, Stalin. It turns out that the chief of the criminals was Stalin? And how can it be called in one word? (For example, from the Italian language?) But more specifically, we will consider the methods of dealing with the Stalinist system with its own citizens later in a separate chapter, but for now let's return to Vyshinsky's biography.

From June 1935 to June 1939 he worked as the Prosecutor of the USSR. His name began to flicker in the reports of newspapers and radio, entering into daily use. All high-profile open falsified trials of the late 30s took place with his direct participation, incl. as one of the directors. Moreover, if we compare the lists of the leaders of the October Revolution of 1917 and the lists of the defendants who went through the trials where the USSR Prosecutor Vyshinsky was the state prosecutor, it turns out that the socialist revolution was carried out by Lenin and Stalin together with a huge army of police agents and foreign spies from all the main capitalist countries. "Scum", "stinking carrion", "dung" - this is how Vyshinsky called the former associates of Lenin driven to the dock, the top leaders of the party and government, the old Bolsheviks who had been to tsarist hard labor, prisons and exile. And at the end of the proceedings in the cases of "enraged dogs" he demanded "to shoot every single one"! (Which was carried out almost immediately, without any appeal). But by the end of the 1930s, terror against its own reached the level necessary for Stalin. New high-profile lawsuits are
no longer

were required. Stalin shifts his main attention to the international arena, and Vyshinsky leaves the post of prosecutor.

In 1939, having received the title of academician, he moved to the post of Deputy Chairman of the Government of the USSR (he held until 1944). And in 1940 he became Deputy People's Commissar (Minister) of Foreign Affairs. In 1949, as mentioned above, he was promoted to minister.

The professional Soviet diplomat, Doctor of Historical Sciences V.L.Israelyan wrote quite well about the methods of his work in the international arena in the journal NOVOE VREMYA, N: 41, 1988 (VYSHINSKY'S PROSECUTOR'S DIPLOMACY). Here are some quotes from his article:

"Vyshinsky was not trusted, they did not go with him to official, friendly contacts, so important in diplomacy ... Vyshinsky loved "public" diplomacy ... At the 4th session of the UN General Assembly, he delivered 20 speeches, at the 5th - 26, on 6th 22. His speeches were, as a rule, long, some of them lasted 2-2.5 hours, or even more ... Vyshinsky branded, pilloried, humiliated, ridiculed. Vyshinsky, in fact, cared not so much about finding a mutually acceptable compromise, but about condemning the enemy... [This fully applies to all the initiatives of the Soviet Union at that time]. about the Peace Pact, Vyshinsky, in his speech, basically exposed NATO, the "Marshall Plan", the policy of the USA and England, along the way "hit" the Kuomintang, and only at the end announced the new proposal of the USSR ... Moreover, the main emphasis was not on the new constructive idea, but on the proposal to condemn the United States and Britain for preparing a new war. As a result, the proposal of the USSR led only to a sharp political confrontation... A tendency to accusatory language, bordering on outright rudeness, to "terrible words"... were in the very nature of Vyshinsky... Of course, such epithets as "enraged dog" , ... "pathetic bastard" and others, which he generously lavished on political processes in the USSR, he still did not dare to put into circulation at international forums. But the "zealous warmonger", "rude falsifier", ... "vile slanderer" met in his

speeches all the time ... He stated that the head of the Australian delegation cited facts that "are bazaar gossip and lies worthy of the famous Baron Munchausen", the speech of the Canadian delegate "represented a cascade of curses and hysterical cries", the head of the Belgian delegation "carried an unbelievable nonsense". Vyshinsky allowed insulting attacks not only against the direct participants in the negotiations, but also against the states they represented ... [Drawing a picture of the world, he used only two colors - black and white]. Everything that pertains to the Soviet Union is excellent, excellent... As for the economic situation in the West, it... "deteriorating", "pre-crisis"... was characterized only by the English Shawcross said the following Soviet delegation extends the about Vyshinsky's style: "When the olive branch of peace, it does so in such an aggressive way that it seems as if it expects to discourage others from accepting it." In conclusion, V. L. Israelyan makes an interesting conclusion that "the style and essence of politics

cannot diverge so much. Disrespectful remarks, ridicule of political figures, their slander, ... are incompatible with the intention to establish good neighborly relations with the states they represent. Swearing never did not, and cannot, contribute to constructive cooperation." In other words, Israelyan hints that Stalin's plans did not include friendly relations with a number of states. And Vyshinsky implemented such a policy with great success. Moreover, with a very great talent, because. possessed many abilities that are very important for a diplomat, politician and statesman. Andrei (Andrzej) Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky was an excellent orator, he knew three languages perfectly (Russian, Polish, French), worse than two more - English and German. Even before the revolution, he studied for a professorship at Kiev University (but was expelled for revolutionary activities, in particular, in 1908 he had to spend some time in the Bayil prison in the same cell with Stalin and they often argued, since he was a Menshevik). Some colleagues note the amazing ability of Vyshinsky to dictate documents of any degree of importance on the move with such literary literacy that at least immediately

to print! (It was he who wrote the draft of Molotov's speech on the radio on June 22, 1941). After a business trip to Latvia in the summer of 1940, he became Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and from the end of 1943 spent a lot of time on business trips abroad. Stalin trusted him very much. For example, immediately after the end of the war in 1945, Vyshinsky ended up at the head of a top-secret commission, which did not even have a specific name in the documents ("Government Commission for the Nuremberg Trials", "Commission for the Management of the Nuremberg Trials" [!], etc.) Its the main goal was to under no circumstances allow public discussion of any aspects of the Soviet-German negotiations, especially the existence and content of the secret protocols to the 1939 treaties. (Vyshinsky went to Nuremberg many times). And it was not for nothing that he sat at the same table in Karlshorst with Marshal Zhukov during the signing of the German Surrender Act on May 8, 1945.

But on the other hand, all his life he was afraid to please after his victims of the 30s. All his life he had to adapt, intuitively feeling what was required of him. He could change his mind to the exact opposite, and he went to Stalin, as a rule, with two draft documents, foreseeing solutions. At the UN, he could lie without hesitation. Ironically, his birthday (December 10) was declared International Human Rights Day by this organization. And Israelyan in his book gives the following result of his activities as the chief diplomat of the Soviet Union: Vyshinsky's "prosecutor's diplomacy", along with other manifestations of the personality cult, helped create the "image of the enemy." In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Gallup polls showed that most Americans were confident that they would soon be at war with the USSR.

This was also facilitated by the inflating of the atomic danger in the press. In the USA at that time, not only textbooks for adults were published (such as "WHAT TO DO TO SURVIVE UNDER THE ATOMIC BOMB?"), but even atomic alphabets for children (A - atom, B - bomb).

Thus, the international situation in 1949 was already quite tense, passing into the state of the "Cold War", which grew due to the efforts of both sides. But if the Soviet

historians trace it from the speech of a "private person" (Churchill) in Fulton, Zagladin, for example, proposes a different periodization. He believes that the events from the summer of 1945 to the summer of 1947 can be called the period of preparation for the Cold War and writes: "The reason for the final break, for the split of the world into two camps, was the conflict, political and ideological, that arose in connection with the US launch of the " Marshall Plan "and the sharply negative attitude of Soviet diplomacy toward him" (p. 144). This is also indicated by the year of the first use of the term "Cold War" (1947). Therefore, not everything is so simple with that time, in contrast to the official explanation that existed for a long time. Zagladin tried to change it in his book A HISTORY OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF SOVIET DIPLOMACY (1990). As for the 1945-1955s, he considered in a completely new way

in the chapters: - Who unleashed
the "cold war"? - The formation
of a "peace camp" - The origins of the crisis
of the military-bloc policy -

At the edge of the nuclear abyss They well and truthfully describe the history of socialist-capitalist international relations of those years. But it remains to be regretted that Zagladin did not see the true reason for the post-war Stalinist policy - the preparation of a new world war.

On the one hand, he notes that "as the tension in relations between the USSR and the USA increased, more and more harsh formulas were used to characterize the " imperialist camp ". Thus, G. M. Malenkov in 1949 in a speech devoted to anniversary of the October Revolution, attributed to the United States the intention to create "through violence and new wars the world American empire" (p. 149). But then Zagladin explains that "tension in relations with the outside world turned out to be necessary to maintain the viability of the Stalinism. At the same time, Stalin and his entourage were not interested in a war with the capitalist world. "(p. 152). A strange conclusion, given that after Stalin's death, much of the domestic and foreign policy was revised. authorities"

It should be noted that in anticipating his conclusion, Zagladin made a very brief overview of Stalin's domestic policy, giving a large place to terror in it. But in it he saw only an element of economic management and did not connect it with a program of covert mobilization. In our conversation, a detailed review of terror with some conclusions will be given in the next chapter. But Truman made a more realistic conclusion. On November 24, 1948, he approved

US National Security Council Directive 20/4. It stated that "the communist ideology and behavior of the USSR clearly show that the ultimate goal of the leaders of the USSR is world domination." US politicians were called upon to limit the power and influence of the USSR to such limits that it could no longer pose a threat to the peace, national independence and stability of the world family of peoples "(Zagladin's book, pp. 149, 150). Unlike the leadership of the United States, Stalin not only carried out defense measures, but also ACTIVELY led the preparations for a new world war. Moreover, much more carefully, more systematically and against the backdrop of countless propaganda statements about the struggle for peace. At the same time, many measures were taken that provoked the West to complicate the international situation. In particular, in the summer of 1948, the Soviet The Union established a ground blockade of West Berlin in connection with the monetary reform carried out in June in the western sectors of the occupation of Germany. This step by Stalin once again created a threat to peace. The Americans organized an "air bridge". But their planes could have been shot down. Why is this could have led, even terribly imagined, and although the blockade was lifted in May 1949, international life once again deteriorated.

Stalin's attitude to the convention also speaks of the preparation of the war. UN on Genocide and the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War.

On December 9, 1948, the UN General Assembly adopted a convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. And on August 12, 1949, the following four conventions for the protection of victims of war were adopted in Geneva:

- on improving the fate of the wounded and sick in the army;
- on improving the fate of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of the armed forces at sea;

- on the treatment of prisoners of war; - on the protection of the civilian population in time of war. All of them were signed by the Soviet Union in December 1949 (with minor reservations). But ratified only in March April 1954! ("COLLECTION OF LAWS OF THE USSR AND DECREES OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPERIOR COUNCIL OF THE USSR (1938-1975)", Volume 2, Moscow, 1975, "Izvestiya SDT USSR"). Moreover, if in this "COLLECTION OF LAWS OF THE USSR ..." The Decree of the Supreme Council (SC) of the USSR on the ratification of the Geneva Conventions is given on the date 04/17/1954, then in the third edition of the "GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA" it is said that the Geneva Conventions were ratified by the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces 04/17/1951! Typo? Or an example of an attempt to hide the unseemly behavior of the Soviet Union?

The "LEGAL ENCYCLOPEDIc DICTIONARY" (Moscow, 1987, "Soviet Encyclopedia") says that "ratification" is the final approval of an international treaty by the supreme body of the state. It is embodied in two different acts: international legal and domestic.

According to the first, "ratification" most authoritatively enshrines the final consent of the state to be bound by the ratified treaty. Internally, "ratification" gives treaty rules domestic legal force. In other words, until 1954 the Soviet Union did not express its final agreement with all of the

above conventions. And they did not have domestic legal force for the USSR. In this regard, when trying to accuse the Americans of violating the conduct of the war in Korea, Soviet propaganda had to recall the Hague Conventions

of 1907 (in particular, in the Pravda newspaper from the end of 1950), and not those that were signed by the Soviet Union just a year ago . Moreover, now it turned out that the issue of the Hague Conventions for the USSR at that time was also not resolved! The fifth volume of the TSB of the third edition

(Moscow, 1971, p. 608) provides information about two peace conferences held in The Hague on the laws and customs of war - 1899 and 1907. In 1899, 3 conventions were adopted: "On

peaceful settlement of international clashes", "On the laws and customs of land war", "On the application of the Geneva Convention of 08/10/1864 to naval warfare". In 1907, 13 conventions were already adopted, but their list is opened by the same "On the peaceful solution of international clashes". The Convention "On the Laws and Customs of War on Land" is indicated fourth in the list. Further,

the encyclopedia says that they all reflected the level of military equipment of their contemporary period. And the USSR recognized them to the extent that they do not contradict the UN Charter. However, in the second volume of the "UKRAINIAN SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA" (Kiev, 1979, p. 420) the year of recognition of the Hague Conventions by the Soviet government

is indicated - 1955! Under what conditions is it not beneficial for the state to recognize such documents? Only in one - if an offensive war is supposed among other things, heavy losses are expected both for military personnel at the front and for the civilian population (for example, out of 9 million dead Koreans, 84% were civilians). Indeed, a soldier can

defend his land without any conventions. But if he is on foreign territory in difficult conditions (bad weather, lack of supplies, encirclement, semi-encirclement, fierce oncoming battles, etc.), then the presence of ratified conventions can act weakening. Under these conditions, under the influence of the enemy's skillful counter-propaganda, the idea of surrender may well arise.

And, by the way, Soviet troops could conduct a ground attack on the United States only in very disgusting conditions of the Far North and the Arctic: through Alaska, the northern territories of Canada, the islands of Iceland and Greenland (More specifically, we will talk about such plans further. Here, as evidence, you can recall what General Ostroumov wrote about the Stalinist task of creating 100 front-line bomber divisions: "The geography of the search for air divisions' bases expanded every day. More and more often, operational teams of specialists flew to future base areas, including the northern coast, Chukotka, Kamchatka. The goal is to study the possibilities of accommodating aviation,

preparation of ice and stationary airfields, creation of reliable bases"). And

regarding the attitude of the Stalinist government to international conventions, specific documents can be cited (from the selection by N. Lebedeva "KATYN VOICES", the magazine "NOVY MIR", No 2, 1991, p. 213): DOCTORS AND PHARMACISTS STATEMENT

PRISONERS OF WAR STAROBELSKY CAMP BERIA AND VOROSHILOV

Citizen Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR

Doctors and pharmacists of the Polish army, concentrated in a prisoner of war camp in Starobelsk, Voroshilovgrad region, among 130 people (104 doctors and 26 pharmacists) allow themselves to tell you, citizen commissar, the following:

All doctors and pharmacists were caught by the Soviet troops in the performance of their medical duties, whether in hospitals or in military units. On the basis of the international Geneva Convention governing the rights of physicians and pharmacists during hostilities, we ask you, Citizen Commissar, to either send us to one of the neutral states (United States of North America, Sweden), or send us to the places of our permanent place

residence.

Starobelsk, October 30, 1939 ... (TsGOA [Central State Special Archive of the USSR] USSR, fund 1, V / P, inventory 1a, d. 1 (Special case), sheet 173-174. Typewritten). [A similar letter was sent to Marshal Voroshilov].

There is a note to this document in the article: On

.... November 4, the head of the Starobelsky camp, captain of state security A. G. Berezhkov, turned to Soprunenko [head of the NKVD USSR Department for Prisoners of War, Major] with a request to send him one copy of the Geneva Convention "for review and guidance in our practical work". He was answered: "The Geneva Convention of Doctors is not a document by which you should be guided in your practical work. Be guided in your work by the directives of the NKVD Directorate for Prisoners of War." (TsGOA USSR, f. 1 V/P, op. 2e, d. 10, l. 5, 73).

By the way, not only doctors and pharmacists recalled international rules. And according to international laws, the USSR in 1939 should not have had any problems with the former servicemen of Poland. N.

Lebedeva, anticipating a selection of documents, writes (p. 208):

... About 130 thousand [Polish servicemen] were detained as prisoners of war by units of the Red Army and operational detachments of the NKVD. And this despite the fact that the USSR did not declare war on Poland. In accordance with international law, the only purpose of captivity is to prevent the soldiers of the enemy army from their further participation in hostilities. But by the beginning of October (1939) [military] operations were over. Thus, there were no legal grounds for capturing Polish soldiers and officers. Internment was also illegal... International norms were also violated by the transfer of prisoners of war from the custody of the army to the NKVD bodies [within the framework of which 8 distribution camps for 10 thousand people each were created. The fate of the detainees turned out to be different, incl. in April - May 1940, 15,131 people were shot, or, according to other sources, 21,857].

And what was Stalin's attitude towards the citizens of his country? About this is the next chapter.

10. WHERE MAN BREATHES SO FREELY...

The Soviet mass media actively tried to introduce the idea that the Soviet system is the most humane in the world. Songs, films, books were created about it, they wrote about it in newspapers etc.

However, over time, the truth about the terror during Stalin's rule gradually made its way to the people. But most of the materials were devoted to the events of the thirties, especially highlighting the pre-war period. The post-war years generally received less attention. Even in Robert Conquest's two-volume book "GREAT TERROR" (Riga, "Rakstnieks", 1991), the period after 1945 is given only one small chapter ("On the old rails"). Moreover, in almost all studies, the question of the

reasons for such an attitude of the country's leadership towards its own people is usually answered by Stalin's desire to achieve unquestioning submission of all to a single (his) will. And also for

elimination of any, even the smallest, manifestations of the opposition. The English writer George Orwell even built many plot events on this in his famous novel "1984" (written, by the way, in 1948; that is, after the war!). In the same novel, another theme of the Stalinist period is used - war (recall the slogan from it: "War is peace!"). However, in the novel they are clearly not intertwined.

And since the tasks of subordinating everyone to a single will and liquidating the opposition were solved in the 30s, the terror after 1945 is usually regarded as a simple continuation of the "usual" internal dictatorial policy. And no special attention is paid to its connection with the preparation of the war. But do they

really have no connection with each other? Let's think about whether it is possible to prepare hotbeds of tension and wage wars for many years with a peaceful mode of operation of one's industry and a peaceful attitude towards one's population? Or vice versa: is it really necessary to carry out terror against one's own with a completely peaceful attitude towards neighboring states and without any military training? Everyone

knows that in modern conditions it is impossible to successfully (victoriously) wage war without extensive preliminary preparation. In the pre-war years, the theorists of the Red Army worked out a list of necessary measures to be taken in peacetime (the so-called "hidden mobilization"). But it is very difficult and costly. It makes no sense to start it just like that. If the leadership of a country went for this, it means that it is planning a "hot" war in the future in perfect sense. If we consider in more detail the actual sequence of events in the economy of the USSR on

the eve and during the war, it turns out that the tightening of working conditions began not AFTER the attack of the Nazi troops, but BEFORE IT! And it was impossible to do this successfully without a preliminary launched terror. By the way, in Germany, elements of terror were also widely used in domestic politics. And they also began before the ensuing militarization and aggression against neighboring states. Thus, the policy of terror against one's own can serve as an indicator of the real intentions of the leadership of a particular

countries in foreign policy. Within the Soviet Union, the Stalinist leadership increasingly turned to the use of elements of terror from the end of the 1920s. But especially this process began to gain momentum from 1935, after the assassination of Kirov in December 1934 and the release of the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the USSR, which allowed the accelerated consideration of criminal cases with the abolition of the possibility of defense and appeal of sentences. It turned out to be in close proximity to the beginning of a big war, both according to Stalin's plan (07/06/1941), and according to the actual beginning (06/22/1941). Moreover, during the war, terror against "free" citizens of the USSR decreased, the death penalty was even formally abolished. But after 1945 they did not abandon terror against their own people! Let's remember the title of the chapter from the book by Robert Conquest - "On the old rails"! And finally, mass terror within the USSR was stopped only after 1953!

Of course, such an attitude towards one's own within the Soviet Union from the late 1920s to the early 1950s is rightly associated with the personality of Stalin. N. Khrushchev talked about this a lot at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. But the true reason remained unclear, because of which Stalin took such actions. Sometimes this is explained by his "bloodthirstiness" or the fact that he was mentally ill, "paranoid". True, for a long time I personally did not find a serious justification for Stalin's "abnormality", and met only a mention of this idea. And for some reason I was sure that Stalin's "case history" could not exist at all. But suddenly I find exactly it, and in one of the most popular publications - the circulation of this particular work turned out to be over 2 million copies. We are talking about the previously cited novel by Vladimir Uspensky "PRIVATE ADVISER TO THE LEADER", published by the "people's magazine" "ROMAN GAZETA" (No 8-9, 1992). In it, the author, in the words of the protagonist of the book, quite seriously and in detail explains what the great dictator was

ill with (p. 7 8): Over the years, I have both practically and theoretically studied his illness, its symptoms and course. It manifests itself differently in different people. Doctors know at least three options. One of them, the most severe, when the disease is continuous and hopeless. This is stable schizophrenia. Second: attacks are more or less periodic, in any case they can be foreseen, sometimes even stopped. And finally, the most common option: the disease is mild,

secretly, a person is no different from healthy people, forgets, or even does not even know about the cross that he carries. Attacks or "bursts", as they are called by specialists, happen very rarely, under the influence of extreme mental shocks. Iosif Vissarionovich just had something similar.

What are the manifestations? ... Stiffness of movements, speech. Seemingly unreasonable outbursts of rudeness, cruelty. Or, on the contrary, excessive tenderness. Quick, unbalanced decisions, orders, as they say, "according to the mood." It is very difficult to communicate with patients during a period of paranoid disorder ... We must protect such people, of whom there are many: let them believe in us, in our care for them - this is very conducive to recovery. With so-called "outpatient schizophrenia" they do not need hospitalization. Scientifically speaking, "negative symptoms tend to compensate." And then the author clearly calls Stalin an "incomplete" schizophrenic.

"But V. Uspensky needed long discussions about his illness not in connection with the tragic events in the USSR since the late 1920s, but to justify Stalin's actions at the end of June 1941, when he retired for a while.

Indeed, at the difficult moment of the enemy invasion, the departure from work of the very first leader, who "tied" the entire pyramid of power to himself, threatened with grave consequences. But Stalin retired from business for a short time, according to V. Uspensky - for the period of treatment from an attack that arose due to "unforeseen events that struck." But it has already been considered above, the attack of the Nazi Wehrmacht ^{how much} was "unforeseen". This is firstly, and secondly, until the medical commission recognizes a person as mentally ill (which leads to the legal status of "incapacity"), until then the person is considered normal and legally responsible for his actions. And no matter how some authors tried to discuss the problems of Stalin's illness, he was not officially recognized as sick, was not deprived of the status of "capacity", i.e. he is responsible for his decisions. In addition, Stalin had been in contact with revolutionaries for many years since pre-revolutionary times, so some of his qualities (which should include health problems) should have been known

for a long time. For example, Robert Conquest in the first volume of the book "GREAT TERROR" (p. 192) cites the following opinion of "one

of the oppositionists" about Rykov: "Two decades to be with Stalin in an illegal party, on decisive days to carry out a revolution with him, to sit for ten years after the revolution at the same table in the Politburo and after that

not knowing Stalin - this is really the limit! On the one hand, many people knew him. But as it turned out, no one knew him very well. And as the proposed study shows, in achieving some goals, Stalin was quite logical and stubborn, one might say, even brilliant. But he was very secretive and therefore there could not

be any "secret advisers who knew him perfectly" in nature. But having paid attention to Stalin's personal qualities, it is useful to get acquainted not with his chronic illnesses, but with character traits. For example, Robert Conquest in the book "GREAT TERROR" devoted a separate (third) chapter ("ORGANIZER AND INSPIRATOR") to the character of Stalin, in which not a word is said about his illnesses, but based on the memoirs of many associates, it is concluded that Stalin had an excellent memory, a strong will to the extreme, a gruff sense of humor, was incredibly secretive, never told what was on his mind, especially in relation to political goals. Will, secrecy and good memory were complemented by good endurance. Combined with the experience of political work and the ability to understand people (one might say, at the level of instincts), they allowed Stalin to become an unsurpassed player in political maneuvers (including intrigues). He never took irreparable steps until he was absolutely sure of their success. But confidence could become the reason for his strongest perseverance, bordering on stubbornness. And incredible patience and calmness could be interrupted by sharp manifestations of discontent and even rage. However, this character is quite typical for players who play large risky games and is not necessarily inherent only in mental patients, although one kind of "chronic illness" can be noted in him - short stature (about 160

By the will of fate, having found himself among the top leadership of a great country, he achieved the highest actual position and made great efforts to strengthen his power. But only the personal qualities of one person cannot explain the mass terror in the USSR in the 20s-50s. The Russian tsars also had enormous power, but almost none of them were fond of wanton massacres of their own subjects with large-scale fooling. But it can be noted that the power of the Russian tsars was hereditary, it did not have to be constantly defended in the fight against comrades-in-arms. And hence the need for an atmosphere of terror may arise. But even this assumption does not explain everything. First, in order to preserve personal power, one can limit oneself to extreme measures only in a certain circle of interested persons. Stalin, however, not only organized terror on a national scale, but was the inspirer of her entire economic and foreign policy. Therefore, the causes of the Stalinist terror cannot be sought only in the personal qualities or illnesses of its inspirer. Even Robert Conquest, who wrote a monumental work on the Stalinist terror, cannot determine what Stalin's true motives were. But in the chapter on his character, he cites an interesting fact from the life of

a former Soviet rocket specialist, Professor Tokaev, who lived in the West since the late 1940s. In his book ("STALIN MEANS WAR", London, 1951, p. 115), Tokayev, according to R. Conquest, "recalls several meetings of the top Soviet leadership in connection with the projects of intercontinental missiles. He quotes Stalin's words that the project under consideration would make it "easier to talk to the great shopkeeper Harry Truman and to squeeze him as necessary." After that, according to Tokaev, Stalin turned to him and made a "curious remark": "As you can see, we crazy time. "No other Soviet leader is known to have expressed anything in

private conversation other than a direct and cynical desire to crush the West..." Strange, but for some reason none of the official historians sees the relationship of terror 30s - 50s and Stalin'

cheap labor. Here, for example, is a quote from the article "STATE TERROR IN SOVIET RUSSIA. 1923-1953 (SOURCES AND THEIR INTERPRETATION)" (V. Popov, Candidate of Historical Sciences, magazine "DOMATIVE ARCHIVES", No 2, 1992, p.

20- 31): Against whom did the new state direct its mass terror?... Firstly, the relatively low percentage of recidivist criminals (16.6% before the war and 9-13% in the post-war years) indicates the absence of "criminal inclinations" of the people and reflects the uninterrupted operation of the repressive conveyor, constantly replenishing the camps with new labor. And this was the main thing ... Thirdly, the mobilization of men to the front doomed women to hard physical labor. The proportion of women among the convicts after the end of the victorious war doubles (from 17.2% to 39.5 -

31.1%). But the whole history of mankind has shown the inefficiency of slave labor (or the same prisoners)! All the more feminine, and all the more so since the dates in the very title of the cited article show that this argument (cheap labor) somehow ceased to be important after 1953. On the other hand, let us recall that any war presupposes a deterioration in the level of the bulk of citizens. And vice versa, the higher the level of well-being and observance of human rights, the less the consent of the population to part with them, especially the willingness to die decreases. But the higher the technical level of weapons, the more troops will be destroyed. And in a nuclear war, losses generally number in the millions. Thus, a sharp drop in living standards can lead to unrest in society. And in order to avoid them, it is

necessary to carry out appropriate preparation in advance. In addition, the "covert mobilization" itself leads to a deterioration in well-being and to violations of human rights: this is an increase in the length of working hours, and all sorts of restrictions on the existence of non-military structures (music, culture, higher education,

high development of medical care, especially in rural areas) and etc. Under these conditions, terror against one's own becomes one of the

multiple tasks at once. It allows: - to force people to endure any suffering; - force people to work where they are told and do what indicate;

- ensure people's consent to work for low wages (in the "freedom") or free of charge (in camps); - provide workers for important military construction projects and production (especially at the expense of free prisoners);
- to achieve sufficient quality of work (at least in military production);
- to ensure the readiness of people to die on the "free" front, and most importantly - in the event of an OFFENSIVE war on FOREIGN territory! Normal people usually protect their land without coercion. It may be required for fights ABROAD! Accordingly, it is possible to pay less attention to the well-being of people (anyway, many of them will die due to various circumstances). Conversely, it is possible to direct the economy entirely to preparing for war.

And now let's digress a little from the post-war period and recall what Viktor Suvorov wrote in the book "DAY-M" about the situation in the economy of the USSR before the war of 1941 (in the chapter "On the gains of October"): In

1939, mandatory production rates were introduced on collective farms: the collective farm is a voluntary matter, but if you don't fulfill the norm, we'll put you in jail. On May 27, 1940, a resolution of the Council of People's Commissars "On increasing the role of a foreman at heavy engineering plants" struck ... The foreman at the plant was endowed with rights no less than a company foreman ... On June 26, 1940, a new decree thundered over the country "On the transition to an eight-hour work day, for a seven-day working week and on the prohibition of unauthorized departure of workers and employees from enterprises and institutions "... On the same day, another decree of the Council of People's Commissars "On raising production standards and lowering prices" ... Decrees come in succession. August 10, 1940: "On criminal liability for petty theft at work" - camp terms for a screwdriver, for a nut carried in your pocket ... Each decree of 1940 generously poured terms, especially fo

discussions of communist professors; But wasn't Stalin paranoid? Here, they say, there is evidence of his mental illness: he put communists in prison ... No, comrade communists, Stalin was not paranoid. Great landings are needed in order to follow them into the decrees of 1940, and so that no one utters a word. The decrees of 1940 are the final transfer of the country's economy to the wartime regime. This is mobilization. The labor legislation of 1940 was so perfect that during the war it did not have to be corrected or supplemented ...

The appearance of various pre-war decrees is also confirmed by testimonies. Here, for example, is the memoir of L. M. Gurvich from the book "... TO HAVE THE POWER TO REMEMBER". In September 1940, he received a camp term and was sent to Sevzheldorlag. For a month he had to live in the Kotlas transit camp, which received replenishment by echelons almost daily. "One echelon - more than a thousand people - came with convicts under a new decree (we did not know it). They were imprisoned for a year for swearing and other petty hooliganism. Basically, they were workers and collective

farmers." Thus, it can be noted that the mechanism of terror was worked out in detail before 1941 and it was no longer necessary to invent something new. Even so, any citizen of "the most humane country on the planet" at any time of the day could be arrested for the most insignificant reason, or even without it. In

particular, even after the war, Stalin practiced mass executions according to lists. D. Volkogonov in his book "TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY" notes that they could contain thousands of names. For the post-war period, there is evidence of the famous Soviet writer Konstantin Simonov in the article "LISTS TO SHOOTING" (magazine "NEW TIME", No. 47, 1992). He recalls that in July 1952 he was summoned by Alexander Fadeev and offered to sign a similar list with the names of writers arrested in the late 1940s in connection with the Jewish case. Simonov explains that the lists for execution were drawn up according to the professional affiliation of the unfortunate and sent to the leadership of departments ("in a circle") for signature. Of course, it would be possible to shoot

without any coordination with the departments. But by this method, Stalin achieved more

greater devotion on the part of various leaders who had to be afraid to get into such lists themselves. But not everyone survived. For example, Simonov notes that Fadeev developed a clear triangle in the last years of his life: an office - a hospital - a sanatorium. In the sense that he periodically drank himself, ended up in a hospital, then in a sanatorium, from where he returned to work for a while until the next binge. And there is a suspicion that the first post-war naval minister, Admiral Yumashev, was replaced by N. G. Kuznetsov because of a similar reason.

For reference: A. Fadeev - was born in 1901, in 1946-1954 he was the Secretary General of the Union of Writers of the USSR, since 1950 - Vice President of the World Peace Council, member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (1939 - 1956). Committed suicide on May 13, 1956 (three months after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, which exposed Stalin's personality cult). Konstantin Simonov in 1946-1954 was Fadeev's deputy in the Writers' Union of the USSR, and in 1950-1954 he was also the editor of Literaturnaya Gazeta.

But in any business there are no limits for perfection. Including the mechanism of terror after 1941, changes were made. One of the meanings of this process is noted by V. Popov in the article already cited above: "A feature of the state's punitive policy was the creation of special decrees that not only supplemented the list of criminal acts", but also contributed to an increase in crime in the country." Firstly, by a decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces of

April 19, 1943, which was not published, a special type of punishment was introduced - hard labor for a period of 10 to 20 years for fascist murderers, traitors, accomplices to the invaders. It was used by courts-martial. But after the war, their role was taken over by the Special Conference, whose decisions were not subject to any appeal. Some sentences to hard labor after 1945 were personally approved by Stalin. (The Special Meeting did not long survive it - it was abolished in September 1953). Secondly, the role of forced labor increased due to the tight deadlines and huge volumes of work to restructure industry for the creation and production of modern

technology. D. Volkogonov writes about this as follows:

- All the activities of Stalin were subordinated to the growth of economic and defense power ... A significant part of the GULAG was aimed at defense work. Often, government assignments, many ministers began with the "usual" first step - they turned to Beria: "To Comrade L.P. Beria. Considering the exceptional need to create a research base in the east, I ask your instructions to

the Minister of Internal Affairs

Comrade Kruglov about opening a camp on the site of the TsAGI branch from among the prisoners of the Siberian camps in the amount of 1000 people. 07/23/1946 N. Khrunichev "Or even more cynically:" To Comrade Beria L.P. tons of barbed wire. 03/22/1947 A. Zademidko ("TRIUFM AND TRAGEDY", vol. 2, pp. 484 - 485) Volkogonov managed to meet with one of the two authors of these appeals

- Zademidko - and writes

that he explained such

actions simply: "there was such a time." There are no comments on the first example.

But it is impossible to say for sure whether Volkogonov accidentally chose the document signed by Khrunichev or on purpose? The fact is that Khrunichev later

became one of the prominent figures in the Soviet rocket and

space program. He was not as famous as Korolev or Glushko, but still ... In Moscow there was even a plant "named after Khrunichev."

Returning to the post-war period, it can be noted that the increase in the need for prisoners after the war led to the need for legislation. Those. punishing decrees and resolutions continued to be brought in relevant changes V issued after the war.

So, in January 1948, Stalin instructed the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR S. Kruglov to think over "concrete measures" for the creation of new, additional camps and prisons for special purposes. And he demanded a draft decision already in February, which was developed by mid-February 1948. It stated that "Trotskyists, terrorists, right-wingers, Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, anarchists, nationalists,

white emigrants" should be sent to dozens of new camps in Kolyma, near Norilsk, in the Komi ASSR, Yelabuga, Karaganda and other places. At the same time, the convicts were ordered to carry out "Chekist work to identify those who remained at large."

In addition, the administration of camps and prisons was allowed "if necessary, to delay the release of prisoners with subsequent processing in the manner prescribed by law." (Stalin agreed). (D. Volkogonov, "TRIOUFM AND TRAGEDY", pp. 429-430). But this statutory violation of the law was not the last. On November 26, 1948,

the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was issued on the fate of those who had already served their term, survived and were released. D. Volkogonov gives only its date and a very brief meaning of the FOREVER REFERENCE (p. 636).

And here are the testimonies of eyewitnesses included in the collection "... TO HAVE THE POWER TO REMEMBER" (Stories of those who went through the hell of repressions). Moscow,

Moskovsky Rabochiy, 1991: V. I. Velmin, member of the CPSU since 1926. Before his arrest in September 1937, he worked in the Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper. He gives an approximate classification of those arrested from the point of view of investigators: terry enemies, just enemies, hostile, enemy accomplices, enemy agents, blind executors, etc. In the autumn of 1944, he was released from the Kargopolag ahead of schedule, but continued to work there. Then he was arrested again in 1950 ("like almost all those who were repressed in the 30s"). In December 1950, he went on a stage from Arkhangelsk to a life-long settlement in Siberia (in the Novosibirsk region) with the deprivation of all rights and status. "The exile turned out to be worse than the camp. In the camp, at least there is a barracks, there are bunk beds, twice a day they give a gruel with a piece of bread. And here no one thinks about you and does not care about you. If you want - live, if you don't want - don't live! No place to work." In 1954 life was made easier, in 1956 they were rehabilitated.

N. P. Aleksakhin, a member of the CPSU since 1932. Before his arrest in 1937, he worked as an assistant to the 1st secretary of the MK RCP (b) N. S. Khrushchev. Term (8 years) spent in camps in Kolyma. After his release, he settled in the town of Strunino, Vladimir Region (102 km from Moscow). In the winter of 1949 he was again arrested. After six months, the prison announced the decision of the Special

meeting on a lifelong settlement in the Udereisky district of the Krasnoyarsk Territory. There he stayed until rehabilitation in 1955.

K. P. Chudinova, a member of the CPSU since 1914, until her arrest on April 10, 1938, she worked as the 1st secretary of the Sverdlovsk District Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in Moscow. Sentence - 8 years in prison under Articles 58-10 and 58-11. Before being released in January 1947, she was in Taishetlag. But they were not released completely, but into exile for 5 years. She settled in the village of Suetikhe (12 km from Taishet). However, in the summer of 1949, she and a large group of exiles were again arrested and transported to Krasnoyarsk. Then they were brought by stage to the village of Motygina, Udereysky district, Krasnoyarsk Territory, where they announced the resolution of the Special

Conference on life-long exile "as previously repressed." They were allowed to work in the geological expedition of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In 1954 they rehabilitated. A more detailed analysis of the re-arrest is given by L. M. Gurvich, a member of the CPSU since 1926, arrested in 1938 and sent to Sevzheldorlag, who was entrusted with the construction of a railway from Kotlas to

the west through Konosha to Cherepovets. In the middle of 1946 he was released "without the right to leave the camp." And then the following happened: - In 1949, some strange arrests began. Those released from the camps were taken, but infrequently and at first it seemed that these were isolated cases. It was alarming... In May, it was my turn. Another arrest... The cell of the Novosibirsk transfer turned out to be huge: more than 200 people fit in it... There were no criminals, only Article 58. But quite different than in the past. "Banderites", peasants from Western Ukraine, predominated... A rather large group in the cell was made up of "followers" from different regions of Siberia, the Urals, and some other regions... We did not know then that a systematic, carefully thought-out not passed the operation of the seizure of "enemies of the people". It was carried out gradually, without haste, without excessive overcrowding of prisons and was designed for approximately 2-3 years ... Only much later, having learned everything for ourselves, did it become clear to us the essence of the new massacre ... Most of the victims of the 30s died in camps. But some of the prisoners survived. It was only a percentage of the millions ground up by the camps, but the number of survivors was not so small

immediately limited by a ban on residence in the capitals, a 100-km zone around them, in dozens of other cities. With great difficulty, overcoming all sorts of obstacles, people settled down, came to life. New families formed. The nightmares of the experience seemed to be a thing of the past. Then the thunder boomed. In 1948, a decision was made. According to it, those who were previously repressed on political charges were subject to life-long concentration in the most remote and sparsely populated regions of Siberia and Kazakhstan. Without the direct and decisive participation of Stalin, such a major operation could not take place. With all its essence, it reflected Stalin's methods and aggravated the situation in the country even more ... Stalin's exiles were not supposed to receive any allowance. There was almost no other work, except for heavy physical work, in the places of settlement. Not only exiles, but also members of their families were not allowed to work in schools, clubs, at the post office, in most local institutions ...

The amnesty of 1953, announced shortly after Stalin's death, did not affect the exiles for life, at least not immediately. Then only criminals were released. Some relief for the exiles came in 1954, and then many were released altogether. But the Amnesty Decree of 1953 has apparently been applied to the release of exiles since 1954. This is written in the memoirs of Professor, Doctor of Geographical Sciences Yu. I. Chirkov. (1919-1988). ("THE ALL WAS SO", M.; Politizdat, 1991).

He was arrested in 1935. In prisons, camps and in conditional release he spent until the end of 1945. In May 1951 he was again arrested. The investigator explained the reason for the new arrest as follows: "There is a decision - to bring all those who were serving sentences under Article 58 again, conduct an investigation and, if there are no violations of the passport regime that give the right to a new term, send them into exile." Chirkov was sent to the Krasnoyarsk Territory for an eternal settlement. In exile, he learned that the decree had been issued in 1948. Moreover, according to it, those who were previously released were not only re-arrested, but those who had camp or prison terms were ending by the time the decision was issued were immediately automatically sent to life exile. Chirkov emphasizes that the eternal settlers were in fact in the position of slaves for local enterprises, because they had to live and work where the local

bosses. Moreover, to feed and clothe themselves was the concern of the exiles themselves. Yu. I. Chirkov was released on May 28, 1954 with the removal of a criminal record in accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Court of March 27, 1953. But it was, as it were, forgiveness (amnesty). Full rehabilitation was carried out in December 1955 by a review of the case by the Tribunal of the Moscow Military District on December 8, 1955 "due to the lack of corpus

delicti". Thus, the idea heard by Yu. Chirkov back in 1938 in the Kotlas transit point is quite suitable for the post-war period: "It was said that Yezhov said that the entire population of the USSR is divided into three categories: prisoners, those under investigation and suspects." Moreover, the Soviet government,

headed by Stalin, as chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, did not show much concern about the situation of those who remained at large. Especially about the situation in the countryside. N. Khrushchev, in his report on the cult of personality at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, cited evidence that Stalin was going to increase taxes on the peasants even more, despite the fact that those who were at that time were already cruel. Of course, one cannot say that Stalin was not interested in

agriculture. However, the measures that he took were aimed at turning the peasants into unquestioning slaves, at destroying the very spirit of "free cultivators". But this was not entirely possible. The reason was NATURE itself, not subject to laws and decrees. Apparently, therefore, in order to create the appearance of concern for the country's leadership about the village in October 1946, the Council for Collective Farm Affairs was created under the Council of Ministers of the USSR (abolished in March 1953). A. A. Andreev became its chairman.

Although, of course, one of the important places in the subjugation of the peasants was played by various measures of violence. And not only the ominous 58th article of the criminal code or pre-war decrees. After the war, new ones came out in addition to them. Here, for example, is the message given in the report of the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR S. Kruglov to Stalin and others dated September 13, 1948 on the results of the implementation by this ministry of the Decrees of the Presidium of the USSR Armed

Forces dated February 21, 1948 and June 2, 1948: "- The collective farm peasantry actively exposes at general meetings loafers and parasites and unanimously decide

their eviction to remote areas of the country."

Criminal penalties played an important role because at that time there was a very cruel agricultural tax, which involved deductions from all conceivable and unimaginable incomes of peasants received from all branches of agriculture: field cultivation, animal husbandry, haymaking, vegetable gardens, tobacco growing, sowing industrial and oilseed crops, orchards, berry fields, vineyards, etc. The real incomes of most peasants were significantly inferior to the overestimated tax salary by the financial authorities. could understand what was happening. Many tried to find the "truth", wrote unanswered letters to the Council for Collective Farm Affairs. These facts are given in the journal "SOVIET ARCHIVES", N: 4, 1991 (the article "THE PEOPLE ARE IN A BAD MOOD, THIS IS A FACT ... "(Peasant letters of the post-war period), pp. 62-71, compiled by V.P. Popov).

In the preface he writes: ...

Of great interest is the period after the end of the Patriotic War of 1941-1945. The whole village was waiting for changes, hoping in their hearts that after the war many things could be changed for the better. Contrary to expectations, the conditions of rural life not only did not improve, but began to surpass [in severity?] the years of war hard times. The only real form of survival was still a "semi-underground" life, double lines of behavior. Beginning in 1950, the number of rural residents, for example, in the Russian Federation began to decline steadily, despite compensatory growth after the war. That was the response of the villagers to the extreme suppression of the village.

Further in the article are some letters that have been preserved in the archives of the former Council for Collective Farm Affairs. The best analysis of the state of affairs was made in an anonymous letter from "a group of heads of collective farms in the Kirov region", written in October 1948. The commentary says that the Ministry of Internal Affairs tried to find its author. Here are some quotations from the

... letter: We very much wish that an authoritative government commission would come here from the center in order to verify the stated facts.

We want to inform you in advance so that this commission ... would be convinced in practice how the ordinary collective farmer lives and what he eats, who for the most part lead a half-starved existence ... In most collective farms of the region, all grain is pumped out in the order of grain procurement, without leaving grain for seeds not to mention the forage fund... Many chairmen and foremen of collective farms were imprisoned only because they gave out grain in excess of 15% of what was handed over to the state, satisfying the minimum needs of starving collective farmers who could not do even light work... As a rule, since the new year, the collective farmer has nothing to eat, his body is depleted ... If it were not for the household plots on which the collective farmer now sows grain, many collective farmers would die of exhaustion. Having the right to life, the collective farmer is forced to find bread. He goes to the district, and there they don't sell bread in stores. In agricultural areas, the abolition of the rationing system is not felt. Previously, bread was sold on ration cards, now on lists and only for those working in institutions and organizations. Where can a collective farmer go for bread? Only in the regional center - the city of Kirov. And they go. Collective farmers go 60-100 km to buy one or two loaves of bread... The mood of urban workers is no better than that of the countryside. Their thoughts and aspirations are focused on questions: how to buy bread, how not to remain hungry... The cost of living for the working people of the city is extremely high. The salary received by the average worker and employee is enough for 5-10 days, and the remaining 20-25 days he is on half-starvation rations, not to mention buying clothes ... Our proposals: 1. Reduce grain supplies ... 2. Raise the standard of living of collective farmers . Leave the collective farmer the required amount of bread. Interest the bread manufacturer and not

leave him hungry.

3. Sell less bread abroad, feed your people to the fullest. 4. Reduce the tax

burden... What blasphemy in this regard

Stalin's New Year's wishes to the Japanese peasants for 1952 "free themselves from high taxes" look like!

But as soon as Stalin died, high taxes were also reduced from Soviet peasants from July 1, 1953, according to the Law "On Agricultural Tax" adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of August 8, 1953 ("Code of Laws of the USSR", volume 5, M., "Izvestia", 1984, pp. 473-477). According to it, collective farmers began to pay tax at fixed rates on one hundredth of a hectare of land in personal use, and, moreover, regardless of the total amount of income. In addition, many benefits were envisaged and, in general, a "significant reduction" in the final tax amount (compared to previous years). This can be compared with the transition from surplus to tax in kind in the early 1920s after the civil war. But 1953 is not formally considered a "post-war year." The Great War for the USSR ended 8 years ago. Why then the state of emergency? Is it only for the fastest restoration of the national economy, as official Soviet historiography assured about this? But even that explanation doesn't quite fit. After all, officially the "economic wounds of the war" were "healed" earlier, somewhere by 1950. But the "surplus appraisal" continued until 1953. And it is not clear why it was replaced by a "tax in kind" if the "Cold War" and the arms race did not stop. It's strange: the "threat" from the West remains, for the sake of this, Soviet nuclear missile forces are rapidly developing, the military bloc "Warsaw Pact" is being created (in 1955), and for some reason the emergency situation inside the USSR has ceased?

Now about the workers, about "improving" their well-being. For many years after Stalin, the people retained the memory (including in the form of securities bonds) of the post-war MANDATORY loans for the restoration of the national economy, the payments of which were "frozen" by Khrushchev for 20 years. In the 60s, 70s and early 80s, one could sometimes hear indignant statements from the older generations that, they say, they signed up for whole salaries, tore them away from themselves, and what did he (Khrushchev) do? Deceived!

But it turns out that the system of state loans is not a post-war invention. They were before the war. It turns out that with their help, the Soviet state successfully withdrew part of the money issued to the workers, including for work in the increasingly used overtime.

In this regard, in the book "Day-M" there is an interesting conclusion:

"And then ... you begin to understand the meaning of the Great Stalinist purge. Stalin needs the best planes, the best tanks, the best guns, and that's it - in the Stakhanov period and so that they don't spend a lot of money on development. And now the designers are in prisons, in "sharaga" "... Tupolev's deputy G. Ozerov recalls: "Volnyag" was transferred to a mandatory ten-hour working day, they also work most Sundays. Confidence in the inevitable war is growing among the people, people understand this in their

guts ..." And this is in 1940! Strange thing: the people were waiting for the war, moreover, as a result of the measures taken by the government. But for the government itself, the German attack was unexpected! Then for what kind of war was SUCH preparation made? And why was the same policy pursued after the war? The same loans, the same "sharags", the growth of camps, the hasty development of the best weapons in the world and

their production in the Stakhanov period? But if we remember that in the age of the scientific and technological revolution, new weapons are rapidly aging, then we get an unambiguous answer to these questions - ALL THIS WAS DONE WITH THE PURPOSE OF UNLEASHING A NEW WORLD WAR

And thanks to the atmosphere of the constant threat of arrest for the most insignificant reasons, there was practically no unrest among the population in most of the Soviet Union. The pre-war criminal legislation was supplemented and improved. "As needed" issued new decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Moreover, the policy of terror was carried out not only for the sake of subordinating the broad working masses and reducing the cost of their well-being. Another goal was pursued - to subjugate a large number of economic bosses who had significant opportunities to disrupt the activities of the central government. Moreover, such an opportunity was not just there, it manifested itself in the early 30s. And Stalin saw by a clear example that without a general atmosphere of fear it would be very difficult to organize the mass production of industrial products for a specific purpose at the lowest cost, with the best quality in the world and in the shortest possible time. Such products, as already shown above, can only be weapons and property for the troops. Moreover, subject to rapid use for its intended purpose.

Manufacturing the best washing machine in the world does not require frantic deadlines. The washing machine does not quickly become obsolete - if only it was washing. But military equipment usually tends to quickly become obsolete, and property deteriorates, which can lead to failure to complete a combat mission if the enemy has equipment of the same quality or even better. And

if the leadership of the country seriously plans to start a big war in the near future, then it becomes necessary to create such an atmosphere in society that none of the directors of plants and factories can resist any production plans and tasks of the government. A developed democracy always bears the threat of raising doubts about the correctness of its measures. In the context of preparations for an imminent major war, this is unacceptable. And such an opportunity existed in the USSR until the early 1930s. The story of the "Ryutinskaya platform", which is rarely paid attention to, can serve as proof.

Considering the high-profile falsified trials of the 30s, historians paid more attention to the trials of prominent party figures of that period - G. Zinoviev, L. Kamenev, N. Bukharin and others. However, the list of charges against him included participation in Ryutin's "conspiracy", although Martemyan Ryutin did not belong to the top party leadership group and was convicted back in October 1932. He joined the Bolshevik Party in 1914. In 1924 - 1928. worked as secretary of the Krasnopresnensky

district party committee of Moscow. At the 15th Congress of the CPSU(b) in 1927 he was elected as a candidate member of the Central Committee. Together with Stalin, he took part in the fight against the "new" and Trotskyist-Zinovievist opposition. However, after 1927, he did not agree with the application of emergency measures to the peasantry, in connection with which he was accused of conciliation with the "rightists" and was released from the work of the secretary of the district party committee. In 1929, Ryutin went as an authorized representative of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for collectivization to Eastern Siberia (which he knew well, because at one time he took an active part in the formation of Soviet power in the Baikal region). Returning to Moscow, he wrote a note to the Politburo of the Central Committee with information about the facts of violence and excesses in collective farm construction. She angered Stali

soon Ryutin saw his main thoughts on the pages of Pravda in Stalin's article "Dizziness from Success" and in the letter of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On the fight against distortions of the party line in the collective farm movement", the negative attitude towards Ryutin intensified. Soon he received a statement to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks with information that he spoke sharply negatively about the policy of the Central Committee of the party headed by Stalin. It served as the basis for initiating a criminal case on his charge of counter-revolutionary propaganda and agitation. But in January 1931 he was released due to lack of evidence. For the last year and a half before his new arrest in September 1932, he worked as an economist at Soyuzelectro.

In March 1932, being concerned about the widespread gross violations of intra-party democracy, the imposition of administrative-command methods in the leadership of party and state affairs, he prepared two documents: "Stalin and the crisis of the proletarian dictatorship" and an appeal "To all members of the CPSU (b)". Other old party members also took part in editing them - M. S. Ivanov (member of the party since 1906), V. N. Kayurov (member of the party since 1900) and his son A. V. Kayurov (member of the party since 1914). Then they began to spread their ideas among other communists and found like-minded people. On August 21, 1932, a kind of "constituent" meeting took place in the village of Golovino near Moscow, at which its participants decided to create a political organization called the Union of Marxist-Leninists. The main goal of their activities for the near future, the participants of the new union began to consider the distribution of their documents among the members of the CPSU (b). But this path was fraught with the threat of failure if any of the newly agitated would inform the leadership of the CPSU (b) about this. And so it happened: on September 14, 1932, the Central Committee of the party received an application against the "Ryutin group", and the next day the leaders of the new "union" were arrested. For a long time, the documents of the "Ryutin group" were not published until they appeared in 1991 in the collection "REHABILITATION: POLITICAL PROCESSES OF

THE 30-50S" (Under the general editorship of A. N. Yakovlev). It also provides a detailed description of the course of the investigation and the liquidation of the participants in the "union". But due to the fact that they could not achieve any serious results in their

struggle, their activities were not subsequently paid much attention. But Stalin himself was very excited about the emergence of such a group, and he remembered him for many years. First, in

the "platform of the Ryutin group" a lot of space was devoted to listing his shortcomings, his desire for unlimited personal power and fears for the fate of the country and its citizens. Of the 12 sections of the "platform", the first four are devoted to the analysis of Stalin's character and methods: 1. "Chance"

and the role of the individual in history 2.

Stalin as an unprincipled politician 3.

Stalin as a sophist 4.

Stalin as a leader and

theoretician evidence of a crisis both in the party and in the country, and was called upon to slow down the pace of industrialization, stop violence against the peasantry and take care of improving the well-being of citizens. And the main condition for getting out of the current situation was considered the removal of Stalin from power. Moreover, the authors of the "platform" did not abandon the idea of building socialism, communism and the world revolution. However, during the investigation, the members of the "union" were accused of calling for the overthrow of Soviet power, and not just a threat to Stalin. But not only she could disturb him. Let's see who was among the

founders of the "union" by position: the head of the group of the People's Commissariat of the RCT of the RSFSR MS Ivanov; secretary of the board of "Soyuzmoloko" NP

Kayurova; Director of the 26th Moscow Printing

House P. A. Galkin; Professor of the Moscow Peat Institute

P. P. Fedorov; director of the trust "Kinomekhprom"

Soyuzkino V. B. Gorelov; head of the department of the

People's Commissariat of Supply of the Ukrainian SSR B.

M. Ptashny; manager of the

association "Giprokoks" N. I. Vasiliev; his deputy S. V. Tokarev.

Thus, it turns out that in the early 1930s, dissatisfaction with the methods of rapid industrialization manifested itself among economic leaders, on whom the pace of this very industrialization depended primarily.

Moreover, this was not the first manifestation of discontent. Back in

1930, similar concerns were voiced by: the chairman of the Council of People's Com

candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU(b) Syrtsov and member of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) Lominadze. They enlisted the support of a number of local party secretaries. Both of them were expelled from the party in December 1930. Lominadze committed suicide in 1935.

What did this threaten Stalin with? This did not pose a particular threat to his personal power within the USSR. But the hopes for a world revolution, the peaceful ways of accomplishing which Stalin did not see at all, were sharply hampered, hoping only for a new world war. But a world war requires huge costs. Hence the need to completely subdue the economic commanders. But this can be done in two ways: material incentives for both directors and workers (which require huge funds, which in the event of war can be uselessly lost) or threats. Stalin chose the second path. And in order to consolidate and develop an atmosphere of fear, he began to intensify the policy

of terror. Moreover, the first blows were carried out against the working masses and against economic leaders at the level of directors of enterprises. A good reason for strengthening police control over the country was the murder of Kirov on December 1, 1934, whose killers Stalin suggested looking for among the former members of the Zinoviev opposition. In the two and a half months after December 1, 1934, 843 people were arrested by the NKVD in Leningrad alone. But soon the cases of 77 arrested persons (of which 65 were communists) were separated into a separate proceeding, which received the name "The case of the Leningrad counter-revolutionary Zinoviev group of Safarov, Zalutsky and others." Among the defendants on it were students, housewives, and workers. This created the appearance

of the scale and branching of the "conspiracy". But the main group was made up of managers or specialists of the main management level, for example: deputy managers of Lenkozhrest A.I. Alexandrov and V.A. Vinogradov; factory director Zhelyabova S. I. Bogachev; director of the plant

"Engine" V. A. Brodsky; N. A. Dmitriev, head of the Soyuztransstroy office;

head of "Stroitrest" G. M. Dryazgov; P. A. Zalutsky, manager of the Stroy Mashina trust; director of "Lensnabtrans" I. S. Kostritsky; director of bakery No 12 G. I. Mironov; director of aircraft factory No. 20 I. K. Naumov; G. P. Potashnikov, head of the group at Plant No. 103, and

others. As a result of the first trial, out of 77 people, 76 were imprisoned in concentration camps or exiled for periods of 4 to 5 years. G. I. Safarov was assigned expulsion for a period of 2 years. But most of them were subsequently shot or died in places of detention (collection "REHABILITATION ...", pp. 123 - 130).

In parallel with this case, the Moscow Center case was falsified, in which 19 people were convicted, almost all of whom also held high managerial positions before their arrest. But Stalin did not stop there, and by the beginning of the war, an atmosphere of fear had become an element of the ordinary life of every citizen of the USSR. It also continued after 1945, testifying to Stalin's attempts to bring the World Revolution closer by unleashing a new world war. In most of the country, the people were subdued and offered no resistance.

However, the residents of the new Western republics and regions of the USSR, who had become acquainted with the "humanism" of the Soviet government before June 1941, did not agree with this. After 1945, they did not meekly wait for their fate, and many of them took up arms. But this is a topic for another large separate discussion. Here I also propose to read an eloquent excerpt from the memoirs of Y. Chirkov, quoted above, who served his term in Ukhtizmlag (or Ukhta-Izhemlag) in the Komi Republic: - In July 1940, many

Poles from the eastern half of Poland, liberated by the Red Army, were transferred to Ukhtizhmlag. In July, the Red Army entered Bessarabia, Bukovina, then the Baltic states... The camp wits predicted the imminent appearance of the Balts and Moldavians on Ukhta land, and the head of the amateur arts of Ukhtasovkhoz was already looking forward to staging folk dances in the state farm club by the forces of future prisoners from the new republics.. Winter (1940-1941) on general

work was hard to bear. The death rate increased sharply, but there was no shortage of labor force: the arrest vehicle was working properly. This winter, they were mainly delivered from the liberated regions: Western Ukrainians, Belarusians, Poles, Balts, Finns, Moldovans ... In early February (1941), a large female group from Poland arrived at the Ukhta state farm. [Polish] Jerome, who came running to work very late, saw these poor women, even talked to many. They were brought from Lvov. In stages for almost six months. They don't speak Russian, they don't have things. Even pots and bowls are not for everyone. He was greatly impressed by two girls of 17-18 years old, who were given eight years. [Then they all ended up either in peat extraction or logging].

Thus, many residents of the new western territories of the USSR could not have a happy future. At the same time, the past war left a lot of weapons on those lands and gave the experience of armed struggle. And many did not put it down after the Victory.

But of course, it must be taken into account that not only conscious opponents of the new government, but also people with a criminal past could go into the forests. Or those who are accustomed to "free" life (i.e., accustomed to getting food and everything else from civilians for nothing under the guise of fighting the authorities) could remain in the forests. However, the Soviet government did not go to any peace negotiations with the rebels. It demanded the unconditional recognition of Soviet power, using a variety of methods to achieve this goal. We will not consider them now, but we will turn to another element of terror against our own - the mass evictions of entire peoples, mainly from the Crimea

and the Caucasus. Officially, this was explained by the fact that most of the representatives of these nations collaborated with the German occupiers. But that doesn't explain everything. Any person accused of something usually answers himself. And if you count how many people of different nationalities went to the service of the Germans during the war years, then representatives of the Russians will not be the last among them. Suffice it to recall the "Russian Liberation Army" of General Vlasov or a large contingent of "policemen".

But what if we look at the places of post-war evictions of peoples geographically? On the territory of the Crimea, Zaporozhye and

Kherson region on July 9, 1945, the Tauride Military District was formed (disbanded on April 4, 1956). In the North

Caucasus and Transcaucasia, military districts were also reorganized (in 1945, 1946, 1949), until a stable structure arose in 1953. And in Western Ukraine there were no military districts before the war. They appeared in 1945. (The word "they" here means two districts: Carpathian and Lvov, later (in 1946) united with Carpathian.)

The Caucasus and Crimea were the southernmost areas in front of Turkey, the capitalist ally of the USA and England. And Western Ukraine (and in general - all the western regions of the Soviet Union) - the westernmost territories of the USSR in relation to the capitalist countries of Europe. In other words, in the event of war, these areas were turned into the rear zones of the fronts for the Soviet Army. And the presence of any opposition in them could interfere with the successful supply of the army in the field. Moreover, armed detachments such as the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) could turn into a base for enemy landings. But if this idea explains something with the Ukrainian rebels, then what kind of threat

could the Crimean Tatars pose to Stalin? To answer this question, it is necessary to become more familiar with the eviction policy pursued by Stalin. This can be done thanks to various documents published in recent years in various

publications.

in the USSR
OF THE USSR IN COLLECTION OF DECISIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT PARTICULAR" (N: 16-17, 1991) there is a resolution dated 06.06.1991 N: 336 "On the abolition of the resolutions of the former State Defense Committee of the USSR and decisions of the Government of the USSR in relation to the Soviet peoples subjected to repressions and violent resettlement" (with the removal of the secrecy stamp). He canceled 47 different decisions of the leadership of the USSR, including: - Two decrees of 1936 on eviction from Ukraine to Kazakhstan Polish and German farms.

- 8 decrees and resolutions of August-October 1937 on the eviction of Koreans from the Far East to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. -

10 decrees and resolutions of September-November 1941 on the eviction of Germans not only from the Volga region, but also from other regions of European

parts of the USSR.

- Decree of 11/6/1943 "On the procedure for settling the former Karachay Autonomous District of the Stavropol Territory".

- Decree 05/11/1944 "On the Crimean Tatars". -

Decree of 05/29/1944 "On the issuance of livestock and food grain to special settlers - Karachays, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars and Kalmyks in exchange for cattle and grain taken from them in places of eviction."

- Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated 11/24/1948 No 4367-1726 "On deportees."

- Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated May 29, 1949 No 2214-856 "On ensuring the transportation, resettlement and employment of migrants from the territory of the Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijan SSR, as well as from the Black Sea coast." - Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated

10.08.1951 No 14133. And among the documents published in the journal "History of the USSR", N: 1 for 1992 under the general heading "40 - 50s: CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEPORTATION OF PEOPLES", is given "Information about the number of deportees and special settlers... (1948-1949)" (p. 130). In it, the first two columns were the following (the sequence of lines was changed than in the original, and a comment was added): Name of the special contingent Was resettled to a special settlement
Comment - 1 - 2 - 3 Germans 1,024,722 "Volksdeutsche" 5,914 "half-Germans" Chechens, Ingush, Karachays, Balkars 608,749

Peoples of the North Caucasus Crimean
Tatars, Bulgarians,

Armenians,
Greeks 228,392

Peoples of
Crimea Turks, Kurds,

Khemshins 94,955
Peoples
of

Transcaucasia Kalmyks 91,919 Language related to Buryats (north-
western

Caspian region) Lithuanians 49,331 Poles (in 1947 they were liberated from the special s
taken again)

41,722

"OUN-sheep"
100,310

Western Ukraine
"Vlasovtsy"
148,079

"Ukazniki" (by decree of 11/26/1948)
16,465

"Repetitionists"
"IPKh"

1,502 ? Former
kulaks

962,251

TOTAL:

3,374,311 The certificate
contains

the amount: 3,332,589

(i.e., excluding Poles) On November 26, 1994, the following was reported
in the program "After the Empire" of the radio station "Svoboda": 25.07 .1944
Beria suggested to Stalin that the Meskhetian Turks and some other peoples of
southern Georgia be evicted to improve control in the border area. On
07/31/1944, a GKO decree was issued on the eviction of these peoples, but the
eviction itself was carried out on 11/15/1944. Khemshins in the program are
called relatives of the Armenians. On the 23rd of February there was an eviction

Chechens in 1944 (this date was heard in many radio and newspaper reports related to the Chechen events after November 1994).

What was wrong with the Greeks? Also massively helped the Germans? Or were their homes in unfortunate proximity to the border? Or maybe to "control" some participants in the Greek civil war? The eviction was carried out in the Central Asian republics of the USSR, Kazakhstan, the Krasnoyarsk Territory and

regions of Siberia. Thus, from 1944 to 1949, millions of civilians were evicted from the Crimea and the Caucasus with the territories adjacent to it. But the eviction from these places continued in subsequent years (judging by the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated 05/29/1949 No 2214-856 "On ensuring the transportation, resettlement and employment of migrants from the territory of the Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijan SSR, as well as from the Black Sea coast").

According to the language, Karachays, Balkars, Crimean Tatars and Transcaucasian Turks (-Meskhetians) belong to the Turkic language family (as do the Turks of Turkey). In addition, from the peoples of the Caucasus, this language family also includes Azerbaijanis. But Stalin did not evict them, at least en masse. It was difficult to do this, since it would mean the liquidation of the union republic, which was unrealistic. On the other hand, many Azerbaijanis live in northern Iran, for which Stalin had special plans (discussed earlier). The facts show that before June

22, 1941, civilians were evicted from the border area by the Germans. Such measures are carried out according to the war preparation plan. If Stalin was planning an attack on Turkey (and on Greece), then the task naturally arises of evicting civilians precisely from the Crimea, the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus and from the Caucasus itself (primarily "sympathetic" nations). To do this before the start of the war would be too noticeable. In addition, the political and economic situation after 1945 did not allow us to accurately determine the time of the war with Turkey. Under these conditions, it became important to carry out the eviction gradually, taking into account various formal reasons as much as possible (supposedly mass aiding the Nazis, improving control in the border zone, etc.). True, the liberated areas were settled by a certain number of other settlers. But with them

if necessary, it would be much easier to deal with than with the indigenous people. In concluding

this chapter, it should be noted that the theme of terror does not end there. Since 1949, Stalin "launched" a "preventive purge" among the economic leadership of the country ("Leningrad case"), as a result of which they were shot:

chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, 1st deputy Stalin in the government, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - N. A. Voznesensky

(who was called "civilian Zhukov" during the

war); Chairman of the State Planning

Committee of the RSFSR N. V. Basov;

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks A. A. Kuznetsov and others (more than 200

people in total). Over 2,000 managers have been fired in three years. ("THEY WERE NOT SILENT", compiled by A.V. Afanasyev, M., 1991). From the point of view of preparing for a new war and clearly shifting the economy back to a state of mobilization, such a step may well be logical. And at the same time, Stalin "removed" witnesses both of his not the best decisions to start the war (for example, A. A. Kuznetsov witnessed his fear of surrendering Leningrad to the Germans in the autumn of 1941), and those who led the pre-war transfer of the Soviet economy to martial law and could have guessed Stalin's true plans after 1948. There is even evidence that he was going to carry out a "purge" among his inner circle and dramatically increase

the number of arrests in 1953. But terror does not exhaust the preparations for a new war. The army must fight. There has already been a conversation about the preparation of aviation and some "special" equipment. But the rest of the troops were

also preparing. This is what the next chapter is

about. 11. THE RED ARMY IS THE STRONGEST OF EVERYONE... In any story about the army, it is impossible to exclude the use of various military terms, the meaning of which must be well understood. Therefore, below is an explanation of s

1. Military "units" include structures from a battalion and below ("companies", "platoons", "detachments" and their corresponding ones in different branches of the military ("squadrons" and "links" in aviation, "divisions", "batteries" , "platoon" and "crews" of artillerymen, etc.).

"Subdivisions" have internal numbering (inside the "unit"): 3rd company, 2nd platoon, etc. 2.

"Units" include "regiments" and separate "battalions". They have all-army numbering. For example: 13th tank regiment, 99th separate reconnaissance battalion, etc. But this true numbering is secret. In "everyday" life, especially for postal communications, another, also all-army numbering is used through the "military unit" ("military unit"), for example: "military unit 36759", "military unit 20004", etc. Unlike "subdivisions", the headquarters of "units" have different support and support services. Accordingly, the structure of "parts" also includes non-combat units, for example, a regimental band (aka a funeral team).

3. Structures larger than "parts" are called "junctions". These include "divisions", "corps", "groups" and "armies". They also have all-army numbering. For example: 4th Guards Tank Division, 19th Air Army, etc. 4. To ensure the implementation of

strategic plans in wartime, "fronts" are created with their headquarters. They were usually referred to by names or a combination of a number and a name. For example: "Trans-Baikal" front, "2nd Ukrainian" front, etc.

5. The rules of engagement are divided into rules of "combat work", "tactics" and "strategy" depending on the level of command.

6. Theater of operations - theater of operations. This is the name given to some territories that have special geographical or natural names, for example: "Far Eastern" theater of operations, "Western European" theater of operations, "Sea" theater

of operations, etc. 7. When talking about the command of "formations", they use the term "management", which means not only the "headquarters", but also the commander himself with his deputies, who are not formally included in the "headquarters". The "headquarters" is under the commander and has its own leader - the "chief of staff".

8. The rules of "strategy", "tactics" and "combat work" are not developed for each military structure, but are of a general nature for all armed forces, regardless of the theater of operations, although there are clarifications for local conditions, but also universal. For example, there are no rules for waging war only in the Alps or only in the Cordillera.

There are clarifications on the war in the mountains, on the plains, in the Arctic. But the general rules of "tactics" and "strategy" in these areas remain in force. Accordingly, by their development it is possible to determine the plans of the enemy. For example, Soviet historians are constantly confused when determining the date of transformation of the departments of some military districts (Baltic, Western, Kiev) into front departments on the eve of June 22, 1941. The exact date is June 19. But often it is rounded up to June 22 - they say, the difference is small. But sorry, on June 19 there was no German attack! They attacked unexpectedly! Nobody expected their attack! And the fronts - the management structure ONLY FOR WAR - were created in advance! For what? For simple workouts?

9. As a rule, detailed information about military districts, biographies of military leaders, and some other information was taken from the unclassified "SOVIET MILITARY ENCYCLOPEDIA", eight volumes of which were published in Moscow in the 70s and early 80s by the Military Publishing House.

Other concepts will be explained as the topic is presented, which we will begin with a general conclusion: the events in the Soviet Army and the Soviet Navy in the period 1945-1953 also convincingly show that the leadership of the USSR at that time did not just pay attention to sufficient defense against a possible military attack, but actively prepared its armed forces for an imminent offensive war. Training of troops is usually carried out in

several directions: - technical; - operational-structural (the number of

units and formations, as well as their deployment in theaters of military operations (TVD) and in the rear area according to mobilization plans); - combat (the ability of soldiers and officers

to conduct combat operations or, as it is called in the troops, the ability to perform combat work and the ability to lead troops); - moral and psychological (including

political). According to the original plan of this

study, it was supposed to present all areas of troop training in one chapter. Moreover, it was planned to pay the main attention to the operational-structural. However, a lot of interesting things were also found on the technical side.

preparation (especially in 1995-1996), which led to the need to separate it into a separate chapter. 11.1. TECHNICAL

PREPARATION Although the first

chapters have already provided information on especially important or special types of weapons, there is interest to revisit this issue and see how, for example, tanks were improved after the war, the history of which is given in several issues of the magazine "TEKHNIKA-MOLODEZHI" for 1990 year.

The famous T-34 tank was replaced by the T-44 tank in 1944. Its fundamental difference was a different arrangement of the engine - transverse. This made it possible to move the turret closer to the center of the hull, which reduced the level of rolling for the crew while moving. There were other innovations as well. Outwardly, the T-44 resembled a hybrid of the chassis of the subsequent model (T-54) with a tower from the T-34. The T-44 was successfully tested at the

front and was put into service. But in 1946, the next model appeared - the T-54 tank, which withstood several modifications (in 1949, in 1951 (two), in 1952 (two) and in 1954). In 1955, the T-55 tank with anti-nuclear protection appeared, although more improved seals of rubbing parts began to be made already in 1951. From the same 1951, an ejection device began to be used to purge the barrel. This allows you to fire on the move. From the 1952 model, night vision devices with an infrared searchlight and a TPN-1 night sight were installed, as well as the Cyclone system for stabilizing the gun in two planes and a device for forcing rivers along the bottom up to 5 meters and up to 700 m wide. By

the way, a few words about the "outdated combat training" BT-5 and BT-7, which supposedly could not offer any resistance to the "medium" and "heavy" German tanks in 1941 (in the words of Marshal I. Kh. Bagramyan and other veterans, which they repeatedly allow in their memoirs). Firstly, I personally do not understand the term "combat training" tank, having experience in serving in a tank regiment. A tank can be either fully combat or fully training (for example, with a transparent tower welded from pipes, or have a rubber cannon and a plywood hull). A training battle tank can be made by drilling a hole in its main barrel so that it cannot be fired correctly. Or you can highlight

several fully combat tanks for training exercises. But at the same time, they will remain combat, only with a smaller technical resource. And according to Marshal Baghramyan, it turns out that the bulk of Soviet tanks in 1941 were either with drilled barrels or were made of plywood - but this is NOT TRUE! Almost all tanks in the regiments are BATTLE and are divided into two groups: those that are in the main boxes for long-term storage with rare trips and those that are in constant training mode (a special "field" park was allocated for this in the Kantemirovskaya division) . In fact, the latest technical solutions were implemented on the BT-5 and BT-7 tanks. And

it is not their fault that the factories did not keep up with the very rapid technical progress in this area of weapons. For example, on the BT-5 they tested a telecontrol system for undermining bunkers and engineering obstacles, and in 1936 equipment was tested to overcome water obstacles along the bottom (4-5 m deep). Since 1938, the BT-7 tanks were equipped with a TOS telescopic sight with stabilization of the field of view in the vertical plane. The BT-7M was modified with the V-2 tank diesel engine, which had just been mastered by the industry, which was then installed on the T-34. Since 1946, the T-54 and its modifications have been superior to foreign medium tanks in all respects, and its gun (100 mm

caliber) was the most powerful. Only 12 years later, the British created a more powerful 105 mm tank gun.

In addition to improving the medium tank, the production and modernization of heavy tanks of the IS series ("Joseph Stalin") continued in the USSR. In the second half of the war, the IS-2 was used in battles, at the very end of the war, the IS-3 appeared with a semicircular flattened turret and a special form of frontal armor (nicknamed "pike nose"). After the war, this tank continued to be modernized, as hidden defects were revealed. In

1947, the IS-4 appeared, but it turned out to be too heavy (60 tons), which reduced its maneuverability (and in addition, it is desirable that the weight of the tank with the weight of the cargo railway platform does not exceed 60 tons, otherwise transportation across bridges is difficult). Therefore, they were released a little and sent to the Far East. But in 1948

a heavier tank - IS-7 weighing 68 tons, with a 1050 hp marine diesel engine. and a 130 mm cannon. But it turned out to be too heavy, and by this time the military reconsidered the role of heavy tanks in the war with nuclear weapons. In accordance with the new tactics, medium tanks were supposed to break through the defenses, and heavy tanks, following them, were supposed to hit various enemy targets from afar. Therefore, since 1950, the troops began to receive a new lighter tank IS-8 (weight - 51.5 tons). A few years later it was renamed the T-10, which then went through three upgrades (until 1962).

The IS-8 (or T-10) tank was also considered the best in its class for some time. But here the question may arise about the new tactics of their application. Since the advent of tanks, their main role was considered to be a breakthrough in enemy defenses. Then, with the improvement of anti-tank weapons, they began to produce tanks of different classes: heavy - for breaking through the defense and medium - both for breaking through and for supporting and escorting the advancing infantry. But why, according to the new rules, heavy tanks had to be launched BEHIND the troops going to break through? It has already been said above that this is connected with the possible use of atomic weapons. And what does it change? The main thing in atomic explosions is the destruction of everything within a certain radius from the epicenter of the explosion. It turns out that the task of the medium tanks going first is not to break through the defense, but to assume the consequences of a nuclear explosion! And, of course, they all die. And for this business it is more profitable to use cheaper medium tanks (even better - outdated ones, they will burn out anyway). Well, to capture a radioactively contaminated territory, of course, it is more useful to launch more advanced

and more reliable heavy tanks. (And who is to be entrusted with the levers of the medium tanks that go first - the penalized ones?). It is this situation that is artistically depicted in the 17th section of the fantastic story by the Strugatsky brothers "Inhabited Island". First, a penal tank brigade on obsolete tanks was sent into the breakthrough. And already behind them were "normal" army tank units on more modern ones. The task of the penalty box was to provoke the enemy to use atomic weapons against them. In the meantime, they all died. And the army had a chance to break through further. Strange coincidence with real tactics

the failed war will continue, but for now let's return to the post-war technical preparation.

In addition to tanks and aircraft, then much attention was paid to other types of main weapons. In particular, the replacement of personal weapons of soldiers began to be carried out, which in the war of 1941-1945 was of two types: rifles and submachine guns (called automatic weapons for short). Non-specialists usually see only the following difference between them: rifles are long and fire single rounds, and machine guns are shorter and can fire bursts, which is convenient in close combat. But despite this, for some reason, rifles were not removed from service for a long time, until the Kalashnikov assault rifle (AK-47) appeared in 1947. In 1992, a

military publishing house in Moscow published a very detailed book by A. B. Zhuk "SMALL ARMS (revolvers, pistols, rifles, submachine guns, machine guns)", which contains not only the technical characteristics of various small arms from different countries, but and explains the history of its development. It turns out that for a long time the

designers of soldier's firearms primarily solved the problem of increasing the effective range of fire. And this depended on the magnitude of the charge, the length of the barrel and the rifling system in it, which, in turn, increased the requirements for the locking mechanism. Ultimately, at the beginning of the 20th century, a rifle cartridge allowed a bullet to fly at a distance of up to 3 km. Thus, it was possible to shoot accurately from a rifle at long distances, measured in hundreds of meters (for a Mosin rifle, up to 2200 m). But in this case, it is a single fire that is more effective, i.e. automation is almost unnecessary. In parallel with the

development of long-barreled firearms (rifles), short-barreled firearms (pistols and revolvers) developed. They were intended for very close combat, when special accuracy is not required. In general, the aiming range of pistols is measured in several tens of meters, and the cartridge is very different from rifle.

But it cannot be said that the designers did not try to create automation mechanisms, which can be functionally divided into

two types: for automatic feeding of cartridges and automatic firing (bursts). First of all, the issues of

automatic feeding of cartridges were solved, which was widely developed on models of rifles and carbines. Automation of firing was more successful on pistol cartridges. So began to appear submachine guns ("machine guns"). However, due to the short effective range, they could not

completely displace the rifles.

In the USSR in the 30s, the Degtyarev submachine gun (PPD-34) was produced. But its release until 1939 was very limited, and in 1939 it was completely discontinued. However, close combat during the war with Finland in the winter of 1939-1940 showed the power of this weapon, which was widely used by Finnish soldiers. The Finns were armed with the Suomi submachine gun of the 1931 model. Its characteristics: caliber - 9 mm, empty weight - 4.68 kg, with cartridges - 7.09 kg, magazine capacity - 50 or 71 cartridges. Outwardly, it was very similar to the Soviet PPD-34, but the magazine held more rounds. As a result, at the beginning of 1940, submachine guns were again adopted by the Red Army.

At first it was the PPD-40 model, and then the Shpagin submachine gun (PPSh-41) began to be widely manufactured. Their characteristics are approximately the same: caliber - 7.62 mm, empty weight - 3.63 kg, with cartridges - 5.45 kg, magazine capacity - 35 (horn) or 71 (disc). But the PPSh was easier to manufacture, which is why it became the main machine gun of Soviet soldiers during the war. In Germany, the main "machine guns" were also submachine guns (MP series: MP-38, MP-40, MP-41), often called the "Schmeisser submachine gun", although he was not their designer. They all had a caliber of 9 mm, the weight with cartridges from model to model decreased from 4.85 kg to 4.54 kg. They were created by the company "Erla" initially as a weapon for paratroopers, but later were manufactured by many enterprises and used in all branches of the Nazi Wehrmacht. However, as noted above, the short effective range did not allow for the complete abandonment of rifles both in the USSR and in Germany.

In the USSR, the modernized Mosin rifle of the 1891/1930 model was produced until 1944. Often it was called the "three-ruler"

according to the old measure of length, which measured its caliber (1 "line" = 2.54 mm, caliber 7.62 mm = 3 "lines"). And the PPSH had its drawbacks: it was heavy (even heavier than the Mosin rifle, which weighed 4.5 kg with cartridges) and had

insufficient aiming range. There were two ways to improve this case: somehow increase the accuracy of shooting and reduce the weight of submachine guns, or come up with something fundamentally new. Designers from different countries practiced both of these areas. In the USSR in 1942, a lightweight PPS-42 (Sudaev submachine gun) was created.

With cartridges, he weighed 3.63 kg. A fundamentally new solution was the use of an intermediate cartridge, less powerful than a rifle cartridge, but more powerful than a pistol cartridge. In the USSR, such a cartridge of 7.62 mm caliber was adopted in 1943, after which they began to create new models of machine guns and automatic rifles for it (although at the beginning of the 20th century, the Russian gunsmith Fedorov suggested switching to machine guns chambered for 6 mm caliber).

In the magazine "OGONEK", N: 11, 1993, on pages 22 - 26, an interview with designer Mikhail Kalashnikov, the creator of the world-famous machine gun, is printed. He says that he began to design them in 1941 in the hospital, where he ended up after being wounded at the front, where he was a tank sergeant. "The idea from the point of view of common sense," Kalashnikov recalls, "was adventurous. Not only did I not have a special education, but I didn't even know how to draw. And therefore I didn't draw, but drew the machine the way I saw it. was not, except for participation in the army competition of innovators and inventors, when I designed a mechanism to take into account the operation of a tank engine. However, as a result of hard work, he made his first machine gun (a submachine gun chambered for the TT pistol) and got with it to the gunsmith-theorist General Blagonravov, on whose recommendation Kalashnikov was sent to serve at a training ground near Moscow, which was the base of "one of the research institutes, who was engaged in the creation of small arms. Kalashnikov began to design the future

AK-47 in 1943 and finished in 1947. But other gunsmiths also made a new machine gun for the new cartridge of the 1943 model, incl. and General Degtyarev. However

The AK-47 was recognized as the best, which was put into service, after which it was considered classified for seven years. In 1949, Kalashnikov became a laureate of the Stalin Prize.

Of course, it is hard to believe that a self-taught person "from scratch" could come up with a technical sample better than many professionals. However, the historical truth is that there was nothing to "copy" the AK-47 at that time. But for the purposes of this study, it is useful to become more familiar with the history of the "intermediate cartridge" and weapons for it in different countries.

First, some technical details about the AK-47. In addition to the model with a wooden butt, there was a variant with a folding one (AK-47S). Their total length is approximately the same: 870 mm / 880 mm. The weight of both is 3.8 kg (1.65 kg lighter than PPSH). Magazine capacity - 30 rounds. Sighting range - 800 m. Automation is based on the principle of removal of powder gases. The barrel is locked by lugs rotating around the longitudinal axis of the bolt. Caliber 7.62 mm. By the way, when I first saw the AK-47 bolt, I was struck by the complexity of its shape, especially the curved cutouts on the sides. And the thought arose: "How could it be so thought out?" Unlike the USSR, in Germany, the development of an intermediate cartridge

was carried out earlier and already in 1942, experimental models of automatic carbines MKB-42 (B) and MKB-42 (X) chambered for 7.92 x 33 caliber appeared. And in 1944 it was adopted the MP-43 (MP-44) model was put into service. It was called "assault rifle". Externally, the MP-43 (MP-44) were very similar to the AK-47. The same layout, the shape of the front sight at the end of the barrel and magazine (horn) was approximately the same, there was also a channel for venting gases (above the barrel) and the widespread use of the stamping method in manufacturing. But the mechanism for locking the bore was different - by tilting the shutter in a vertical plane. Because of this, the relative vertical size of the MP-44 was larger than that of the AK-47. And other dimensions were larger than those of the Kalashnikov: length with a butt - 940 mm, weight - about 5 kg. But the magazine capacity was the same - 30 rounds and an effective range - 800 m. In the USA, an automatic carbine (Garanda) for an intermediate cartridge appeared in 1941. Its

caliber is 7.62 mm, magazine capacity is

15 rounds (since 1944 30), weight - 2.36 kg, effective range - 300 m. Outwardly, it looked like a light sports gun. This was achieved due to the fact that the shutter did not move vertically to lock the bore, but rotated around the longitudinal axis. The barrel was locked by its lugs. The shutter moved due to the removal of powder gases. The magazine "TEKHNICA-YOLODEZHI"

N: 12 for 1990 (p. 36-37) states that the Garand carbine under the intermediate cartridge was developed by the employees of the Winchester concern on the basis of the "normal" M-1 self-loading rifle of the same name, which Garand designed 10 years (from 1926 to 1936) and which by the end of 1945 had completely supplanted magazine rifles in the US Army. From the end of 1942 to 1949, the Americans produced at least 633,000 Baby Garands. Thus, some of the technical solutions used in the

AK-47 were already known in the world. Did Kalashnikov know about them? He should have known well, as an employee of a research institute, where information ABOUT ALL samples of small arms from around the world flocked. Moreover, in the USSR of that time, the borrowing of advanced foreign experience was greatly encouraged, as already discussed in the first chapters. In 1992, the Military Publishing House published M. Kalashnikov's book "Notes of a Gunsmith-Designer". In it, on page 141, the author confirms that he "studied, in particular, with the American designer Garand, when he designed a self-loading carbine at the end of the war." But in the chapter "ABOUT BLANK SPOTS..." I already expressed my

idea that in the field of armaments, a monopoly on technical ideas can lead to the temptation to unleash a new war, therefore it is unacceptable, and the class of weapons of different countries should be approximately the same. Therefore, I see no reason to strictly enforce patent law in this area.

And this study is not about casting a shadow on the glory of the AK-47. It takes talent to create a world-famous weapon. In particular, Kalashnikov writes in his book that after intermediate tests, he guessed in time to combine the bolt carrier with the piston in one piece. In addition, successful

the solution was to combine a fuse, a fire type translator and a protective cover from dirt and dust. Etc. The point is different.

In 1945 the great world war ended. There were a lot of small arms in the main participating countries, albeit old models, including captured ones. For the defense of ITS TERRITORY, it could well fit, at least for the next ten years. Germany tried to create an intermediate automaton, but it was defeated and the winners ruled it. Since 1941, the "intermediate" carbine "baby-garand" has been produced in the USA. But he had insufficient sighting range (although 300 m for close combat may well be enough). A new "intermediate" cartridge (T65) for the United States Army was developed already in 1952, and was put into service two years later - in 1954, including as the main NATO cartridge under the designation "7.62 x 51 NATO". But it turned out to be more powerful than the Soviet one, i.e. the weapon created for it is closer to the concept of "automatic rifle" than the AK-47. And in the USSR already in 1943 they adopted a new "intermediate" cartridge and announced a

competition for the creation of small arms for it. In 1947, the competition ended, the winning machine (AK-47) was urgently put into service with a stamp "secret". Of course, it is easier for soldiers to serve in any conditions (war or peace) with lighter machine guns. But was it really so important to urgently deal with the replacement of personal weapons of soldiers in the post-war period? When defending their land, ground transport is mainly used to move large masses of troops. Under these conditions, the PCA could well fit (of which there were "mountains"). Lighter weapons are important when transported by aircraft. The AK-47 was lighter than the PPSH by more than 1.5 kg and was more convenient than a rifle (while maintaining a fairly large aiming range). In short, under the conditions of preparing for war far from supply bases and with the widespread use of transport aviation, lighter and more unified weapons can be very useful. And it must be prepared in advance (which, in fact, was done). And before the start of hostilities, such an assault rifle had to be kept secret (which was also done). In vain, M. Kalashnikov, in his interview with the OGONEK magazine, complains that he does not understand why until 1954 his machine gun was listed

secret. That's why it was listed that something was being prepared. There are two options here: either it is "normal" to study history (at least on the basic facts) or generally do not touch the period 1945 - 1953! And remain "Ivans

who do not remember kinship"! But let's not digress and look at what else was done after the

war in the field of armaments. After the war, the personal weapons of the officers were also replaced - the Makarov pistol (PM) was adopted (also as a result of the competition). It turned out to be smaller and lighter than the TT pistol and had other advantages. And it was also created under the new cartridge of the 1945 model. It is quite possible that the Walther pistol of 1929 influenced its design, the design of which, as written in the book of A. B. Zhuk (p. 234), "turned out to be very successful, therefore in a number of countries it served as a model for creating new pistols, almost exactly the

same." We will not consider the situation with pistols in detail, we will only "fix" and move on to the history of another Soviet post-war lightweight weapon - landing artillery systems. S. Gryankin's article "ASU" was published about them in the journal "TEKHNIKA-MOLODEZHI" in N: 5, 1990. The

abbreviation "ASU" stands for "airborne self-propelled units." It turns out that after the war, the design bureau headed by N.A. Astrov, which was engaged in their development, was not disbanded. When designing new models, he was instructed to make extensive use of automotive components and assemblies. In 1949, the ASU-76 was created based on the engine from the GAZ-51E truck. But it turned out to be heavy for aircraft and did not go into the series. By 1951, a lighter ASU-57 was created (the M-20E engine from the Pobeda M-20 passenger car). Its weight is 3.3 tons. In 1954, the ASU-57P floating model appeared. But they didn't take it into service - "there were enough produced ASU-57s and the development of more powerful equipment has already begun."

In 1951, they began designing a new vehicle (SU-85) weighing 15.5 tons. The undercarriage was the same as that of the PT-76 amphibious tank. It was created simultaneously for ground and airborne troops. But the vast majority of installations came in the latter. Like all post-war armored vehicles,

the self-propelled gun was equipped with night vision devices, a radio station, and BDSH-5 smoke bombs were

attached to the back. The question of why the airborne troops (VDV) are needed is something I don't want to discuss here. I think one thought is enough - the Airborne Forces are needed only during an offensive. Especially in a surprise attack. And especially - with absolute dominance in the air. In all other situations, they turn into "golden fittings" - both expensive and bending. So what was the Soviet leadership thinking about when they ordered airborne self-propelled guns after a devastating war on their territory? Did you think they would defend their land from external attacks? From an external attack, something else is better suited: barbed wire; defensive lines with reinforced concrete firing points filled with cannons and machine guns; light grenade launchers against tanks, etc.

Airborne self-propelled guns somehow do not fit into defensive policy. But you can't erase a fact from history - it was! And how were they going to deliver airborne equipment? Including, apparently, on airplanes. For example, on the Il-12 aircraft built after the war, the landing version of which was produced under the Il-12D brand. Or on Tu-4. By the way, in the Kharkov magazine "AVIO" (No 5, 1996), most of which is devoted to the history of this aircraft, there is information about various research works on its use. It speaks openly about the development of chemical munitions for it (except for conventional and atomic). It also reports on attempts to adapt the Tu-4 for the transportation of various cargoes. In particular, a photograph of the attachment of the ASU-57 under its wing in a parachute container is provided. In addition, large landing gliders were

also developed. In the book edited by G. V. Novozhilov "Airplanes of the Design Bureau named after S. V. ILYUSHIN" (Moscow, "MACHINE-BUILDING" 1990), it is said that in 1948, on the instructions of the Air Force, the IL-32 glider was built to transport various equipment and oversized cargo with a total weight of 7 tons or troops up to 60 people (the photo is in the "DIGEST"). Its towing was planned by the four-engine IL-18 aircraft built by the same Design Bureau in 1946 (but which, until Stalin's death, was never put into serial production due to the fact that the TU-4 went into series, which could also tow

discussed glider). In addition, the heavy landing glider Yak-14 was also created in the Yakovlev Design Bureau (Information from the book by A. S. Yakovlev "The PURPOSE OF LIFE (notes of an aircraft designer)", M.:

"POLITIZDAT", 1969, p. 487). There is another interesting recollection in A. Yakovlev's book. He notes (on pp. 469-479) that at the end of the summer of 1952, Stalin decided to instruct two design bureaus (Mil and Yakovlev) to urgently create new helicopters. A year was allotted for all work (design, construction of prototypes and testing). The designers tried to challenge this deadline, but they were told that "things are too neglected", that "unlimited assistance will be provided, but the proposed period of one year is final and not subject to discussion." The designers agreed and a government decree was signed.

Yakovlev himself hints at what prompted Stalin to urgently organize the production of helicopters, citing the following information: "In the 30s and 40s, designers Igor Sikorsky and Pyasetsky worked very hard on helicopters in the United States, and in England - the Bristol company. .. The first to achieve the greatest success then was Sikorsky, who created a number of small single-rotor helicopters. Some of them were adopted by the American army and participated in the Korean War. Pyasetsky's work was also successful. He created medium-lift helicopters. His "workhorse" helicopter found widespread use in the US airborne troops. And the first Soviet helicopters were created, first of all, for the army. Yakovlev in 1952 was asked to urgently create a twin-engine helicopter car with a carrying

capacity of up to 4 tons. Mile - single-engine for 12 people. Work in the design bureau at Yakovlev was difficult. For a long time they could not reduce the shaking until they guessed to reduce the length of the blades. The Yak-24 helicopter was presented for state testing in December 1953.

By the way, in his book, Yakovlev cites an interesting circumstance related to this helicopter. It turns out that after Stalin's death, the hard deadline for the creation of the Yak-24 seemed to be forgotten. After the successful testing of the prototype machine, the designers even had to be reminded that the task had been completed, in particular,

Marshal Zhukov, who at the exhibition of new models of military equipment accidentally went into the Yak-24 to warm up. Strange. External enemies seem to have remained the same, but much has changed in domestic politics and the economy. "Sharply outdated"? It reminds me of something! But let us return again to the topic of post-war rearmament.

Extensive research and development work after the war was also carried out on other types of weapons. As noted above, more detailed information about this began to appear from the mid-90s (and earlier all this was considered secret). In particular, a large selection of materials was published in many issues of the journal "AVIATION AND COSMONAUTIKA" in the issues of 1995 and 1996 (moreover, in cooperation with other editorial offices ("TEKNIKA AND ARMS", etc.). A number of materials were published in the historical series of the journal "TEKNIKA-YOUTH". Here it is not possible and necessary to repeat all this in detail. But there is a need to at least list some special

topics that Soviet military designers worked on. In 1947, the development of the anti-ship aircraft of the "KOMET" projectile began. It was put into service in 1953, although it was put into production in 1952. During tests in front of Beria,

the COMET pierced the target ship through and through. a terrible idea for the use of these weapons: "During the war in Korea, the Politburo considered the use of the first 50 serial Kometa missiles against American aircraft carrier formations off the coast of Korea, for which it was supposed to use two regiments of Tu-4. Technically, this was feasible, but the proposal was rejected because there was a risk of a local war escalating into a world war. "In addition to cruise anti-ship missiles, cruise missiles of the German FAU-1 type (Soviet name - " 10X ") were also developed. winged guided (planning) bombs (work on which was carried out in OKB-2 of the Ministry of Agricultural Engineering).

Many developments were carried out for the navy. "On October 16, 1946, the government (USSR) adopted a program according to which, until 1955, it was planned to build warships according to new projects prepared taking into account the experience of the Second World War. Large submarines were also envisaged, which were to operate on ocean communications, block naval bases conduct operational reconnaissance. (Magazine "TEKHNICA-YOLODEZHI", No 2, 1996, p. 25 article by I. Bochir "THEY WERE CALLED "BUKS"). I didn't pay much attention to it, because I'm not fond of the pre-war period, but apparently, it was for their defense that they began to plan the construction of ocean-going ships and submarines in 1946. Otherwise, such plans can only be called offensive. perhaps only in anecdotes. And how many hundreds of thousands of tons of metal are needed to implement such "defensive" projects? And this after a devastating war, when millions lived in dugouts? And what experience of the war should have been taken into account? Maybe it was planned to install "snorkel" on Soviet submarines? - a device for operating the engine under water like on German ocean-going submarines?

Although a submarine in the Pacific Ocean is still somehow understandable. Blow up someone's base or ship and back - it seems to be for defense. And what about the project of a submarine transport boat for carrying out tank landings in the Arctic latitudes? (the same journal, No 12, 1996, article by A. Shirokorad "TANK LANDING AT THE POLE"). Landing tank troops from a submarine on foreign soil is somehow not very similar to defense. This only makes sense when it comes! The first project (No 621) began to be developed in 1948 at TsKB-18, the second project (No 626) -

in 1952. Thus, after the war in the USSR, various work was urgently carried out to develop technical support for combat operations in the Arctic. There were three options: by air (airplanes and landing gliders), by ice (aerosleigh designs had already been tested during the war), or under the ice. The last option, although it was worked out, was practically never implemented (in fact, like the whole main idea - a new world war).

But they tried to do it. This is evidenced by the former Soviet submariner, captain 1st rank N. Cherkashin in the article "PIKE AMBUSH" (reprinted in the newspaper "KIEVSKIE NEWS" for 07/05/1996). He himself sailed on a large torpedo diesel electric boat "BUKI-409" (1971-1994). About the tank submarine project, he writes the following:

"And post-war plans to defeat the United States in the event of an armed conflict were associated with submarines even before the initially fantastic idea arose to place missiles on them and fire them from the depths. I saw drawings,

partly made in metal, of a tank landing submarine, which was intended for a hidden landings on the US coast of ten "Thirty-fours" (medium tanks) and up to an infantry battalion. Fortunately, these adventurous giants - the miraculous Yudo-fish-whales from the fairy tale of the Little Humpbacked Horse were not built. The funds allocated for them were embodied in other projects. " And the fate of Soviet aircraft

carriers is not entirely simple. The fact is that in the early 50s the question of their creation was raised, but they refused to build them only after the death of Stalin. (Information of the journal "TECHNIQUE AND WEAPONS", No 1, 1996). If we also

recall the information of a Soviet missile specialist who fled to the West in the late 40s (from the previous chapter), it turns out that Stalin after the war was very interested in the rapid development of the following types of offensive weapons:

- atomic weapons;
- intercontinental missiles;
- intercontinental bombers; ocean fleet,
- including long-range submarines and aircraft carriers;
- landing troops.

But who was he going to fight? For Europe, only paratroopers and partially atomic bombs could suffice. Why the rest? The rest could only be used for the war with the United States (which at that time were considered allies). Fortunately for all progressive mankind, work on these topics turned out to be too complicated and time-consuming. But if aircraft carriers and tank submarines were not made during Stalin's lifetime, then the American Katalina seaplane was mass-produced in the USSR under the GTS brand.

Information about this is in one of the issues of the magazine "TEHNIKA YOUTH" for 1990 in an article about the Pe-8. For a long time I was interested in the meaning of the brand of the Li-2 aircraft. It was deciphered as "Licensed", i.e. under the brand Li-2 in the USSR, under license, the American transport aircraft C-47 was built. But why Lee-SECOND? Where's Lee FIRST? Was any other aircraft built under license in the Soviet Union? And only once did I see the phrase that the American "Catalina" and C-47 were mass-produced in the USSR under the brands GTS and

Li-2. Li-2 left a more noticeable mark in the history of Soviet aviation than the GTS. Maybe there really is no point in considering something? But it depends which side you

look at. For example, the famous Soviet polar pilot General Mazuruk, already mentioned in the DIGEST, with a group of other pilots, in the autumn of 1944, specially flew to the USA for four Katalinas. Moreover, he notes that there were influential forces that prevented the transfer of this aircraft to the USSR. He even had to turn to a familiar senator for help. In the end, Mazuruk received the planes and flew them to the USSR through South America, the Atlantic Ocean, Africa, Iraq, Iran, the Caspian Sea. Mazuruk speaks very positively about this aircraft. He especially notes that Catalina has a special system of automatic support for low flight altitude. In military language, this is called - "a low-flying target that is difficult to detect by locators." A similar principle was later implemented in low-flying computer-controlled cruise missiles. In combination with the ability to land on water, the Catalina could become an aggressor aircraft for underdeveloped territories rich in rivers, lakes, and bays. Well, for example, as in the north of Canada or Alaska. (The maps of Alaska had already been prepared in advance by the pilots of the division under the command of the same Mazuruk). And what is the sudden appearance of a low-flying helicopter over the heads of the troops, I personally experienced myself during divisional exercises in the army. The impression is unpleasant. For a moment I felt like a blind kitten who had been drowned but missed.

But, perhaps, "Catalina" (or GTS) was less common in Soviet aviation because in a large series in

In 1946, the Be-6 flying boat designed by G. Beriev was launched. The act of her testing was ready on March 31, 1946. Then she was in service with the Soviet naval aviation for 20 years. Some of her data: maximum weight - up to 29 tons; maximum speed - 415 km / h; flight range - 5000 km. there was an

all-round radar and 5 guns of 23 mm

caliber. In 1947, Beriev was given the task of creating a jet flying boat, but this

turned out to be very difficult (the Americans even abandoned such a project). But

Soviet designers made the Be-10 jet by the end of the 50s! (Source - A. Grigoriev's book "ALBATROSSES: from the history of hydroaviation", M., 1989). By the way, this book explicitly states that seaplanes can be a very effective tool in case of an unexpected attack by a potential enemy. In addition, the low-altitude control system turned out to be on the most massive Soviet post-war front-line jet bomber - the Il-28. We draw brief interim conclusions. It turns out that in the USSR the process of improving military equipment after the war continued actively. Four directions can be distinguished in it: First, it is an accelerated modification of the existing samples (for example, from

1944 to 1953, 7 models and modifications of the main tank were created). Secondly, the development of fundamentally new equipment (for example, jet aircraft, cruise missiles and helicopters) was accelerated.

Thirdly, much attention began to be paid to the rapid development of strategic forces (long-range aircraft and missiles, including intercontinental ones). Fourth, even more important was the requirement to reduce the weight, especially of the most mass-produced weapons. Fifthly, special military equipment such as amphibious tanks or combat seaplanes was also improved.

Moreover, not only military design work was carried out quickly, but also a rapid release of new types of weapons was carried out, followed by the replacement of old models in the troops. Here's how about this book "RED SIGN written, For example, V FAR EAST" (Khabarovsk book publishing house, 1978):

"Based on the experience of the last war, the conclusions of Soviet military science, the Ground Forces were reorganized, including their complete motorization and mechanization. The number of tanks in combined arms formations increased sharply. The rifle divisions included tank and self-propelled artillery units, and rifle corps - mechanized formations. All this, including the adoption of modern types of small arms, artillery systems, communications and engineering equipment, significantly increased the fire and strike power of our Ground Forces ... Other branches of the armed forces developed and strengthened just as intensively, in particular, the Air Force, whose units and formations during 1947-1950 switched to jet aviation ... In aviation, in air defense units, radar and radio navigation facilities were widely used ... [p. 237] After the end of the war, work began on the creation of a rocket. The first R-1 ballistic missile was launched in October 1947. In 1950, the more advanced R-2 missile was successfully tested... [p. 242] At the 19th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, held in October 1952, the Minister of War of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky reported that the Soviet Army and Navy had changed radically in the seven post-war years. They are equipped with new modern weapons, which in terms of quality significantly exceed the weapons of the

period of the Great Patriotic War" [pp. 239-240]. And it should be noted that the new in the army at that time was introduced with maximum secrecy. 1954. Or you can look at photographs of the military parade on November 7, 1950. Then T-34 tanks were driving along Red Square in Moscow, and the infantry was walking with rifles at the ready (the newspaper "RED ZVEZDA" for 11/10/1950). But completely hide the rearmament of the troops. Here, for example, is what the American Richard Stockwell wrote in the book "SOVIET AIR POWER", published in New York in 1956: "The pace of Russian progress in the field of aviation in the late 40s was simply amazing ... , with which the Russians launched the MiG-15 into mass production, was truly incredible ... By the end of 1949,

East Germany". (This quote is taken from A. Yakovlev's book "SOVIET AIRCRAFT", M., "Nauka", 1975, p. 138). (In total, about 20,000 MiG-15s were produced in the USSR). However, one

can notice that the creation of new types of military equipment should take place constantly. That's why the state exists in order to provide defense against a possible attack. But was it really necessary to hurry with a wide rearmament after such a destructive war? It is urgent to develop new weapons and produce them in large quantities makes sense only in one case: if there are specific plans to put it into action in the near future! Otherwise, it will become obsolete! In other words, if a country is deliberately preparing a new war, then the active modernization of weapons at the level of the best models in the world becomes a vital task. And with whom were they going to fight? For a long time, Soviet historians usually liked to note only one fact of accelerated expensive work on the creation of Soviet atomic weapons. At the same time, it was emphasized that this was done to eliminate the US atomic monopoly. But then how to evaluate the urgent modernization of tanks, aircraft, landing gliders, machine guns, self-propelled guns, missiles, etc.? They modernized to eliminate whose monopoly? And if you remember that some of the samples that the USSR had were already the best in the world or had no analogues? (For example, tanks or guns). And why arctic submarines with tanks and intercontinental delivery vehicles? And this is called the struggle for peace? Indeed, "solid stockade of questions"! True, if by the word "world" we mean "world space", then everything becomes logical. Defense is usually carried out on its own territory. To do this, it is much cheaper to strengthen anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, coastal defense and pursue an active foreign arms control policy (with the publication of data on our own army). But a more detailed acquaintance with the facts clearly shows that in the USSR after the war, huge amounts of money were spent on the urgent development of means of attack.

But they don't fight on their own. People are fighting, reduced to regiments, divisions and other types of subunits, units and formations. And they also require preparation. This will be discussed further.

11.2. OPERATIONAL AND STRUCTURAL PREPARATION

In describing those years, historians for some reason like to pay attention only to Stalin's unfair treatment of certain famous commanders, for example, Marshal Zhukov. First, Stalin tried to arrange a kind of "court of honor" over him, then sent him, allegedly, "into exile" to command the Odessa military district, and then to an even greater "backwoods" - the Urals. Everything else seems to be of no interest. It seems that nothing special

happened. The ordinary life of the army, which "stands guard for peaceful labor" within the framework of the Ministry of Defense.

However, in the biographies of many generals and marshals in the period up to 1954, one can read strange positions associated either with the "Minister of War" or with the "Minister of the Armed Forces". Was there no Ministry of Defense?

It turns out that before there was a single Ministry of defense already in March 1953, it had an interesting background.

On September 4, 1945, the GKO (State Defense Committee) was abolished, and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (Supreme High Command) ceased its activities. But at that time there were two military people's commissariats: defense and the Navy. Logically, this is understandable - there was a war, the military had a lot of worries. And the existence of separate people's commissariats for land defense and the navy is quite understandable.

But the war ended and on February 25, 1946 they were united into a single People's Commissariat of the Armed Forces (NKVS USSR). Since March 1946, it became known as the Ministry of the Armed Forces (MVS) of the USSR. The step is quite consistent with "peacefulness." The war is over, the worries of the military have diminished, and managers can be reduced a little. The only thing that somehow confuses the name of the ministry is "Armed Forces", and not "Defense" (again, defense was not provided for, as in 1941?) Although, the choice of name could also be influenced by the fact that Soviet troops after 1945 were in many foreign countries. But so far there is no evidence for this. Yes, and it doesn't matter.

Something else is important. In February 1950, the MVS of the USSR was again DIVIDED into two ministries: the Military Ministry and the Naval Ministry. And already they were merged into a single Ministry of Defense in March 1953.

How to explain this step of the Soviet government headed by Stalin? With whom was the USSR going to fight? With England and the USA? Yes, indeed, these countries actively participated in the Cold War and stepped up their military preparations. As noted earlier, the command of the American strategic air forces saw itself at the peak of its power in March 1954. And readiness according to the "Dropshot" plan was to be achieved by 01/01/1957. (For information: in English, two spellings of this word are possible: "Dropshort" or "Dropshot". But the translations of both are approximately the same: either "Sudden throw ((on-) fall)" or "Sudden shot").

But then why were the divided War Departments reunited in March 1953, a year before the aggressiveness of the US Air Force reached its peak? (And even more so, four years before America was ready for the Dropshot plan?) Probably, it was necessary to act on the contrary, to further increase readiness for a "surprise attack" from the United States. For example, by dividing the land ministry into several more parts; creating, for example, the Ministry of Defense of the Far East? Funny? I believe that there can be no laughter here.

Moreover, something similar happened in the Soviet construction system at the end of the 70s, when the Ministry of Construction was created in the regions of the Far East and Transbaikalia.

And all the more so because something similar already existed in the War Department itself! To do this, it is enough to read the biography of Marshal of the Soviet Union Malinovsky R.Ya. Here is a part of it from the

summer of 1945: From July to September 1945 - Commander of the Trans-Baikal Front in the war with Japan; 1945-1947 - Commander of the Trans-Baikal-Amur

Military District; 1947-1953 - Commander-in-Chief of the Far East; 1953-1956 - Commander of the Far Eastern Military District; 1956-1957 - Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and 1st Deputy Minister of

Defense. Let's digress for a while and see what they write in "SOVIET MILITARY ENCYCLOPEDIA" about the term "Commander-in-Chief":

"Commander-in-Chief (Commander-in-Chief) - the highest military position in any theater of operations or strategic direction, as well as in certain types of armed forces. In the Soviet armed forces, the Commanders-in-Chief were in the North-Western, Western, South-Western (July 1941 - May 1942), North - Caucasian (April-May 1942) directions and in the Far East (1945). By 1976 there are Commanders-in-Chief of the branches of the armed forces, as well as the Commander-in-Chief of the group of Soviet troops in Germany.

Apparently, in this list there is no mention of the position of Marshal Malinovsky in 1947-1953. Accidentally? The Far East is not a type of armed forces, it is a direction (or theater of operations). But the Commander-in-Chief of the direction is a post more likely in wartime than in peacetime. In peacetime, it is enough to have a General Staff within the structure of the Ministry of Defense and the administration of military

districts (as it has been since 1953). During the war with Japan in 1945, Marshal Vasilevsky held the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Far East. (in the presence of commanders of three fronts, and since 1949 he became the

Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR). Nikita Sergeevich was mistaken in his memoirs, calling Malinovsky the commander of the Far Eastern Military District. He held this position from 1953 to 1956. And until 1947 he commanded the military district (Transbaikalia-Amur). But it turns out that between them he was, as it were, at war.

In what battles was Marshal Malinovsky to coordinate the actions of the troops in a combat position in PEACETIME? As requested by Khrushchev, Stalin did not let him into Korea. When the Chinese volunteers entered the war, they were commanded by the Chinese general Peng Dehui. Khrushchev wrote that he was called a "rising star" among the Chinese generals. Then what was Marshal Malinovsky supposed to do? Maybe at that time there were no military districts in the Far East? It turns out they were! Here again we

have to digress a little and consider the question of military districts. The GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA (Volume 5, 1971) explains that a military district is "[in the USSR] a territorial combined-arms association of units, formations, military schools and various local military

institutions. It is headed by the commander of the district troops, who reports to the Minister of Defense. The division of the territory of the state into military districts ensures the convenience of command and control, the implementation of operational and other types of training of troops in case of defense against attack. "In addition, in the event of a war, the departments of the border military districts turn into front departments. Strategically, this is better than bringing generals from other areas and lose time while they study their theater of operations and establish command and

control. Thus, the structure of military districts to some extent can be judged on the plans of the military command. Moreover, after the war, this level of command and control in the USSR turned out to be more important than before war, when there was a secret process of creating new divisions and armies. Then it had to be classified as much as possible, and the structure of military districts changed little. Moreover, only a few western border districts turned out to be especially important, which with the outbreak of war were transformed into fronts (more precisely, BEFORE the German attack on 06/19/1941).

But the experience of the war showed that the operational strip on the ground assigned to the front should be smaller than it was supposed before the war. Accordingly, if Stalin planned the imminent start of a new war, then this circumstance had to be taken into account when re-transforming the departments of the fronts and armies into the

departments of military districts. In this regard, it is interesting to recall the fact cited in the article by O. Rzheshevsky, published in the newspaper Pravda on October 31, 1988, as part of a discussion about the causes of the Cold War. As confirmation of the "peacefulness" of the Soviet Union at that time, the author of the article cites a list of measures of the Soviet government, including the demobilization of soldiers of "older" ages, and the abolition of the GKO, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from foreign countries, and what was in 1945-1946 the number of military districts has been reduced from 33 to 21. And then he writes:

"What kind of "Soviet military threat" could we talk about?" Indeed, the reduction of military districts from 33 to 21 seems to be peaceful.

But how many were there before the war? It turns out 16! The same article from TSE

defense of the Soviet Union and as the Armed Forces of the USSR developed, the number of military districts changed. For example, before the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 there were 16 of them (and one Far Eastern Front). After the war, there were 33 military districts, and by October 1946 their number was reduced to 21.

To this we can add that in the period of "developed socialism" (for example, in 1976, at the time of the publication of the second volume of the "Soviet Military Encyclopedia") there

were also 16 of them. Moreover, the lists of pre-war districts in 1976 turned out to be almost the same:

Before war

of 1941 In 1976

1. Baltic 1. Baltic

2. Western

2. Belorussian

3. Kiev 3.

Kiev 4.

Leningrad 4.

Leningrad 5.

Odessa 5.

Odessa 6.

Arkhangelsk 6.

Carpathian 7.

North Caucasian 7.

North Caucasian 8.

Transcaucasian

8.

Transcaucasian

9. Moscow 9.

Moscow 10.

Volga 10. Volga

11. Central Asian

11. Central Asian

12. Ural 12.

Ural 13.

Siberian 13.

Siberian

14. Trans-Baikal

14. Trans-Baikal

15. Kharkov 15.

Turkestan 16.

Orlovsky 16.

Far East - Far East

Front But the list of 33

post-war districts could not be found. However, the "Soviet Military Encyclopedia" contains descriptions of many of them, as well as biographies of famous military leaders, in which there are indications of positions, for example: "commanded (such and such) districts." This made it possible to find the names of the 31st military district as of December 1945: 1. Baku 11. Kiev 21.

Carpathian

31. South Ural 2.

Baranovich 12.

Kuban 22.

Primorsky

32. ??? 3.

Belomorsky 13.

Leningradsky 23.

Smolensky

33. ??? 4.

Voronezh 14.

Lvov 24. Stavropol

5. East Siberian 15.

Minsk 25.

Steppe 6.

Gorky 16.

Moscow 26.

Taurida 7. Far

East 17. Odessa

27. Tbilisi 8.

Donskoy

18. Special (Kenigsberg)

28. Turkestan 9.

Trans-Baikal-Amur 19.

Baltic 29. Ural 10.

West-Siberian

20. Volga 30. Kharkov

The names of

the two districts

could not be found. But in the SVE there is a vague mention of some kind of Caucasian Military District in the biography of Colonel General Gusev N.I., which says that after the war he commanded the troops of this district (1945-1946). However, there is no separate article about the Caucasian VO in the encyclopedia.

What can be said about these lists? The appearance in 1945 of many small military districts is striking. For example: Baranovich, Baku, Special, Voronezh, etc. However, in 1946 their number was reduced. And this is cited as proof of the "peacefulness" of the USSR. Judging by the descriptions of the history of the districts, the administration of many of them was created from the administrations of different fronts or armies. Perhaps this was done, incl. and for the purpose of more convenient demobilization. But "21" is

larger than both the pre-war 16 and the subsequent 16. In addition, at the end of the 40s, some military districts were recreated again! (This was called the "second formation"). For example, Gorky, which existed from June 1949 to May 1953, Voronezh (from the same June 1949, but until 1960) or Donskoy (August 1949 - November 1953). In other words, the figure "21" is

not the last, and it increased again, and only from 1953 began to decrease, until the number of military districts by the 70s began to equal 16. Thus, not everything is so simple in their post-war history. And before recalling it to prove one or another direction of the policy of the USSR, it is necessary to familiarize yourself with it in more detail. But the study of this issue is not an easy task. It must be

carried out in two directions at once: by territory (by possible theater of operations) and by time.

We have already spoken about the high command in the Far East. It makes sense to see how the structure of military districts has changed there.

The war with Japan was carried out by the troops of three fronts. Three military districts were formed on the basis of their directorates on September 10, 1945: the Far East with headquarters in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk (from the troops of the 2nd Far Eastern Front), Primorsky with headquarters in the Ussuriisk (from the troops of the 1st Far Eastern Front) and the Transbaikalian-Amur with headquarters in Khabarovsk (from the troops of the Trans-Baikalian Front).

05/22/1946 The Trans-Baikalian-Amur Military District was renamed Zabaikalsky, part of its territory was transferred to the Far Eastern Military District, and its administration in Khabarovsk was transformed into the administration of the Commander-in-Chief of the Far East. The administration of the Trans-Baikalian District was located in Chita, and it began to include the Chita Region and the Buryat-Mongolian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

Briefly about the East Siberian Military District. It was formed on 10/1/1945 from the eastern part of the Siberian Military District (which, in turn, was renamed the West Siberian). The territory of the East Siberian District included: the Krasnoyarsk Territory, the Tuva and Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics and the Irkutsk Region. The office was located in Irkutsk. This district lasted until May 1953, when it was merged with the West Siberian, in 1956 it was again renamed the Siberian Military District (headquarters in Novosibirsk). Note: in front of Alaska (US territory - a possible enemy) - the troops of the Far Eastern Military

District, the command of which may well be quickly transformed into a command of the front (to Alaska). But what about Japan? And in front of her are the troops of the Primorsky Military District. Moreover, there are two reserves: the departments of the East Siberian and Trans-Baikalian districts. In 1947, in the Far East, generals also moved in positions. For example, Purkaev M.A., who was previously commander of

the 2nd Far Eastern Front, and then commander of the Far East, from June 1947 became chief of staff and first deputy commander-in-chief of the Far East troops. In the same year, General Odintsov G.F. arrived at the post of commander of the artillery of the troops of the Far East, leaving a similar position in the Leningrad Military District. For the post of Commander of the Naval Forces of the Far

East in 1947, Admiral Tributs VF arrived, leaving the command of the 8th Navy (Baltic). Speaking of Purkaev. He

met the war of 1941 as the chief of staff of the Kyiv Special Military District, or, more precisely, the chief of staff of the Southwestern Front. And he fought in this position during the first difficult months of the war, until he was replaced by General Tupikov (then who died while trying to break out of the autumn encirclement near Kiev). Purkaev was in the DalVO until July 1952, when he was transferred to Moscow to the post of head of the Department of Higher Military Educational Institutions of the USSR Military Ministry.

Thus, in addition to the directorates of the military districts in the Far East, since 1947, a solid company of combat generals has been added, headed by the Commander-in-Chief of all the troops of the Far East. For what? It is difficult to manage this territory from Moscow due to the large time difference (from 8 to 10 hours). But in peacetime, the directorates of the military districts are enough. An additional local superstructure is important only in one case - FOR THE COORDINATION OF MILITARY ACTIONS! But the Soviet Union did not enter any

major war in the Far East at that time (not counting Korea and China). And by order of the Minister of Defense of the USSR dated 04/23/1953, the structure of command and control in the Far East was reorganized in the direction of lowering offensive readiness. In particular:

The Directorate of the Commander-in-Chief of the Far East Troops was liquidated. The Primorsky Military District was liquidated. The headquarters of the Far Eastern Military District in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk was

transformed into the headquarters of the army. On the basis of the Directorate of the Commander-in-Chief in Khabarovsk, the Directorate of the new Far Eastern Military District was created,

which included the territories of all Far Eastern regions and territories. In addition, in April 1953 (possibly by the same order), a single Pacific Fleet was again formed, which in January 1947 was divided into two: the 5th (the main naval base (Naval Base) in Vladivostok) and on the 7th (the main

naval base in Sovetskaya Gavan). The fact of the division of the Pacific Fleet, Soviet historians usually also tried not to remember (as well as the fact of

Baltic Fleet on the 4th and on the 8th in February 1946). For example, in various biographies of the pre-war and military People's Commissar of the Navy of the USSR N. G. Kuznetsov, they usually wrote briefly about the period of the late 40s: either that he was sent to the Far East, or that he commanded the Pacific Fleet. But only from the "Soviet Military Encyclopedia" you can find out his specific post-war positions:

February 1946 - March 1948 - Head of the Department of the Naval War.
educational institutions;

June 1948 - February 1950 - deputy. Commander-in-Chief of the Troops of the Far East
for naval forces;

February 1950 - July 1951 - commander of the 5th Navy; July

1951 - 1953 - Minister of the Navy; 1953 - December

1955 - first deputy. Minister of Defense - Commander-in-Chief of the Navy; from

February 1956 - retired with a reduction in rank. Moreover, before

sending N. Kuznetsov to the Far East, Stalin "passed" him through the "court of honor." And not only him, but also three more admirals (L. M. Galler, V. A. Alafuzov and G. A. Stepanova). The trial was held from January to March 1948 under the chairmanship of Marshal of the Soviet Union L. A. Govorov. The reason was the information that during the war years, the defendants allegedly handed over secret scientific and technical information to the Allies. As a result, N. Kuznetsov was demoted in rank "3rd from the top" (to "rear admiral"), the rest were sentenced to different terms of imprisonment (4 and 10 years). Alafuzov and Galler did not live to see their release. ("FLAGSHIPS: COLLECTION OF MEMORIES AND ESSAYS" - M.: Military Publishing House, 1991).

There is also some secret connected with Admiral Galler. At the end of 1937, he was appointed head of the newly created Main Naval Staff (GMSH), Rear Admiral Alafuzov - his deputy. At the same time, at the direction of Stalin, a strong-willed decision was made to build a large sea and ocean fleet (in particular, many battleships, heavy cruisers, ships of other classes of the surface fleet, as well as torpedo boats and submarines of various types) were built. However, sometime towards the end of 1940, a meeting was held at which Stalin remarked that Soviet warships would not go to America. Moreover, it was decided

stop building large ships. All these events or some other ones led to the fact that Admiral Haller began to consider himself "doomed", was afraid to make responsible decisions, became too cautious. In October 1940, Admiral I.S. Isakov was appointed head of the Main Staff, and Galler went to work as Deputy People's Commissar of the VFM for shipbuilding. In 1947 he was transferred to Leningrad, and in 1950 he died in prison (at the age of 67).

Until 1937, in Soviet Russia, the Naval General Staff existed only during the war of 1917-1921, being the highest operational-strategic command and control body of the naval forces. The fact that it was organized again (under a different name) in 1938 is understandable: Stalin began concrete preparations for a new world war. But in February 1950, the "Naval General Staff" was again created, which lasted until March 1953, when the Main Staff of the Navy was created on its basis. Admiral Golovko A.G. was the Chief of the Main Naval Staff since February 1947, and since February 1950 - the Chief of the Naval General Staff. In 1952, he moved to command the 4th (Baltic) Fleet. (The 4th and 8th fleets existed as separate naval operational formations until December 1955, and then were again merged into a single Baltic Fleet).

While in retirement, Admiral Kuznetsov took up literary work and wrote, in particular, memoirs entitled "SHARP TURNS", which were published at different times in various publications, for example: in "VIZH" in 1992 and 1993. But in them he does not provide a detailed analysis of military-strategic work in the post-war period, perhaps given the secrecy of such information. It also allows for inaccuracies. For example, he writes (the newspaper "PRAVDA", 07/29/1988) that Stalin offered him to divide the Baltic Fleet in the spring of 1946. He refused. But it has already been noted above that this fleet was divided into two in February 1946. Of course, you can

see that there is no big mistake - whether it is the end of winter (February) or spring (March to May). But February and March exactly 1946 are a big difference. Since the beginning of March (from Churchill's Fulton speech), historians have been counting down the Cold War. In February, it formally did not exist yet!

Moreover, N. Kuznetsov notes that he did not really understand what was happening. In particular, in an excerpt published in "VIZH", N: 3 for 1993, there is the following phrase: "in 1951, under mysterious circumstances for me, I again found myself in the position of Minister of the Navy." Of course, if we consider the USSR of that time as a fighter for peace (in the sense of "for non-war", and not "for world space"), then misunderstanding is possible. Indeed, why did it suddenly take Stalin IN PEACETIME to first punish the military admiral, and then gradually promote him again? And besides, there is some information about how, on the orders of Stalin on 07/20/1951, N. G. Kuznetsov turned out to be the Minister of the Navy, set out in the article "JV STALIN:" THE STATE CANNOT WAIT UNTIL ... MINISTER STOP DRINKING "("VIZH", NoNo 2, 3 for 1996). In particular, it contains transcripts of meetings of the Main Military Council of the Naval Ministry, held in mid-July 1951. They considered many issues on improving this kind of troops, including the rapid increase in the number of graduate naval officers in the near future. However, "misunderstanding" of what was happening did not prevent N. Kuznetsov from placing an order for the retired (since 1947) Vice

Admiral A.V. combat operations in the naval theater in modern conditions. "(Until his resignation, Nemitz was a professor at the departments of strategy and tactics of various military academies - information from the collection" FLAGSHIPS:..."). As a result, "analyzing the experience of past wars, A. V. Nemitz emphasized that for a successful confrontation with a powerful naval enemy, a balanced development of the heterogeneous forces of the fleet is necessary, and carrier-based aviation should also be among the strike forces. He argued his reasoning with statistical data, calculations. By 1952, the study was completed and personally handed over to N. G. Kuznetsov. "Of course, it can be argued that military admirals exist to increase the combat readiness of the navy. But why would a peaceful country after a fierce war

"strike naval forces with carrier-based aviation "? Only for the landing of operational assault forces within the operations of land fronts? And on what

sections of the Soviet border could such a situation arise? In the Soviet Far East, where there is a long winter with 40-degree frosts, permafrost and continuous impassability? In the Baltic Sea surrounded by friendly or neutral countries? Or on the Black Sea in the war with Turkey? After all, we are talking about the sixth year after the devastating war! Was naval "strike forces with carrier-based aviation" really necessary at that time?

But we must pay tribute to Stalin: they were in no hurry to build aircraft carriers under him. Apparently, he was well aware that they could not be attributed to defensive weapons. An aircraft carrier is a means of attacking distant territories separated by the sea. Stalin, in the first place, paid attention to the secrecy of training. And it would be difficult to hide the presence of aircraft carriers. But some kind of need for shock naval

forces arose, since in 1950 not only the Naval War Ministry and the Naval General Staff were restored, but also the Main Military Councils under each of the military departments (merged in March 1953 into a single Chief military council under the Ministry of Defense of the USSR).

Here you need to digress again and get acquainted with the occupation of such military structures. The "SOVIET MILITARY ENCYCLOPEDIA" says that the Main Military Council is an advisory body under the Minister of Defense of the USSR in peacetime. But for the first time such councils were created by decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks N: 322 dated March 13, 1938, under both military people's commissariats. They discussed the most important issues of building the army and navy. Much attention was paid to the discussion and generalization of the experience of military operations with Japan and Finland. The main military councils made recommendations on the development of new types of weapons and military equipment and on the modernization of existing models. At the meetings, the reports of the commanders of the military districts on the issues of ensuring the combat readiness of the troops, measures to prepare the theater of operations and others were systematically heard. 06/23/1941 in connection with the creation of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the Main Military Councils of

the Red Army and the Navy were abolished. And until 1950, for some reason, the need for them was not felt, although the rearmament of the army and navy was in fu

command and control structure. What could have changed in 1950? As mentioned earlier (and especially in the chapter on the events in Korea), Stalin was not opposed to the Americans being drawn into a new big world war at the end of this year or the beginning of next. But the crisis in Korea arose with the serious participation of the USSR. And it turns out that active preparations for the war were going on not only in North Korea, but also in the Soviet Union itself!

But let's end this small digression and return to naval affairs. It was said above that the Pacific and Baltic fleets were divided. And how was the situation in the other two fleets: the Northern and the Black Sea? Were they divided? No, although there were just four "free" numbers: 1, 2, 3, 6.

For comparison, it can be noted that two American fleets operate in the Pacific Ocean: the 3rd (eastern operational direction) and the 7th (western part of the ocean). And in the Atlantic Ocean there are also two American fleets: the 2nd and 6th (Mediterranean

Sea). Why might the division of the Soviet fleets be required? At least not from the point of view of the defense of its coastal strip. For this, the existing management structure could well be enough. But in the event of a war with the United States and its Western European allies, the need naturally arises not only for "strike naval assets with carrier-based aircraft," but also for the need to conduct operations in various operational areas. For example, the Pacific Fleet would be forced to send its ships to opposite areas of the Pacific Ocean: to the southeast (Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Philippines) and to the northeast (Alaska, the northwestern coast of North America).

A similar situation could arise with the Baltic Fleet, when a large group of ships would have to go far to the west to support military operations in West Germany, France, England and beyond. As for the Black Sea Fleet, there could also be a need to divide it into two for two operational directions: the Turkish-Greek and the Western Mediterranean. But it is possible that the division of the Black Sea Fleet was made dependent on the solution of the problem with the Black Sea straits, which was delayed due to the stubbornness of the former Western allies.

And the need to divide the Northern Fleet could become urgent, when it would be necessary to send groups of ships to divergent directions: southeast (Norway, northern Great Britain) and southwest (Svalbard, Iceland, Greenland and the east coast of North America). But one can ask a quite reasonable question:

are we not too carried away by fantastic assumptions? I can advise you to flip through the pages back and admire the drawing of the project of a submarine for landing a tank assault in the Arctic. I didn't draw it. And here we will discuss another problem: where to get so many ships? Indeed, for such tasks they may require a lot! But firstly, the Soviet shipbuilding industry to a greater extent built warships (the Soviet Union ordered peaceful ones in other countries). Secondly, many ships were received from the United States under lend-lease, and Stalin was in no hurry to return them. Trucks were given away, and as for the ships, their return was delayed in every possible way. Thirdly, some warships were received from Germany and Italy as trophies. Fourthly, a certain number of ships could be captured in the ports of Western Europe in case of an unexpected attack on them (with the help of landing troops).

Thus, the technical base for maritime operations was available. Perhaps not in full. But in 1941, Hitler showed Stalin that it was not necessary to carry out full training. You can start with minimal sufficiency. But in any war, military operations at sea are

not the main ones. The main "work" is carried out by ground forces, which must also be carefully prepared. So let's get back to events on land. The training of troops in the Far East has already been considered above. Therefore, we are moving on to other territories, in particular, to the European north of the USSR. And one can immediately say that here, too, there was a "shuffling" of military districts. Moreover, to a greater extent than in the Far East. But first, let's get acquainted with a part of the biography of

one of the prominent Soviet military leaders - Marshal of the Soviet Union Meretskov K.A. In the final period of the war with the Germans, he commanded the Karelian Front, then was the commander of the 1st Far Eastern Front. And then, as stated in the "GREAT SOVIET

ENCYCLOPEDIA", he commanded the troops of the Primorsky, Moscow, White Sea and Northern military districts, or by year:

1945 - 1947 - Primorsky
Military District; 1947 - 1949 -
Moscow Military District; 1949
- 1951 - Belomorsky Military

District; 1951 - 1954 - Northern Military District. It turns out that he commanded four military districts. But in fact - three! Since the name "Northern" would be more correct to write in brackets, and not through the union "and". Minor note? To answer this

question, let's get down to the details. In March 1940, the Arkhangelsk Military District was formed with control based on the command of the 15th Army. After the end of the war in Karelia, on December 15, 1944, the district administration moved from Arkhangelsk to Kem, and the district itself was renamed Belomorsky. Its territory included: Arkhangelsk, Vologda, Murmansk, Pechenga regions, Komi

ASSR and Karelo-Finnish SSR. In February 1946, the Arkhangelsk Military District was again detached from a part of the Belomorsky Military District with command and control based on the field headquarters of the 2nd Shock Army. And in March 1946, the

administration of the White Sea Military District moved to Petrozavodsk. In July 1951, the Belomorsky Military District was renamed into Severny, and the Arkhangelsk - into Belomorsky. The new Belomorsky Okrug existed until April 1956, then it was disbanded, and its territories were again annexed to the Northern Okrug. But the latter four years later, in March 1960, was also disbanded. At the same time, the Komi ASSR was assigned to the Ural Military District, the rest of the territory was

Suppose that Stalin was preparing a war with the USA and England (which from 1949 meant a war with the rest of the NATO countries). How should the hostilities in the north of Europe have unfolded? First, it would be necessary to send Soviet troops to the north of Norway and to the island of Svalbard, which belonged to Norwegian territory. This would require a separate front. Logically, the name "Northern" is requested for it, and not "Belomorsky", since the troops had to move further west from the White Sea. At

In this case, the territory of the "preparatory" military district could be transferred to the neighboring military district that remained.

But the troops of the Belomorsk (in Arkhangelsk) Military District, in turn, could be used as a second echelon for the troops of the Northern Military District, which would have entered the battle first. This can be assumed from the fate of Colonel-General V.A. Frolov. From September 1941 to February 1944 he was commander of the Karelian Front. In February 1944, he "surrenders" the front to Marshal Meretskov K.A., and he himself becomes his deputy (of course, this was not done according to their wishes, but on the orders of the Headquarters). From 1945 to 1948, General Frolov commanded the White Sea Military District, and from 1949 to 1956 - Arkhangelsk (which was renamed Belomorsky in 1951). Since 1956 - in

reserve. In other words, both the Northern and the neighboring White Sea military districts since 1949 were commanded not only by former front commanders, but also by those who knew each other well. And besides, they had experience of fighting in these natural climatic conditions. And Marshal Meretskov had one more "dignity" from Stalin's point of view - in April 1941 he was arrested (from the post of chief of the General Staff) and spent several months in the dungeons of the NKVD, where he was beaten in connection with the "leadership" of a non-existent conspiracy of top commanders Air Force of the country (according to which many of those arrested at the end of 1941 were shot). But the war in

the Arctic has a number of features for which we must carefully prepare. Has there been such preparation? Was held! This has already been briefly noted in previous chapters (for example: the presence of aerosleigh units, the development of aircraft landings on floating ice and the construction of railways in the tundra). And in the journal "KNOWLEDGE-POWER" (N: 9, 1993), an entire article by Z. Kanevsky was placed under the heading "TOP SECRET ARCTIC" (ie "top secret"). In 1951 - 1955, the author of the article studied at the Faculty of Geography of Moscow State University with a specialization in geography of the polar countries, where from the second year and closer to the end of his studies, "the word "special course" appeared more and more often in the schedule of classes" (this name in Soviet educational institutions usually meant military training).

Z. Kanevsky himself did not have time to take an active part in the events in the Soviet northern latitudes until 1953, but he was familiar with information about them. And he writes that "the Soviet Far North was "closed" shortly before the Patriotic War or with its beginning. All special Arctic publications and many detailed maps ended up in a special depository. And after 1945, powerful complex air expeditions took place one after another in high latitudes. With the help of airplanes, groups of various researchers (including purely military ones) landed at various points in the Arctic Ocean. Secret airfields were built on the permafrost, strategic roads were laid." From 04/02/1950 to 04/11/1951 in the eastern Arctic, in the Region of

relative inaccessibility, for 374 days the "North Pole - 2" station, headed by Mikhail Mikhailovich Somov, carried out a secret drift. The drift went to a distance of 2600 km (or 640 km in a straight line) ("SHORT GEOGRAPHICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA", Volume 3, Moscow, "Soviet Encyclopedia", 1962). In its 5th volume, in the article "GEOGRAPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS IN THE ARCTIC AND

ANTARCTIC IN THE 20th CENTURY", it is confirmed that after the war, air expeditions began to be regularly carried out in high latitudes with landings on ice at many points (but it is indicated that this process began with 1948). In addition, oceanographic work was carried out in the northern seas on the ships Litke (1948) and Equator (1951).

Kanevsky recalls that the SP-2 station was being prepared and landed in an atmosphere of not just strict, but "insane" secrecy. Radio communication with the station was carried out in coded form, there were no radio conversations with relatives. Relatives of the drift participants sent parcels to the address "p/box ...". And the expedition members themselves worked, as it were, without the right to be themselves, as if in the deep enemy rear. The head of the station, Mikhail Somov, had an order to blow up the station and burn all the documentation if there was a threat of the appearance of American aircraft or submarines. After the successful completion of the drift, by a secret decree, all participants were awarded the Order of Lenin, and Somov also received the gold star of the Hero of the Soviet Union.

After the war, Americans and Canadians also showed interest in the Arctic. They also directed high-latitude expeditions and took aerial photographs. From the spring of 1952 to 1962, the American station T-3 (Fletcher's Ice Island) drifted in the Arctic. But the Americans began to show military interest in Greenland as early as 1941. On April 9 of that year, the Danish envoy to Washington signed a defense agreement with the American government (ratified by the Danish Riksdag on May 16, 1945). The United States built several military bases on Greenland (the largest of them is located in the village of Tula (emphasis on "e"). Then it was focused on defense against Nazi Germany. But after the war, as Soviet-American relations worsened, military bases in Greenland a new purpose arose - defense against the USSR. And after Denmark joined NATO, a new agreement was signed between the Danish and American governments on April 27, 1951 to continue cooperation between Denmark and the United States in the joint defense of the island. By 1971, the Americans had two military bases in Greenland and others military facilities with a total staff of 2 to 4 thousand people (information from the "GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA") Returning to the Soviet presence in the Far North, we can note another oddity associated with the fate of the head of the first Soviet Arctic station "SP-1" rear admiral (1943) Papanin I.D. For some reason, in all his biographies that could be found, there is no indication of what he did from 1946 to 1948. Only the following of his positions are listed:

1941 - 1945 - Commissioner of the State Defense Committee for transportation in the North and, at the same time, head of the

"Glavsevmorput"; 1948 - 1951 - Deputy Director of the Institute of Oceanology of the USSR Academy of Sciences

for expeditions; since 1951 - Head of the Department of Marine Expeditionary Works of the

Academy of Sciences of the USSR; since 1952 - (at the same time) director of the Institute of Biology and Zoology of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

As for snowmobiles, as noted earlier, during the war of 1941-1945, a lot of combat experience was gained in their use, including as part of special snowmobiles.

battalions. However, the history of the snowmobile, as it were, ends with the end of the war. There is evidence of their use on post-war postal aerosleigh lines in the Far East and the Far North. However, uneconomical former combat snowmobiles built in 1941 and 1942 were used for this. And there is a mention of the post-war service of combat snowmobiles "mainly in the border troops." Strange. But, unfortunately, there are no other data on this technique yet. Thus, it can be quite convincingly noted that the

USSR was actively preparing for a war in the Arctic. But it can be seen that the forces of only two military districts are not enough for an offensive. Moreover, it was impossible to secretly deploy many troops in the open and sparsely populated territories of the Soviet European north. But there are considerations that prisoners

("black jackets") could turn out to be an additional manpower reserve for the front line. There were many of them in the North at that time. One can recall the camps in the Komi ASSR, in Vorkuta, around Arkhangelsk, as well as Kolyma, Chukotka (for example, see the article by S. Golubchikov "STALIN'S "AUSCHENTIM" IN CHUKOTKA" in the journal "Energy: Economics, Technology, Ecology", N: 2, 1991. Moreover, the remains of the Chukotka camps could be found back in the 70s, for example, along the roads from the northern port city of Pevek deep into Chukotka. From them, large houses built of local stones in the form of a large tent were preserved - this is for prisoners. For protection, small houses of an ordinary type were built nearby (with walls painted in two colors. Local geologists assured that the first Soviet atomic bombs were created on Chukotka uranium). But after the war, another feature appeared in the case

with the camps. It was noticed by the former Intlag prisoner A. Zorohovich, already mentioned in the chapter on the "blank spots" of the post-war history of Soviet technology. In his memoirs, he emphasizes that the northern outskirts of the USSR, separated from the main territory by the Iron Curtain, at the end of the 40s were the most real slave-owning state in the state. But the behavior of two camp leaders turned out to be surprising for him: Lieutenant Bogdansky - the head of one mine camp and Lieutenant Nazarkin - the head of planning

production part. Unlike the others, they treated the prisoners "like people". Then it turned out that before the camp they were combat pilots. Zorohovich, who worked at the Research Institute of Minaviaprom before his arrest, once asked Nazarkin why he abandoned his profession? In response, the former pilot told a whole story.

- It was in the summer of 1945. The regiment in which he served was stationed near Bucharest. In Romania, at that time, the young King Mihai, a military pilot by profession, was in power. On the birthday of the king, a group of pilots, incl. and Nazarkin, decided to go to the royal palace and congratulate her professional colleague, recently, by the way, awarded the Soviet Order of Victory. None of them saw anything reprehensible in this. But, of course, they all hoped that the king would bring them a cup or two. When the king was informed that a group of Soviet pilots had come to congratulate him on his birthday, he invited everyone to the table. "We tasted such wines, - said Nazarkin, - that we would never have had to." After the royal treat, the pilots, leaving the palace, saw the commandant's car waiting for them. They did not judge them, but they lowered their ranks and sent them to work in distant camps, which at that time were growing rapidly, and there were not enough regular camp officers. Interesting

story! So, in the summer of 1945, the command of Nazarkin and others received some kind of "order" for secondment of a certain number of officers for use in the Gulag system. And now let's remember what special things could happen at that time (in the summer of 1945)? First of all - the reduction of the army, i.e. many, including officers, were to be transferred to the reserve. But it turns out that the government of the USSR (i.e. Stalin personally) already in the summer of 1945 takes some decision to transfer a certain number of BATTLE OFFICERS to a new "peaceful" type of service - chiefs in camps (which, in turn, could be considered as "penal battalions"). For the world community, the Soviet Union is reducing the army, but in fact a considerable reserve for future fronts is preserved. Moreover, for a future war in the Arctic, where it would be too noticeable to keep a lot of "normal" troops. Here, by the way, it would be quite appropriate to recall the fact of the transfer of former Soviet prisoners of war from Nazi concentration camps to Soviet ones. These are natural troops! Well

and what, that the "normal" army was reduced? First, only until 1948. And secondly, maybe we can add on the camps where former prisoners of war were kept? By the way, some prisoners who went through the front and the Nazi captivity tried to organize uprisings (for example, near Vorkuta, when they held out for 3 months and only the planes managed to stop the "black jackets" that got out of control).

But "normal" troops also had to be trained, including somewhere near the Northern and White Sea military districts. What counties were their neighbors? From the south - Leningrad and Moscow. From the southeast and east - Ural and West Siberian. Leningrad and Moscow, of course, could be a reserve for the northern districts. But their territory was too industrialized and it was impossible to "bare" it in which case it was impossible. Those managing them primarily solved non-combat tasks of an internal nature: maintaining order and preparing various resources. This also confirms Stalin's attitude to their command. Some generals from Leningradsky "left" to other positions. For example, the former commander of the front, Marshal L. A. Govorov, who in April 1946 transferred from the post of commander of this district to the post of Chief Inspector of the Ground Forces, and from July 1948 commander of the country's air defense forces. Or the previously mentioned General Odintsov G.F., who in 1947 transferred to the post of commander of artillery of the troops of the Far East from a similar position in the Leningrad Military District. Or the same Marshal Meretskov, who in 1947 "took over" the Moscow District from Colonel-General Artemyev P.A., and in 1949 "surrendered" it to him. By the way, General Artemiev commanded the Moscow Military District until 1953, when Marshal of the Soviet Union Moskalenko K.S. arrived in this position. Other "neighbors" of the northern military districts - the

Urals and West Siberian ones - may be of greater interest. First, they were located away from the eyes of foreigners. Secondly, their natural and climatic conditions were very similar to the nature and climate of North America. Thirdly, both of them were commanded by the former commanders of the fronts: the Urals - the pre-war chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov G.K. (1948 - 1953); West Siberian - Army General Eremenko A.I. (1946 - 1953).

Marshal Zhukov did not escape Stalin's disrespectful attitude after the war. They did not like to remember this for a long time, until the 90s came. The most detailed description of this story appeared in the Ogonyok magazine, No. 11, 1993, in which, on p. 12-13 was placed the article by G. Tsitrinyak "CRIMINAL CASE OF MARSHAL ZHUKOV". It contains data that after his appointment in January 1941 as chief of the General Staff, the NKVD began to prepare "denunciatory materials" against him. Various generals and officers were arrested and interrogated. The "case" was conducted until the end of the summer of 1942, then stopped. In particular, the arrest for several months (in 1941) of the future Marshal Meretskov is also recalled. But from the end of 1945, this process was restored after

Stalin, at one of the meetings in the Kremlin, publicly accused Zhukov of attributing all the victories to himself (despite the fact that Soviet military historians at that time were intensively developing the idea of "Stalin's ten strikes", which meant all major strategic offensive operations of the Soviet troops since 1944).

Two criminal cases were opened. First, the USSR Minister of Aviation Industry A.I. Shakhurin was arrested, but he did not testify against Zhukov. Then (until May 1946) Air Marshal A. A. Novikov and former adjutant Zhukov, Lieutenant Colonel A. S. Semochkin were arrested. "After severe torture, both signed testimony against Zhukov." In May

1946, Stalin convened the Main Military Council, at which he brought charges against the famous marshal. But, as Zhukov himself recalled, "most of the marshals who spoke supported me. Marshal of the armored forces P.S. Rybalko spoke in my defense especially sharply," who, in particular, stated that one could not trust the testimony drawn out by violence in prisons. However, after this meeting, Stalin removed Zhukov from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and sent him to command the Odessa Military District, and since 1948 - the Urals.

Briefly about the fate of Novikov and Rybalko. Summing up the data of the "Great Soviet Encyclopedia" and the "Soviet Military Encyclopedia", we get the following:

Novikov A.A. - Air Chief Marshal (1944), twice Hero of the Soviet Union (both times - 1945).

1942 - 1946 - Commander of the USSR

Air Force; 1946 - 1953 - "Held a number of responsible positions in the Air Force"; 1953 - 1956 - Commander of Long-Range

Aviation; since 1956 - In reserve due to illness. Rybalko P.S. - Marshal of armored forces (1945),

twice Hero of the Soviet Union (1943, 1945). From

April 1946 - First Deputy Commander, and from April 1947 - Commander of the armored and mechanized troops of the Soviet Army. Years of life:

1894 - 08/28/1948 (Moscow). We return to the fate of Zhukov.

From the beginning of 1948, the arrests of generals related to him resumed. But the matter did not come to his arrest. Moreover, Stalin gradually began to promote him in the system of the Soviet hierarchy. In particular, at the end of 1952, Zhukov was a delegate to the 19th Congress of the CPSU, at which he became a candidate member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Party. But Zhukov managed to

"recoup" more fully for the humiliation only after Stalin's death. Now let's move on to the situation with other military districts. A certain dynamics in their reorganization was observed in the eastern and southern parts of the European zone of the USSR. Here we can recall the existence of the Taurida military district in the south of Ukraine (1945 - 04/04/1956). We can recall the divisions and mergers of military districts in the North Caucasus and in central Russia. It can be recalled that before the war in 1941, the Kiev Military District was quite enough for "defense" for the entire western half of Ukraine, and after the war, when possible opponents moved to the West, for some reason the Carpathian Military District with headquarters in Lvov (closer to the West?). By the way, about him. In the sense of the situation with the Soviet troops beyond the western border of the USSR. In Poland, there was the Northern Group of Soviet Forces, headed by the former commander of the front, Marshal K. Rokossovsky. Among historians, there were opinions that Stalin did not do well to him by sending him to serve in Poland as the Minister of Defense (and this is also considered as a link by a

Rokossovsky was already in it, commanding the Soviet troops. Only the headquarters was not in Warsaw, but in ... Legnica (at least in 1945 - 1946). This is evidenced by Pavlov I.P. in the already mentioned collection "HAVE THE POWER TO REMEMBER ...". In order to avoid arrest before the war, he changed jobs, moved from city to city, became an officer during the war, fought, was shell-shocked. After the war, on business, he went to the headquarters of the Northern Group of Forces in the city of Legnica to Rokossovsky. This is the extreme southwest of Poland.

Why not in Warsaw? Perhaps in order to close the "gap" in Czechoslovakia between the Soviet troops in eastern Germany and eastern Austria in the event of a war. In

addition, Soviet troops were in Hungary and Romania. In his memoirs, Khrushchev writes that they tried to send troops to Czechoslovakia, but Klement Gottwald at that time convinced him not to do this. Then Stalin agreed. Perhaps he considered it real to quickly deploy troops in which case from the same Poland, whose Minister of Defense (1949 - 1956) and his deputy (1945 - 1956) (General Poplavsky S.G.) were immigrants from the USSR (and even in the Polish Army itself there were many immigrants from the Soviet Union). And once again, we note that Marshal Rokossovsky ended the war as a front

commander. The military districts near the western border of the Soviet Union after the war were also headed by former commanders of the fronts (Baltic - Army General Bagramyan I.Kh. (1946-1954), Belarusian - Marshal Timoshenko S.K. (1949-1960), Carpathian - Army General Eremenko A.I. (1945-1951) and Marshal Konev I.S. (1951-1955)). In

addition to the organizational training of troops on his territory, Stalin also controlled the interaction of the armies of the new allies. But historians usually like to start the topic of military cooperation between socialist countries with the Warsaw Pact. And I want to draw attention to it. But I hear the question: "What does this have to do with it? After all, it was created in 1955 after the death of Stalin and in response to the creation of NATO!" That's right, I want to discuss this thesis: "IN ANSWER". As far as we know, NATO was created on 04/04/1949. "Warsaw Pact" in 1955. And if I say this phrase: the Nazi troops attacked

Poland in 1939, and in response to this, Soviet troops entered Berlin in May 1945. Again I hear the question: "How is it? and some write also: "345"). If you count by minutes, then six years will result in astronomical numbers. Then why is the 1955 event STRONGLY suggested to have happened IN

RESPONDENCE to the event six years ago? Is everything clear without explanation? By the way, Stalin was CATEGORICALLY against

the creation of any military blocs between the countries of Eastern Europe. Is that understandable too? Strange! Until 1955, a military bloc in the east of Europe is not needed. And it's elementary! And since 1955, for some reason, it was very much needed! And this is also quite understandable! Who understands? I'm not quite, if we take into account only official explanations, or rather, the lack of

them. Recall that the conflict with Yugoslavia occurred precisely because of problems between the Yugoslav leadership and Soviet advisers, incl. the military. Those. it is openly admitted that Soviet military advisers were in the countries of "people's" democracy without any kind of joint bloc treaty. And what should the governing bodies of the military blocs do? Apparently, to create joint defense systems. So, if before 1955 there was no military bloc in Eastern Europe, then there were no joint defense systems either? And if there were no joint defense systems, then how

could Stalin plan a world war? But let's read a quote from the article "AIR VITYAZ" ("VIZH", No 6-7, 1992. Author - Air Marshal I. I. Pstygo). The article is devoted to the fate of General Zimin G.V.: "In December 1951, G.V. Zimin was appointed to the very responsible position of chief inspector of the Ministry of Defense [more precisely, the Military Ministry] for a unified air defense system of the countries of people's democracy. He kept this area of work under personal control Stalin and Zimin repeatedly had to meet with him and report on the state of affairs. To create an air defense system in the countries of people's democracy is a big, complex, multifaceted matter. The work went on with great difficulty, but

In these countries, their own air defense forces began to be on duty and carry out the tasks of protecting air borders, which Zimin's considerable merit is.

So, Stalin was not stopped by the lack of officially signed agreements. Joint military systems were created as needed and without the presence of a military bloc. The creation of the "Warsaw Pact" was required for other reasons. But this is a topic for another conversation. And here we can note one more fact of preparing a surprise attack - the creation of a joint military system of several countries without an official military bloc between them (that is, when trying to carry out these activities in very deep secrecy). On the contrary, the absence of a military bloc (i.e., the absence of joint governing bodies) allowed Stalin

to carry out activities according to his own plan much more effectively under the formal guise of bilateral economic agreements. Otherwise, one would have to spend extra time on the interconnection of plans, which would have to be created in two forms: formally for cover and actual in deep secrecy. And this would complicate the task and could introduce confusion. In general, a military bloc is more viable in the case of defense against an aggressor (or to preserve power from other threats). But creating it to prepare an attack is difficult. First, the extra interconnection of two-level plans; secondly, an extra source of information leakage; thirdly, it is much more calm to put the governments of other "allied" countries before the fact of war than to explain to them in advance the "charms" of the near future. And no matter how much you send "your" people to "allied" countries, they have the opportunity to resist or do something wrong. Yugoslavia showed this to Stalin by a clear example. Moreover, the situation in the Eastern European countries still needed to be brought to the desired state.

This, in particular, was shown by the exchange of views at an information meeting of representatives of some communist parties in Poland at the end of September 1947 (a collection of speeches by the participants of which was published in Moscow in 1948 by the publishing house of political literature). The CPSU(b) was represented by Zhdanov and Malenkov.

If you carefully read the notes of the reports, you get the following impression: representatives of other countries (except the USSR)

they talked about their internal problems (crop failures, elections, lack of goods) and agreed that the Soviet Union was providing assistance on a larger scale than the United States. And the representatives of the USSR considered it most important to explain to their colleagues the international situation. Zhdanov's report was called "On the International Situation". It said that of the six great imperialist powers after the war, only one remained strong - the United States of America, which wants to take over the whole world. And then it was noted: But the USSR with its growing international influence stands in the way

of the United States to world domination ... Therefore, the new expansionist and reactionary course of US policy is designed to fight against the USSR ... Thus, the US expansionist program is extremely reminiscent of the ingloriously failed adventuristic program of the aggressors, recent pretenders to world domination... Wonderful! Less than two years had passed since the end of the joint struggle against the fascists, as one of the allies wrote down

the other in the next "fascists". Incidentally, there was no NATO yet (which was a year and a half away!). But everything is clear to Stalin:

After the war, two camps were formed - imperialist and anti-democratic, whose main goal is to establish the world domination of American imperialism and destroy democracy, and an anti-imperialist and democratic camp, whose main goal is to undermine imperialism, strengthen democracy and eliminate the remnants of fascism.

Who is in the forefront of these remnants, see the quote above. But what does "liquidation of residues" mean? In what way it was necessary to eliminate them by the military? I hear an indignant voice: "Communists never called for war!"

And here I would like to object and turn to the famous primary source of the work of I. Stalin "SHORT COURSE OF THE HISTORY OF THE AUCP(B)", published in millions of copies in different languages of the world. At the end of 1950, 12 years were celebrated from the date of its first publication. In the newspaper "RED STAR" for 10/1/1950, on the second page, a large article was devoted to this event under the heading: "THE GREAT

THE CREATION OF STALIN'S GENIUS. On the attitude of the Communists to war,

it says: Comrade Stalin in his "Short Course..." expounds the Marxist-Leninist view of the nature of wars in the era of imperialism, teaches to distinguish between just and unjust wars, breaks down the wrong view of the Bolsheviks as ... War, -

Comrade Stalin points out, - is of two kinds: a) just war, non-conquest, liberation war, which has the goal either to protect the people from external attack and attempts to enslave them, or to liberate the people from the slavery of capitalism, or, finally, the liberation of the colonies and dependent countries from the oppression of the imperialists...

For those who are obtuse, the formula can be simplified even more: "A just war can be aimed either at protection from an external attack, or ... (there are variants of a just attack on others)". I can also quote from Lenin's

works, which struck me while still studying at the institute: "You were given ... [a rifle, a machine gun,] ... a

rapid-fire cannon, take these weapons of death and destruction, do not listen to sentimental whiners who are afraid war; there is still too much left in the world that must be destroyed by fire and iron in order to liberate the working class. (V. I. Lenin, volume 26 of the PSS, p. 259).

No one tried to compare Stalin's "Short Course ..." with Hitler's "Mein Kampf"? And in vain, I feel, one could find interesting parallels if one replaces national superiority with class struggle. But we digress. Let's better consider the question: how do you know if an attack is justified or not?

Here is his explanation and should occupy an important place in the policy of the main determinant of justice, who then, by the will of various circumstances, turned out to be JV Stalin. In particular, it was necessary to explain to the leaders of the new allied countries in the joint camp. Zhdanov,

in his report at a meeting in Poland at the end of 1947, clearly explained the intentions of the United States: - The US

military-strategic plan provides for the creation in peacetime of numerous bases and bridgeheads ... provided

to be used for aggressive purposes against the USSR and the people's democracies. American air and naval bases exist or are being established in Alaska, Japan, Italy, South Korea, China, Egypt, Iran, Turkey, Greece, Austria, and West Germany. Feverish preparations are underway to use the Arctic for purposes of military aggression. The concrete expression of expansionist aspirations in the United States under present conditions is the "Truman Doctrine" and the "Marshall Plan". Several comments can be made to the above list of countries: 1) Why can't

the US establish military bases on its territory (Alaska)? 2) The previous

chapters have already considered, with whose active participation the American troops

ended up (or were delayed) in Germany, South Korea, China, Iran, Turkey, Greece and Japan.

3) For balance, it would be useful to indicate a list of countries where Soviet troops were located. But then this phenomenon, apparently, was meant as "fair". (By the way, in the Law of the USSR of 01/15/1960 on the second reduction of troops by 1,200,000, as proof of the "peacefulness" of the Soviet Union, a list of countries from which the USSR withdrew its troops was given, but for some reason it was not indicated why

they were there). In addition to the aggressive forces in the US-led camp, at a meeting in Poland at the end of 1947, additional opponents of the communists in European countries were identified - right-wing social democrats. They should have been called "traitors in the business of frustrating the plans of imperialist aggression." I

personally re-read this phrase several times, trying to understand its meaning. I am citing a line of thought: let's say the imperialists are preparing aggression, transferring industry to a military regime, increasing the army, and so on. How should political forces act in these conditions? To disrupt them - call for their collective sabotage. Or actively support the activities of the authorities, then they can be called traitors in the disruption. And what could the political forces in the European countries devastated by the war in 1947 call for? To a new war? Something is doubtful. borders on mental

diseases. It means that they were not called for a new war, but why were they classified as traitors? Maybe they didn't call for sabotage? What kind of political forces are they if they did not call for anything? But why are they traitors?

In short, I suppose that with this formula, Stalin taught the communist activists of the European countries the following: the imperialists MUST prepare aggression. But the RED ARMY must break it. And the Right Social-Democrats, while calling for peace, get in the way of the imperialists and frustrate their preparations for aggression. But that's how the role of the Red Army in thwarting aggression is being thwarted! In this case, the right-wing social democrats are indeed traitors.

And the fact that the activists of foreign communist parties needed training is also shown by the materials of the conference itself in Poland at the end of 1947.

For example, the representative of the Hungarian communists I. Revai, apparently wanting to give an example of the treacherous behavior of the right-wing Social

Democrats, issued the following passage: As for the Social Democrats, their policy during the election campaign [in Hungary in August 1947] was dictated by the right wing. To achieve their goal, they adopted anti-communist and partly anti-Soviet slogans and arguments from the reaction. For example, provocative rumors spread throughout the country that if the Communists won the elections, collective farms would immediately be organized. Strange, what is anti-

Soviet here? Malenkov himself at the same meeting listed the achievements of the planned Soviet system in the USSR, among which a certain place was given to the advantages of the collective farm system. Maybe "anti-Soviet" was in the word "immediately"? So, "breaking the backbone" of the peasants is not immediately - is it humane, is this an achievement of socialism?

And how was Stalin going to liquidate the remnants of fascism - systematically or how it will turn out? But the plan is a very serious thing. In this matter, it was dangerous for Stalin to completely rely on the leaders of the new allied countries of the USSR. It is much safer to rely on your advisers and your own armed forces. And when the "just" attack begins, find out who is an ally and who

traitor, it won't take long. With traitors, according to the laws of wartime, the conversation is always short. So it turns out that the military bloc in the east of Europe was harmful to Stalin. Therefore, we will return to the USSR of those years and continue to consider the training of the Soviet armed forces. Troops with a

certain number of people should attack someone. What was the situation with this case after the war? Historians very loudly explain that after the war the Soviet armed forces were drastically reduced (from 11.5 million people in 1945 to 2,874,000 people in 1948). These figures are given in many publications (for example, Donchenko V.N. "DEMOBILIZATION OF THE SOVIET ARMY AND SOLVING PROBLEMS OF PERSONNEL IN THE FIRST POST-WAR YEARS", magazine "History of the USSR", No 3, 1970). And they usually added: "What kind of "Soviet threat" could we talk about?"

That's right, an army of 3 million is not enough to conquer world space. But why do historians "stumble" about 1948? What happened in subsequent years? I answer: the number of Soviet troops began to GROW! Those who do not believe can count. From 1955 to 1962, reductions of Soviet troops were carried out for a total of over 3 million people. And if after them about 4 million people were to remain in the troops, then it turns out that by Stalin's death the army should have increased to 7 million people (in peacetime and in the presence of incompletely equipped units!). However, an explanation can be put forward: the Soviet Union did not plan a new war, in 1946-1948 it carried

out the demobilization of troops, but in 1949 the Cold War intensified, the external threat increased, and therefore the army had to be increased.

Composite fairy tale. But before agreeing with it, it would be useful to get acquainted with the system of conscription and dismissal in those years. As I already noted in the "DIGEST", in addition to the "older" ages, in the army en masse called: - in

1942 - guys born in 1925; - in 1943 -

guys born in 1926; - in 1944 - guys

born in 1927. In the summer of 1945,

the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted the Law "On the demobilization of older ages of the personnel of the current

army. "(Moscow, OGIZ publishing house, 1945). It established the sequence and procedure for the dismissal of the "older" ages, in particular, by the end of 1946, 30 ages were dismissed from the army, but some of the "senior" remained until the end of March 1948, whose dismissal was carried out according to the February (1948) decision of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces. This is confirmed by Stalin himself in an interview with the faceless correspondent

of the newspaper "PRAVDA" on February 17, 1951: QUESTION: How do you regard the last statement of the British Prime Minister Attlee in the House of Commons that after the end of the war, the Soviet Union did not disarm, i.e., did not demobilize its troops, which since then the Soviet Union has

been increasing its armed forces more and more? The Union demobilized its troops after the war. As you know, the demobilization was carried out in three stages: the first and second stages - during 1945, and the third stage - from May to September 1946. In addition, in 1946 and 1947, the demobilization of the older ages of the personnel of the Soviet Army was carried out, and at the beginning of 1948 all the remaining older ages were demobilized. These are the known facts... Strange. Again, the phrase "older age" catches the eye. And not a word about the fate of

the "younger ones". But excuse me, Stalin gave an interview in February 1951. It turns out that by this time there were some "younger" ages in the Soviet troops since the war? Is it possible? I answer: exactly like that, they stayed. The "younger" ages included guys born in 1925, 1926 and 1927. But maybe my father, purely by chance, ended up in some elite units? Firstly, the "elite" units were inaccessible to my father: he spent 1941-1943 in the Bryansk region, which was then occupied by the Germans.

Moreover, there is even a confirmation of this information in the book by V. M. Khaitsman "USSR AND THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT. 1945-1959". It says on page 105 that since April 1948 "there were mainly conscripts of two ages in the Soviet Army - those born in 1926 and 1927." But nothing is said when they were called and

when they were finally fired. And what does the remark "mostly" mean? What age was skipped - 1925? To

clarify the situation, it would be useful to talk with veterans, can they confirm all this? Unexpectedly, fate gave me several such meetings.

The first took place on a quiet sunny September evening on September 3, 1994, when I was returning from a suburban summer cottage. The role of one of the bags for the harvest I played an army duffel bag. I went to the dacha by regular bus, the final stop of which was a few kilometers from ours. Shortly

after the bus drove to the terminal, and I stayed to wait, an unfamiliar elderly man approached the stop. He said hello and asked if the bus had passed to the terminal. I replied that I passed. After that, he lowered his bags with the harvest on the ground, began to arrange them and said: "Here, I'm used to them, I don't even want to let go of them." I pointed to my duffel bag and said that I really liked it for its convenience. The man was silent for a few seconds and suddenly says: "And I had to wear this urgently for seven years." I was almost dumbfounded by these words and decided to ask him in more detail. To begin with, he asked: "And what year are you?" He answered shortly: "Twenty-seventh." After such an answer, I began to feverishly think about how to talk to him until the bus arrived. But he continued on his own and began to explain that the 1944 conscription was so "lucky". But the guys born in 1928 have already served "normally" for three years. - When were they called? I asked.

"In 1948," he replied. -

Maybe in 1949? I tried to clarify. He replied that he did not remember. And then we had this conversation:

- And when did you quit in 1951 - at the beginning of the year or at the end? - I didn't quit. I took a one-year officer course in 1950. I looked at such a life and decided to become an officer, otherwise it was not clear how much longer I would have to serve as a soldier. The courses were at the school. We were also given general training. We made better officers than those who studied for a normal three years.

- But you somehow explained why you have to serve so much? After all, every soldier knows when he is demobilized! - No explanation! Serve everything!

- And how did you recruit for the courses? Were there any reports in the newspapers? - Nothing was written in the newspapers. It was a special set. Agitators traveled to military units. So I ended up in Kaliningrad, which is Koenigsberg. They taught well, mines, obstacles (and listed other elements of sapper business).

- And after school where were you sent? -

Optional. We had the opportunity to choose. So I ended up in Kyiv (and again I began to remember how well they taught, gave knowledge of the Russian language, mathematics, German ...)

I asked: "And English?" - Did not have.

- Well, of course, because they were going to fight with America, England. - Yes, they were not going to fight ... But he already said the last words, getting on the bus and our conversation

was interrupted. As a result of it, I received not only confirmation of the fate of the guys in 1927, but also new information: at the beginning of 1950, Stalin decided to increase the number of junior officers in 1951 through, among other things, accelerated retraining of soldiers and sergeants.

My father, in the summer of 1950, also took courses at the school. But at home, he did not say that agitators went to military units. He believed that the path to the officers was forbidden to him because of the line in his biography: "I was in the occupied territory." But he really wanted to become an officer, and he explained that he got into the courses by a successful car repair to some general, who helped. But if there hadn't been a wide agitation in the schools, then another question is how my father's service would have developed further. Moreover,

my random fellow traveler said that he studied at the courses for a year. And my father is six months old. Why such a hurry? Once I asked my father, where did the graduates from his courses go? He replied that the accelerated graduation group (in which he was also included) went to the Far East, the rest studied for another 6 months and then ended up in Germany.

Then there were more meetings with veterans born in 1927. One happened right at work. In the

late 80s, I knew that the Minister of Construction of Ukraine was Vasily Prokofievich Salo. But in the early 1990s, after

retirement, he began to work for us in the construction trust. Somehow I met him and sometimes we had to communicate on production issues. Then I found out that his birthday is November 21st. And when I was already working on the book, I also found out the

year of his birth - 1927. And then one day I decided and asked him to share his memories of serving in the army in the post-war period. He agreed and listed in some detail the places and positions of his

service. He was drafted on November 21, 1944 and ended up in the Gorohovets camps (near Gorky (now Nizhny Novgorod), where I had to spend many months in 1982-1984). There, in the 51st training rifle regiment of the 30th Ivanovo rifle division, he was preparing to become a gunner of a 45-mm gun. In the same camps they had to meet

the Victory. In the summer of 1945, after some decree by Stalin on the replenishment of the navy (whose sailors were often used in the war on the front line instead of infantry), Vasily Prokofievich was transferred to the Moscow naval crew (in Khimki).

In October 1945, he was sent to Kiev to the Naval Training Detachment for a 6-month helmsman course, after which he ended up on the Danube military flotilla. At first he served in the city of Baja (Hungary) on the monitor "Zheleznyakov" (which now stands as a monument on Rybalsky Island in Kyiv). Then

he was transferred to the 1st brigade of river ships of the Danube military flotilla (armored boat 231), based in Vienna, Kuchelau backwater. Vasily Prokofievich explained that they had to go on combat duty in the area of Linz (west of Vienna). They were on duty opposite the American

armored boats. After the reduction of the Central Group of Forces, at the end of 1947, the division was transferred to the city of Reni (Odessa region), and then to the city of Vilkovo, where Vasily Prokofievich served until his transfer to the

reserve at the end of October 1951 with the rank of foreman of the 1st article. And here is another unexpected meeting with 1927: the biography of the writer Vladimir Dmitrievich Uspensky, printed on the inside cover of "ROMAN-NEWSE", No 8-9, 1992 - the author of

LEADER". And although I do not agree with some of his conclusions and storylines, I believe that this novel for the first time paid attention to a number of tragic events of 1941, which official historians rarely addressed. In this regard, his novel has a certain value. But It turned out that there is an interesting stage in his biography as well, in particular, it says:

"V. Uspensky was born in 1927 in the city of Odoev, Tula region. A participant in the Great Patriotic War. He served in the Navy until 1951. Then, before the publication of his first book, he was a journalist in Moscow. He graduated from the historical faculty of the Arkhangelsk Teachers' Institute and the Literary Institute named after A.M. Gorky For more than thirty years, the author has been working on a novel-confession "PRIVATE ADVISOR TO THE LEADER".

Thousands of people could read this biography, but few paid attention to the phrase "I served until 1951 ...". And only veterans of 1927 could clarify it: "conscription service, starting from 1944."

Stalin was right when he spoke in February 1951 about the dismissal of only "older" draft ages. But why did this clarification then disappear from the lexicon of official historians? Didn't consider it important to understand the details? Or decided "not to embarrass the uninitiated"? So, after all, "not by that, they know this by birth, ... not by himself, but through those who

themselves ..." But that's not all. It is necessary to find out when the "normal" conscription of youth was resumed in the USSR. At that time, according to the pre-war law, 19-year-olds were usually drafted for 3 years in the ground forces and 4 years in the navy. Moreover, this order continued until the end of 1967, when the term of service was reduced by 1 year and began to recruit, starting from 18 years old under the new Law on universal military duty.

So, a specific question: when were the guys born in 1928 called? Theoretically, they should have been in 1947. But as it has already been clarified above, at that time all the "older" ages had not yet been fired. It turns out that 1928 should have been called later. When? For a long time I could not find a clear answer to this question. Well, do not go to the military registration and

enlistment office with a request ?! And now I'm reading the article "MYSTERY OF CAPE LAZAREV" (magazine "TEKHNICA-YOUTH", No 7, 1996, p. 21). It contains the memoirs of a former participant in a secret construction site (g

on non-disclosure) of the railway tunnel under the strait to Sakhalin Island. The fact itself is interesting for our study. But I was interested in the dates in the fate of the main character of the article: Gryazev Vitaly Afanasyevich, Doctor of Agricultural Sciences (1982). The year of birth turns out to be 1928 (the article says that now he is 68, i.e. $1996 - 68 = 1928$). He was drafted into the army in March 1949 to the construction battalion located in the city of Blagoveshchensk (military unit 65526). In June 1950, the battalion was reorganized into an engineering sapper and sent to build a tunnel. Gryazev V.A. resigned. in October 1952, having served more than 3 years. (And Vasily Prokofievich Salo said that guys born in 1928 began to appear with them in 1949).

But that's not all. A few years ago I learned that guys born in 1931 were called up "normally" in 1950. Another question arises: when were the guys born in 1929 and 1930 called up? Like Gryazev, in 1949? I could not find

an answer to this question in the literature. But in some form I found information - again through a chance meeting. She also confirmed the fate of the guys born in 1928.

On that day, for various reasons, I stayed at work, and then rode the subway with the thought of getting home as soon as possible and reading a detective by a Romanian author about a crime analysis in 20 years. I sit in the car, I read a book, people get off at stops and come in. And when more than half the way has passed, suddenly I hear the question of an elderly man

over my head: - Sorry, friend, will I go straight to Obolon or with a transfer? I was surprised that an adult is not able to deal with metro stations and replied: -

With a change.

"Is this on Tolstoy?" he clarified. -

Yes ... at the "Palace of Sports", - I

corrected. - Ah, - he said and continued, sitting down next to him: - Well, I'm sorry, I won't bother you anymore, you're

reading something here ... - It's not Moscow, - I interrupted him, feeling that he belongs to categories of people who like to talk (even with strangers). And he continued: There are dozens of interchange stations there. There are only three here.

"Yes, we are a little confused here," he began to explain. - Celebrating 70 years with a friend. I tell him...

"70 years?" - I pricked up my ears and asked: - Are you

from 1927? - No, this is a friend from 1927, and I'm from 1928. "Since 1928?" - I was surprised and quickly

start "interrogation": - Did you serve in the army? -

Certainly! -

What year were you drafted? - In

1949. - In the spring? - No, in autumn. - And the year 1929 was called up with you? - In 1950, there was a delay, but what? he asked, apparently beginning to be surprised

at this turn of the conversation. "My father is from 1927," I explained. He served in the military for six years. "Ah, yes, that's right," he agreed. - They served for a long time ... But at that moment the train, jerking, stopped and I

said: - It's time for you to leave. For

a transplant. He quickly got up and began to make his way to the exit, ending our conversation with the phrase: - Yes, they served and served... his name and how specifically he was served at that time. But he said almost nothing fundamentally new, but only confirmed the previous data. When I asked him about the year of the draft, I was sure that he would name 1949. And so it happened. Fundamental to our study is that in 1949-1951 more draft ages were drafted into the army than were supposed to be. And this is reminiscent of the situation that was before, in particular, in 1939, when a new law on universal military service was adopted, the conscription age was lowered from 21 to 19 years, and several conscription ages were called up at once. And this is already called a "dam", and taking into account other facts, it proves the determination of the country's leadership to fight in the coming years.

It turns out that in the late 40s they tried to repeat the situation? We analyze: In

1948, the demobilization of the "older" ages was completed, but the guys from 1925, 1926 and 1927 who saw the front or communicated with the front-line soldiers remain. In 1949 1950. guys born in 1928, 1929 and 1930 are added to them. By

the end of 1950, they will take over valuable combat experience from the "junior", moreover, conscripts born in 1931 will be added to this company.

Or maybe it was this massive increase in soldiers that led to the shortage of junior officers? What forced Stalin to use accelerated courses for their preparation in addition to regular schools? But it turns out that this is too simple an answer for Stalinist combinations. Not so simple. The fact is that then (at least in the Far East, where my

father served) there were many cropped units. Those. there was NOT enough soldiers for all the officers! What it is? This is when there are officers and equipment, but there are almost no soldiers. Soldiers must come from civilian branches after the announcement of mobilization. Father said so that to his proposals to reduce the number of officers, they answered: "You don't understand! If there is a war tomorrow, we will quickly call on the storekeepers and the part will be ready!" So, the Soviet armed forces from 1949 began to grow.

Up to what size? There is a book - Giuseppe Boffa, "HISTORY OF THE SOVIET UNION", in 2 volumes, volume 2, 1941-1964: translated from Italian, - Moscow, "International Relations", 1990. On p. 256 regarding the number of armed forces of the USSR in 1948 at 2,874 thousand people, he notes: "According to the ideas of the second half of the 30s, it was enough to have an army half as small ..." And then he claims that the armed forces of the Soviet Union "began to grow again from the moment of the war in Korea and by 1955 increased from 2.8 to 5.7 million people.

But, firstly, not since the moment of the war in Korea (June 1950), but since 1949. And secondly, where does the figure of 5.7 million come from? If after Stalin's death, during the cuts, more than 3 million people were fired, then taking into account the remaining (about 4 million), the total figure is 7 million. My father also called this figure, stating that he heard it at meetings in the Officers' Houses ("We'll crush anyone!").

Is this a joke? Deploy an army of 6 - 7 million in peacetime! Yes, with a lot of cropped parts! Yes, even with universal military duty and a well-established system of mobilization (which at that time could be carried out quite calmly)! Moreover, in the presence of almost ready-made "black jackets" in the camps! Plus a stock that had combat experience! Plus a submissive population with full police control! From this information, there can be only one main conclusion - the readiness of the country's leadership to fight!

Now I turn to the title of this book ("Day-M-2"). First, "Day-M" is the day of the announcement of mobilization. But according to the Soviet theories worked out in the 1920s, the maximum number of mobilization measures should be completed before this day. And "Day-M" is the day when covert mobilization develops into open, at the moment when it is no longer possible to hide it, and the troops prepared in advance are ready to throw. After the announcement of mobilization, the framed units and units from the peaceful state quickly recruit soldiers and officers to the full state and move into battle.

To illustrate, I can present an excerpt from my personal "Mobilization Order". I managed to get it at the end of the USSR. I carried it in my pocket for a month to make a photocopy, but did not dare to insert it into the book in its entirety. What if this is a case? So what if the tanks are sawn up, and the atomic missiles are given to the neighbors. (But maybe they just forgot about "mobile instructions"?) Indeed, I don't think that Ukraine in the current situation would start covert and then open mobilization with a declaration of war on anyone. But just in case, I will not demonstrate a complete copy of my "sheet". I will give only a quote: On the basis of the Constitution of the USSR

and the Law of the USSR "On universal military duty" with the announcement of mobilization, you are obliged, without waiting for the agenda of the military commissariat, to appear within _____ hours at the address: (in words)

Here is another confirmation that mobilization is assigned a matter of hours and days. And the "mini-leaflet" is at home with many 1st-class military servicemen. But meticulous readers may object that everything is correct, that in the presence of a nuclear missile

weapons, when missiles fly for tens of minutes ... I answer, I agree. But I can give an example from service in the army. Once,

before the start of regimental exercises (by the way, at the Gorokhovets training ground), I got to hear the regiment commander from the division commander in front of a box with a sand model of the training ground. It was a nice sunny day. We (from the company commander and above) are standing around this very box of sand, our regiment commander is in dialogue with the division commander. Suddenly, the general points his pointer at some place in the "sandbox" and gives an introductory note: "The enemy used tactical nuclear weapons here, what are your actions?"

Our regiment commander begins to report cheerfully: "We are setting up fire barriers with the remaining artillery systems. Artillery chief! Report the decision! .." At that moment, one of the officers standing next to me suddenly expressed this thought out loud: "What nonsense! consider the consequences of nuclear explosions! I remember this. Indeed, strategic missiles fly for tens of minutes. But in any case, this is less than the hours in which I have to run to

some house. And if other people's missiles fly first, then in any case I don't have time. How then to mobilize? But no way! It is not necessary to prepare for war, but to fight for peace. However, this situation began to take shape only by the beginning of the 1960s. In Stalin's time, it was still possible to carry out mobilization in days and without much haste. But

the question arises: how to ensure that all those liable for military service learn about its beginning in time? First, they must feel that it is about to be announced. Secondly, conscripts must perceive

the fact of the announcement of mobilization correctly, cheerfully and with a sense of duty performed, set off on the road. It is not so easy to create such conditions; certain measures are required. And this is what the next

chapter.

And in conclusion of the current one, I will continue explaining the meaning of the title of the book "Day-M-2". First, I wanted to emphasize that Stalin, after 1945, decided to repeat the "Day-M", which he was preparing for 1941. But in the light of the facts that are being revealed, it turns out that there were two such attempts: one - for 1951, the second - for 1954. The first failed due to the crisis of strategic aviation, the second - due to the death of the "main

architect". But couldn't Stalin's heirs continue the preparations at the same pace? There is an assumption that they could not. And not everything is so simple here. And not only because of the struggle for power. And this will also be considered in the next chapter. 12. WHO IS THE NEW ENEMY World War II officially started on

September 1, 1939, officially

ended on September 2, 1945. Six years later, almost to the same day, and for most of this time, fascist Germany was considered the main enemy for the USSR. Japan, but not for long. The Soviet mass media day after day reminded of them in many reports from the Information Bureau, from reports of directions: correspondents, prose, poetry, music of masters of culture, etc. Not to mention the living participants and their own experience.

But now the war is over. And there were no more enemies? For a short time - yes (for several years). More precisely, there were enemies, but on a "small scale": former accomplices of the same fascists, "anti-Soviet element" in the western regions of the USSR, etc. In addition, as a result of the war, there were gaps in educational work. To correct this, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on September 27, 1944, adopts scientific and educational propaganda. " Among the reasons that caused its appearance, it was resolution "About organizations indicated: "During the war years, many party organizations, directing all their efforts to ensure victory over fascism, reduced attention to scientifically - educational propaganda among the population. The activity of the church intensified in the country, religious survivals expanded among part of the population, especially in areas that were occupied. AND

Further:

"In order to radically improve the production of scientific and educational propaganda among the population of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decides:

1. ... Among the population, especially in the countryside, it is necessary to widely practice organizing lectures, conducting conversations and reading aloud popular brochures and articles about the structure of the universe, about the origin of the Sun and Earth, about the main astronomical

phenomena, ...about the origin and life of plants and animals, ..., energy and its use, etc.

.

9. To oblige the journal "Science and Life" to publish systematically in assistance to lecturers materials on natural science issues.

In this resolution, "fascists" are mentioned only in the preamble when indicating the reasons for its appearance. But in itself there is no list of "enemies" of which a reminder to the people is required along with an explanation of astronomical and other phenomena. This is understandable. The war with the German fascists was in full swing, Japan is waiting in the wings, so there are enough "enemies" for

now. But time passed, the wars with Germany and Japan ended. Their results for Stalin turned out to be much less than planned. The world revolution has stopped again. To continue it, a new war is needed. Of course, it is impossible to start it immediately after the victory of 1945. Peace treaties have not yet been signed in Europe and Asia, and international trials have not been held against the leadership of Germany and Japan. And most importantly, it is necessary to restore the destroyed economy and make up for the loss of the population.

Several years have passed. The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials were held, some peace treaties in Europe were signed (in 1947). The economy is recovering. You can think about the continuation of the war. More precisely, you can come to grips with its preparation. And that requires a new enemy. But is it necessary to look for it? After all, the

Cold War has been expanding for several years now! The USSR has been declared an enemy by the USA and England! An aggressive NATO bloc has been created! Etc.

Of course, from time to time the peoples of the Soviet Union were informed about the "bad" behavior of the former allies. But in the summer of 1949, Stalin decided that the scale of such explanations was completely unacceptable. It urgently needed to be sharply increased.

For this purpose, on June 20, 1949, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted another resolution "On the state and ways of improving the work of the all-Union society in the dissemination of political and scientific knowledge."

It was created in 1947 on the INITIATIVE of scientists, public figures, artists as a VOLUNTARY INDIVIDUAL organization. With admission fee and

annual membership dues. And also with payment to lecturers for the lectures delivered.

However, firstly, it is well known that no "initiative" in those years could exist for a long time without the support of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. And most of the time it went straight to them. Secondly, the concept of "voluntariness" in those years usually

meant "voluntarily coercion." It can be seen that then television was just in its infancy. There were very few radio receivers and broadcasting stations. Intercity transport was underdeveloped. Therefore, the concern of the country's leadership for the state of public education looks quite necessary.

But no state, and even more so public organization, to which the CPSU (b) considered itself, can logically and legally indicate anything to any other VOLUNTARY PUBLIC ORGANIZATION. Order

possible for those who are subordinate.

But in the resolution of 06/20/1949, from the very first lines we read: "The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (b) notes that the All-Union Society ... has carried out certain positive work since its organization. However, the Society still does not fully fulfill the tasks assigned to it in the dissemination of political and scientific knowledge among the general population." The following is a list of serious shortcomings in the work of the

Society. According to these lines, the question may immediately arise: who on the other hand "set tasks" for the "voluntary society"? The initiators of its creation are "famous scientists, artists," etc. Well, something doesn't work for them. So the members of the society itself who see this could solve such problems at its own meetings. And criticism in the main areas of work can only come from the most important initiators. It turns out that the main initiator of the creation of the VOLUNTARY "All-Union Society for the Propagation of Political and Scientific Knowledge" was the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Moreover, in those years, these arguments would not have occurred to anyone. Everyone knew his role. What

mistakes did the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks

1. It did not become a mass organization of the Soviet intelligentsia (as of May 1, 1949, there were only 34,000 full members and 16,200 candidates). [Strange structure, reminiscent of an academy of sciences. On the other hand, if there are professional associations of scientists and artists (the same academies, unions (of writers)) and so on, then why else do we need some kind of society? Maybe it would be enough to "puzzle" each of them with an additional task and that's it? Or would effective control over execution be impossible in this case? Could a report on such an additional task be lost among other reports?] 2. The basic

principle of the Society's work is violated - the activity and initiative of the Society's members in the dissemination of political and scientific knowledge. Most members of the Society do not take part in its work. ["Driven voluntarily-compulsorily" and some kind of high activity is still expected without a "carrot and stick"?]

3. The Society's lectures do not adequately reflect topical issues of the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR. [How to reflect, the decision says further]. 4 and other paragraphs point out various

smaller (or very important?) shortcomings, such as lectures are given without preliminary reading of the text, ideological mistakes are made in some lectures, etc. In the commentary to the above, it can be noted that in order to carry out

such a detailed analysis, a lot of work had to be done to verify the activities of the Society. Secondly, what are these "ideological errors"? The US is called an ally? Do not explain the importance of trials in the countries of "people's democracy" over their leaders with death sentences? Thirdly, what is this need for a sharp "improvement" of the Society's activities? In connection with what? Massive complaints from listeners? Many who want to listen to lectures? Something among the errors was not indicated. This means that mistakes are made not on the part of the listeners, but on the part of the main initiator of the creation of the Society. For two years the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks did not pay much attention to his activities. But by the summer of 1949, the situation had somehow changed in such a way that it was necessary to "direct" the work of the Society in the right direction. What was offered to him by the Central Committee of the

1. ... [to the Board] to transform the Society into a mass voluntary organization of the Soviet intelligentsia.

2. Offer the All-Union Society ...: a) Give lectures on the all-conquering Marxist-Leninist doctrine, about the advantages of the Soviet system, etc.

b) Ensure regular lectures on the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, respond in a timely manner to the most important events in international life; STRENGTHEN lecture propaganda that reveals the AGGRESSIVE PLANS OF AMERICAN IMPERIALISM, the anti-popular nature of the social and state system of the United States, the deceitfulness of bourgeois democracy, culture, systematically lecture on the economic condition of workers in capitalist countries, on the development and strengthening of parties, communist strengthening of the anti-imperialist democratic camp.

about

forces

.....

4. Propose to the Board of the Company to organize the work Societies... To this end:

a) Regularly hold meetings of the members of the Society.

.....

c) Revise the existing procedure and amounts of remuneration for lecturers ... 5. Propose to

the Board of the Society to ensure the necessary control over the quality and ideological content of lectures (preliminary control of notes, etc.)

.....

7. ... The best lectures should be printed in the journal of the Society "Science and life" and in national newspapers.

.....

10. Reduce entry and membership fees (by 2 times). 11. Propose to the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics, the regional and regional committees of the AUCP(b) to strengthen the leadership of the Republican Societies, the regional and regional branches of the All-Union Society, to ..., systematically provide them with assistance in their work, create the necessary conditions for expanding lecture propaganda and ensure control over the quality and ideological content of lectures.

That's it. And someone thought that all this was optional and "voluntary". "Carrots and sticks" issued. Big contributions? Let's reduce! Low pay for lectures? Can add. Not many people willing to listen? Nothing, the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics, the regional committees and regional committees will provide! And there will be other help from them (together with control!). In the outback, few of the local intelligentsia know the anti-popular nature of the US social and political system? Read the journal "Science and Life" and national newspapers. Everything is written there. And so that no one doubts the seriousness of this matter, the resolution ends with the following: "Before December 1,

1949, submit to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks a report on the actions taken to implement this resolution."

For those who do not get it, then "Comrade Mauser" will continue to joke. To illustrate the results obtained, I can cite a small review of the journal SCIENCE AND LIFE, No. 1, 1953. Its title says that it is "a monthly popular scientific journal of the All-Union Society for the Propagation of Political and Scientific Knowledge." On the first page of the cover is a photograph of the head of the farm of the Leninskaya Iskra collective farm

in the Kirov Region, who, standing at the table, reads a volume of works by V.I. Lenin against the background of a large portrait of I.V. Stalin in uniform, framed by large ears of some kind of grain. On the table lies the newspaper "PRAVDA", a blank sheet of paper and a pencil. By the way, for a long time it seemed to me that something unnatural in this photo. And only when I was about to write the words "standing at the table

reading," something began to dawn on me. Indeed, if a person reads at the table, then why standing? And if so, why is he reading? A normal person cannot stand at the table and read a book! This position can only be taken for a minute, for example, in order to take a picture. But this is a window dressing of the purest water! Yes, even on the cover of the All-Union magazine!

The second page of the cover is Stalin's handwritten instruction in everyone should be guided by the precepts of V.I. Lenin.

The next page - a large portrait of Lenin is pasted. Both Stalin's instruction and Lenin's portrait are not in color, but are executed

so that they can be used in the design of some "red corners". The first to be published was

the large article "Under the Banner of the Ideas of Marxism-Leninism." Here are some quotes from it: "... Soviet astronomy has

significant achievements. It owns the scientific theory of the origin of the Earth and planets, new theories that penetrate deeply into the regularity of the origin of stars. These theories have refuted the idealistic nonsense of the reactionary Anglo-American astronomers who are trying ..." [It took only 8 years after the "alliance", as England and the United States turned into a "reaction". And why only they, without the "reactionary" French, West Germans, Japanese?] We read further: "The newest" overseas

"theoreticians" and

their European counterparts deny the objectivity of the world and the possibility of knowing its laws, preach the fatalistic "predestination" of happens and fideism, mysticism, everything that the futility of any attempts to change the world. All this "philosophical" rubbish is most directly connected with the praise of the "American way of life" and Anglo-Saxon "democracy", with vicious slander against the camp of socialism and democracy, with furious attempts once again to "refute" and "destroy" Marxism.

In our time, it is especially obvious that in the ideological struggle one cannot be neutral, one cannot take a "middle" position,..." (p. 3)

"The fascist" prophet "of American capitalism, Henry Ford, argued that "the worker must be deprived of all the need for brain work." The capitalists are doing everything to suppress the creative inclinations in the worker, to physically exhaust and spiritually devastate him. Thus, capitalism, especially in its current imperialist stages, extremely narrows the possibilities for the development of science and technology ... "(p. 4) [Here is the label of "fascism" in combination with the word "America"!]. Much later, if the entire

magazine is devoted to one topic, then usually at the beginning it was somehow noted. For example, "in connection with ... the editors decided to dedicate this issue to ... (to something)". In the first article of "Science and Life" number 1 for 1953, there are no indications, but practically

the entire magazine is devoted to the name of Lenin on the map of the country, the triumph of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, the most advanced Soviet science. With periodic denunciations of the aggressive plans of American imperialism, the anti-people nature of the US social and political system, and the slanderousness of bourgeois democracy.

Here are excerpts from other

articles: "There, in the world of capital, where the dollar is in charge of all affairs, the entire development of science and technology is subordinated to the goals of obtaining the maximum capitalist profit, the tasks of preparing a new world war, which the US monopolists are plotting against the USSR and the countries of people's democracy ... (p. 8) [But doesn't the pound sterling do business under capitalism? Or franc?

And what about the Italian lira?] "... - wrote Marx in the first volume of Capital. All the further development of capitalist agriculture confirmed the correctness of this brilliant analysis. 000 hectares of previously cultivated land. The formation of deserts is accompanied by famine, ruin and impoverishment of millions of working people. (p. 10) [Here we will not consider the question: who then bought bread from whom: the USA from the USSR or vice versa?] in the capitalist countries a sharper struggle against this doctrine

than that waged against it in tsarist Russia This struggle against the ideas of I. P. Pavlov is directly connected with the struggle of the reactionary camp of imperialism and the war against the progressive camp of democracy and peace. The American and British imperialists are shedding the blood of the heroic Korean people and are turning biology and medicine - the science of life, of human health - into an ominous weapon of death, the indignant voice of Pavlov, a fighter for peace, resounds with renewed vigor...." (p. 13).

The magazine concludes with a review of the translated novel by Canadian writer Dyson Carter, *The Future Is Ours* (under the title *Under the Dollar's Yoke*). Some quotes from the review:

"The edge of this work is directed against warmongers, against those who threaten with an atomic bomb and sow panic among the population, frightening them with fictitious spies, conspiracies of the "Reds" and similar nonsense. The novel convincingly shows the difficult conditions in which honest representatives have to live and work scientific and technical intelligentsia in a capitalist country. Canada, by the grace of its rulers, is becoming more and more

like a branch of Wall Street. The notorious American "way of life" penetrates deeper and deeper into the bourgeois circles of the country. The offensive of dark forces is intensifying every day reactions. Against this background, the events described in the new work of Dyson Carter take place. Sometimes it seems like a diary, a chronicle. Student Cal Finley, the son of a pastor, introduces Byrd to Professor

Somerville, who ..., that "The Future is for Us" is not fiction, but somewhere blabbed

that he was connected with some scientific circles Soviet Union. In reality, this Sommerville belonged to that type of "professors" whose soul was completely corrupted by the dollar and who are trying to hide their complete retreat to fascism by rhetoric...." (p. 46) Those arrested are carefully processed so that they give evidence pleasing to the police. The investigator persuades Patricia to testify that Kirby and student Cal Finlay were engaged in espionage....

Old Michael is "treated" differently: he is beaten until he bleeds. Finley is also

threatened with this. The police agents have made up "testimonies" and demand that he sign them without reading them. At the same time, he is tortured with a burning beam of a searchlight directed at his face,

in the eyes.

- Will you sign at last? - No! I demand that they let me read it first. It is my right. - Right? the agent laughed. - You have only one right, my dear! Sign up! Byrd's engineer's wife, they drive them crazy

with their "gentleman's" interrogations, and she begins to claim that her husband -

spy.

Sommerville, a professor who has long since broken with science and has become a lackey of the ruling classes, agrees with the police on everything. All "testimonies" written by the detective Morton Kine, this "pundits" signs without any objections. "Yes, they are all spies, all agents of Moscow!" (page 47)

[By the way, indeed "sometimes it seems ... , that "The Future is for us" is not fiction, but a diary, a chronicle", true, if you change the names and the country of the scene, and also specify the year, for example - 1937. I wonder where the author of the review had such an experience? Did he go to Canada?] And

in conclusion: "The Soviet reader will read Dyson Carter's novel with great interest. The book successfully shows the life and customs of one of the capitalist countries, controlled by the American dollar.

This is how the scientific and educational NEW YEAR magazine turned

out! But a remark may arise: successfully and on a large scale to accuse the USA, England and other countries of all mortal sins is possible only for ignorant people. Those. those who were not there, did not read other literature, did not go there and did not communicate with anyone who was there. That's right, this is where the demand for an "iron curtain" comes from? Those. such a policy of the country's leadership towards its citizens, as a result of which it is very difficult for people to travel abroad. And those who leave must be carefully monitored. This was clearly visible from the West. In particular, Churchill spoke about the "Iron Curtain" in his famous Fulton speech at the beginning of 1946. And although since the late 1950s, the Soviet leadership has tried to soften this opinion, it did not go to the abolition of control over those traveling to other countries. There are many examples, because it was one of the "hot" topics until the early 90s.

But for our study it is important to understand that it was conscious state policy, incl. based on laws. For example, on December 16, 1947, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a Decree "On the procedure for relations between state institutions of the USSR and their officials with institutions and officials of foreign states" ("Code of Laws of the USSR", volume 9, Moscow, 1982, p. 39) . The order was set as follows: only

through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs! Note: in the "CODE OF LAWS ..." there were only those that at the time the "CODE ..." was out of print were in operation. Those. The Decree "On the Order of Relations ..." of 1947 continued to operate in the 80s, being one of the few Decrees of the 40s that survived until the 80s. And on June 29, 1976, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted an additional Decree "On the procedure for relations between ministries, state committees and departments of the USSR and the Union Republics, central bodies of public organizations and their officials with foreign journalists", according to which it was possible to communicate with foreign journalists, but "in the manner determined by the Legislation of the USSR". Going back to the end of the 1940s and based on all the previous

information, one can make the assumption that not only were there strong obstacles for Soviet citizens to travel abroad, but there should have been many obstacles for foreign citizens who came to the USSR. Is it fair? Are there any memories on this subject? Available. For example, the notes of the famous Indian diplomat Kaul T.N. "FROM STALIN TO GORBACHEV AND FURTHER" (Moscow, PROGRESS, 1991). In 1947-1949 and in other years he worked at the Indian embassy in Moscow.

Moreover, I believe that for our study, the opinion of a diplomat from India, a country that for a long time was considered friendly to the USSR, is especially interesting. So Kaul recalls:

Contacts with Soviet citizens for foreigners in general, and diplomats in particular were almost impossible [p. 23].

The Soviet side also believed that Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Nehru represented "bourgeois-reformist" tendencies that played along with the policies of the Anglo-American bloc [p. 25].

In Stalin's Russia, all foreigners were under suspicion. Even foreign communists and those who sympathized with the Soviet Union were not trusted. But even those few contacts with Soviet citizens that were possible before were completely prohibited after Zhdanov's decrees in 1948. Even Anna Louise Strong, an American, committed communist and friend of Russia, was imprisoned on suspicion of being a Chinese spy...

We were followed everywhere. The more important the embassy, the more Soviet surveillance was on it. Our telephones were tapped, our Russian employees were regularly interrogated... The hotel rooms we occupied were searched in our absence. There was no way to be alone. Moscow in 1947 was a gloomy city permeated with an atmosphere of terror, mistrust and disregard for human rights and dignity [p. 28].

What did Stalin achieve with this? If a country is really not preparing a war, then on the contrary, it must be demonstrated to foreigners. Their isolation is needed only to hide some of their activities. Such actions are also useful for reducing the scope of activities of foreign intelligence services. By the way, it doesn't work.

On this subject, "VIZH" (No 1, 1997) has an interesting article by a specialist from the Institute of the USA and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences, candidate of historical sciences. Sciences V. I. Batyuk "THE CIA CONSIDERED THE SUCCESSOR OF I. V. STALIN ...".

In it, the author assures that in 1948-1953 "American intelligence did not have sources of information close to the party and state structures of the USSR." For example, he notes that 11 months before the first test of the Soviet atomic bomb, US Secretary of Defense J. Forrestal made an entry in his diary in which he expressed doubts about the ability of the Russians to create such a weapon. "And this was stated at a time when hundreds of the largest enterprises of the Soviet heavy industry were already involved in the implementation of the nuclear project!... Such ignorance of the Minister of War, of course, is on the conscience of the US national intelligence" (p. 27). n. V. I. Batyuk discredits his own assertion in VIZH

(No 5, 1996) in the article "WHY TRUMAN 'SPARED' THE USSR" when he stated that "there is evidence that the reports of the US intelligence services of this period were

of a fairly objective nature and by no means In 1950, in connection with a distorted interpretation of them by a number of representatives of the US military-political leadership, the CIA turned to responsible officials with a special message, which indicated that neither in 1945 nor later did the Soviet Union

actually had no aggressive intentions against the United States. Remarkable reaction to it. Thus, the State Department replied that "the absence of evidence of the existence of Soviet plans to use military force against the United States cannot be taken as evidence of the absence of such Soviet intentions" (pp. 71-72). But excuse me, dear Ph.D., if American intelligence did not have sources

of information, then where did the objective nature of the US intelligence reports come from? From what sources did the CIA draw its objectivity? From Stalin's speeches "trust me"? Conclusions cannot be drawn only on the basis of intelligence data, which can be slipped into disinformation. And why should the US Department of Foreign Affairs (State Department) believe the CIA if something was also observed through its own channels? (It has already been discussed above how diplomats were treated in the USSR at that time).

A clear example of the attitude to the reconnoitered is also in the Soviet history of the period of the first half of 1941. Recall what Stalin wrote on reports about Germany's preparations for war with the USSR? Where did he propose to send their authors? And how did it end?

In the history of the post-war "Iron Curtain" there is another fact that does not quite fit into Stalin's desire to isolate Soviet society from communication with foreign countries - this is a requirement for the allies to return to the USSR those former Soviet citizens who ended up in European countries. For some reason, this topic turned out to be important for the Soviet leadership and took a certain place in the ideological struggle in the post-Stalin era. For a long time there was no complete clarity on this issue. The

Soviet media reported that the Allies tried to prevent the return of interned Soviet citizens to the USSR, urged them to stay in the West, and recruited agents. Occasionally, information appeared that the Motherland met some of the returnees with hostility and sent them to their concentration camps. But in the West there was an amateur historian (Nikolai Tolstoy), who decided to explore this topic and wrote the book "VICTIMS OF YALTA" (Paris, 1988). Its magazine version was published in the magazine "Youth", No. 5, 6, 1991

year.

The main conclusion of the book: in 1944-1947, the Western allies (especially the British, apparently bound by a 1942 friendship treaty with the USSR) forcibly handed over to Stalin more than two million Russians, most of whom suffered a terrible fate. In particular, terrible examples are given of how those who did not want to return to the USSR were forcibly herded onto ships, what desperate steps some of the returnees were forced to take in order not to sail to the Soviet Union. And also the testimonies of officers from the teams of those ships are given about what happened in the ports of unloading:

- replacement of clothes and things issued upon departure;
- filtering returned and shooting some groups right in the port. Strange. And what

was the interest of the Beria department in natural English underpants? What threat could arise if the interned Soviet citizens remained abroad? How could they interfere? On the contrary, after returning to the USSR, they would be inconvenient in that they could refute the reports of the Soviet media about life there. It turns out that all of them should be isolated. Why extra expenses? Indeed, under a peaceful policy, there was not much difference whether they remained abroad or not. But in the event of a war between the Soviet Union and the West, the

latter will have a demand for specialists who know Russian. In particular: to groups of saboteurs, to front-line reconnaissance groups, translators to the front, translators to prison camps, etc. Of course, not everyone would go into the service of a future enemy, especially women. Most likely they could be former military personnel. Here they were first of all shot at the ports of unloading. Conclusion: during the Yalta negotiations and even earlier, Stalin worked out plans for preparing a new world war. Okay, let's say measures to isolate Soviet citizens in the first post-war years were carried out. Foreign contact is kept to a minimum. But this is not an end in itself. Something must have happened next. And it happened.

From the middle of 1949, the leadership of the USSR, for some reason, really wanted the peoples of the country to get used to the idea that the United States and England were the worst enemies, "fascists." That they are preparing a new war,

which could start very soon. Let us recall what Stalin wrote to Beijing in October 1950 in connection with the offensive of American troops in Korea:

"... the United States, because of its prestige, can be drawn into a big war, and, consequently, China will be drawn into the war, and at the same time it will be drawn into war and the USSR, which is connected with China by a mutual assistance pact. Should we be afraid of this? In my opinion, we should not, because together we will be stronger than the USA and England, and other capitalist European states without Germany, which cannot now to render any assistance to the United States, do not represent a serious

military force. If war is inevitable, then let it be now ... "Thus, Stalin himself considered the United States and England to be his first enemies. But since they were just recently listed as allies of the USSR, it was necessary to do a lot of work to change this opinion. And the shorter the deadlines were given for it, the more carefully and responsibly it had to be

organized. Which is what was done. But you can't just call a country an enemy for a very long time and say that it is about to attack. The people can simply put up with this and "noble rage" will not work. The effectiveness of such propaganda has a time frame. And it makes sense only if the war is really being prepared, but not by an attack by the accused country, but, on the contrary, against it.

It turns out that this was part of some big plan? War preparations? For comparison, I.

A. Kahn's reminiscence can be cited here (OGONEK magazine, N: 1, January, 1991, pp. 25-27). Here is what he tells about the year 1950 in the DPRK: "- Shortly before the

start of this fratricidal war, all the media of the North launched a wide propaganda of the efforts of the DPRK leadership in the cause of the peaceful unification of the country, those supposedly peaceful proposals that Kim Il Sung repeatedly made to the administration of South Korea. At the same time, not a day passed without indignant reports of armed provocations by the South Koreans. The newspapers kept saying that Syng-man Rhee sought to unite the country by force of arms ... Thus, the entire population, including myself, were confident that ambulance

war cannot be avoided and that it will begin, undoubtedly, at the initiative of the South, which has sold out to

... the Americans. At the time, I was the Vice Chairman of the Gangwon Province [Gangwon-do?] WPK Committee. In May 1950, I went on a business trip to Yeoncheon [Icheon?] county. Here, in the immediate vicinity of the 38th parallel, two divisions, consisting of servicemen of exclusively Korean nationality, had just been introduced from China. Naturally, I decided that this was a preventive measure by the North Korean leadership in case of hostilities. In June, I fell ill and ended up in the central hospital in Pyongyang. At the same time, several high-ranking party and government officials were lying there with me. We often gathered together and discussed the situation in the country in connection with the clear signs of the approach of war. And suddenly, on the eve of the discharge at two in the morning, they call me to the phone. The first secretary of the Central Committee of the WPK called, suggesting that I immediately come to the chairman of the Council of Ministers, i.e. to Kim Il Sung. When I entered the office, the entire Council of Ministers and a number of invited persons were already fully assembled there. Kim Il Sung immediately announced that two hours ago, at one in the morning, the South Korean army opened fire along the entire 38th parallel. In connection with this attack, he, as supreme commander, ordered a counteroffensive. Everyone unanimously voted for the approval of this order. "Let's analyze this evidence. At three o'clock in the

morning on Sunday, June 25, 1950, Kim Il Sung convenes a meeting and declares that the enemy (South Korean troops) opened fire. It looks like the beginning of the war ("without its announcement "). Of course, you can believe that someone started the

war on the shortest summer Sunday night. But it's hard to believe at the time of the beginning - "one in the morning." The fact is that you can't open fire from cannons just like that. That tanks and infantry will go on the attack after it. That is, it is called "artillery preparation of (subsequent) attack". Accordingly, it cannot last indefinitely. And the attack of tanks and infantry, although it can begin late at night, is very risky. May not be as effective as attacking troops may confuse directions, get under their own artillery fire, or into very inconvenient territory

(minefields, etc.). In short, during a night attack on fortified positions, very heavy losses are very likely. Therefore, the offensive is usually planned at dawn. Moreover, the conduct of artillery preparation must be visually controlled, i.e. and it must be performed under illumination. Night shooting is usually illuminated either by illuminating projectiles or by aircraft dropping illuminating bombs. But this is very difficult and less effective, at least in the long run. In this regard, we can recall "June 22 at exactly 4 am" or the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, and many other battles of

the Second World War began in a similar way. By the way, you can also quote on the Korean War from the book of Colonel M.P. Tolchenov "ARMED STRUGGLE OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE FOR THEIR FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE (Review of military operations. June 1950 - June 1952) (Moscow, "Voenizdat", 1952 , page 22):

Exactly following ... the plan, the South Korean troops at dawn on 25 June 1950 launched an offensive, crossing the line of the 38th parallel.

Dawn in the summer of June 25 comes around 4 am. It turns out that the guns of the South Koreans fired for more than three hours? It is hard to believe!

Artillery preparation is very difficult to carry out for a long time - for hours. Firstly, a very large consumption of shells is required. For example, with 4 shots per minute, one cannon can fire $4 \times 60 \times 3 = 720$ shells in 3 hours. Artillery batteries usually have 8 barrels. Artillery divisions have 3 batteries. In one artillery regiment, 3 artillery divisions. Etc. If you multiply everything, you get tens of thousands of shells. And this, in turn, is mountains of boxes. Moreover, all these stocks can be released to empty places, i.e. aimlessly! In addition, it is necessary to leave shells for artillery support of the attack!

And also, it is necessary to take into account the complexity of firing at night with a large number of illuminating equipment on batteries and the fatigue of gunners. Three - four hours to transfer in the dark "blanks" of 15 - 20 kg at a rate of 3 - 4 per minute, as well as boxes of 50

kg is a very difficult task.

Therefore, if the offensive is planned for the morning, then the artillery preparation should begin at the very beginning of dawn. And it should last one or two hours, no more.

And if in June 1950 the offensive was planned by the troops of the DPRK, then everything converges. Let's assume that the beginning of the artillery preparation is scheduled for 4 o'clock in the morning. And for this you need an order. It takes some time from its formal approval (at the Council of Ministers) to its entry into the troops. Time is also needed for the Council of Ministers to meet. In addition, some time must pass from the beginning of the "shelling" of the South Koreans until the moment when the message about this "should reach" the chairman of the Council of Ministers, and also until he makes a decision and members of the government are notified.

Here is another proof that the offensive of the DPRK troops began on Sunday, June 25 at exactly 4 am. Nine years have passed since 1941, but the attack tactics have remained the same. And the beginning of the war in Korea shows one of the possible options for the start of the Soviet operation "Thunder" on 07/06/1941.

And, as it turned out, there is no need to prove all this anymore. In the already mentioned magazine of the parliament and government of the RSFSR "RODINA", No 5, 1990, in the article by S. Volovets "PROHIBITED WAR" about June 25, it says this:

"At four o'clock in the morning on June 25, 1950, red rockets from the north of the 38th parallel, which divided Korea into two parts after the war, gave a signal and indicated targets for artillery preparation. Thousands of guns and mortars fired for two hours. And then 100,000 The North Korean army, supported by T-34 tanks, began to rapidly move south, pursuing a randomly retreating enemy.

But this information is already from the end of the 80s, and in Stalin's time, everyone would not have done a detailed analysis. Especially if for a long time only various provocations and violations were reported, that the neighbor on the border is an enemy, and in general - that a war is about to begin.

In 1949, there was practically no mass television in the USSR. Radio receivers too. Under these conditions, lectures have an important place in ideological education. An interesting example of lecture work at that time in Moldova is given in the journal "OGONEK", N: 5, January 1991, p. 13 (an excerpt from the article "APOTHEOS"): "... Overcoming difficulties,

Chernenko set about improving party education. During 1949, he organized more than 45

thousands of propaganda meetings attended by more than 9 million people, i.e. for each inhabitant of the republic, including infants, there were 10 visits. 35 thousand lectures were read to the population of the republic - they collected (more precisely, they collected) 6 million listeners.

And what did they say? About the anti-people nature of the US state system? What is this all for? What role can mass indoctrination play at all? How serious is this? There are reports that under some conditions

it is very serious. In particular, Rudolf Balandin's article "BEKHTEREV'S SECRET WEAPON" was published in the "TEKHNIKA-MOLODEZHI" magazine, No 4, 1993. In it, the author cites a recording of his conversation with a certain popularizer of science Gleb Anfilov. He said that a talented Russian thinker, psychologist and psychiatrist, physiologist and neuropathologist Academician V. M. Bekhterev carried out work on the collective suggestion of emotions at a distance. At the same time, he found that in the team there is an increase in the effect of suggestion. The most successful effect is on emotions. Then the science fiction writer Belyaev gave him the idea of technical amplifiers of mental signals. For this, a conventional radio network was used in the experiments. As a result, complex radio signals of a certain rhythm were established, causing a slight hypnotic state in listeners, conducive to an increase in suggestibility.

It turned out that at first the few, the most pliable, react to them. And then the process of mutual induction, characteristic of the crowd, spreads relatively quickly. Something like self-indulgence. People become truly mesmerized. [Balandin's question]: - So what

kind of weapon is this? [Anfilov's answer]: -

Ideological, of course. Internal use. [It] organizes, mobilizes, directs and inspires. Let's put it this way: it's a weapon to conquer your own people. It creates not only obedient crowds, but also insanely - insanely! - the adored leader ... - So the cult of Stalin ...

- Yes. Implementation of Bekhterev's secret weapon. No less successful than in Germany.

However, here we can add that the strengthening of adoration is possible only in the complete absence of doubt, other opinions. And for this it is necessary to carry out special measures, for example, under the "Iron Curtain" program (which was done). However,

by the beginning of the 50s, in addition to the task of adoring the leader, the inhabitants of the USSR had to be instilled with the idea that the leaders of the United States and England were "fascists" who oppressed their peoples. And besides, they are preparing aggression against the Soviet Union, which must be thwarted and the peoples of the United States and Britain freed from oppression

(together with other dependent and colonial countries). Moreover, such an understanding of the international situation was explained not only by the desires of the leaders of the USSR or "international duty", but also by the "scientific theory" of Marxism-Leninism, which allegedly scientifically proved the doom of "bad" orders and the inevitability of the "World Revolution". In other words, the inhabitants of the Soviet Union quite successfully introduced the idea of "historical planning" of the class struggle, which allows for the possibility of a "just" war (but which is prepared, first of all, by the leaders of those very "bad" countries who do not want to "reconcile" with their "historical defeat"). The same situation was raised by Stalin in the summer of 1950 in a discussion on questions of linguistics. Thus, the cult of personality was an integral part of the preparations for the world war.

But subsequent events showed that it has a strong negative side: after the death of an adorer, a serious gap appears in the souls of people, which cannot be quickly filled. The cult of personality is possible only with the assertion that this personality is the most (ie, that nearby personalities cannot simply replace it). But after the death of the deifier, it is impossible to quickly appoint a "replacement" of "equally degraded" leaders. Including because of the struggle for power.

Years must pass before someone alone comes forward (as happened with Nikita Khrushchev). But if the new leader starts criticizing the previous one and tries to implement some other plans, then the generation "attuned" to the former personality will be very

it will be hard to readjust. Here we have to wait for the change of generations. And if control over alternative opinions is reduced, then the creation of a cult of personality in general may turn out to be an impossible task. But it must be taken into account

that the personality cult of Stalin was not an end in itself, but was associated with the preparation of a world revolution. However, by the end of the 50s, time for her was hopelessly lost. The United States has a nuclear-missile "shield and sword". And although the USSR had something similar, but under these conditions it became too risky to start a new world war with impunity. And in the early

50s, there were no nuclear missile weapons. There was still an opportunity to mobilize in days. There is only one problem: how to ensure that the conscripts in the reserve learn about its beginning in time? This requires an extensive

network of alerts. What? Before the war, large black loudspeakers - cymbals - were installed free of charge in most Soviet apartments, and silver bells were installed on every street. Victor Suvorov in the book "Day-M" specifically draws attention to this and explains that one day they had to shout mobilization to the whole country - Day-"M".

But this is about the pre-war period. And now we read excerpts from the resolution of the May Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine "ON THE STATE AND WAYS TO IMPROVE THE MASS POLITICAL WORK AMONG URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION":

Plenum of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U decides:

.

2. The most important task of the mass political work of the working people must be a profound explanation of the decisions of the Party and the Soviet government, the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR, and questions of the international situation.

.

23. Oblige the Committee on Radio and Broadcasting under the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, authorized by the Ministry of Communications of the USSR under the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, regional committees, city committees and district committees of the CP (b)U, executive committees of regional, city and district Soviets of Workers' Deputies to ensure the completion of full radio coverage in the next 2-3 years republics. Necessary

widely organize socialist competition for the radio installation of enterprises, collective farms, state farms and MTS, apartments workers, collective farmer's houses, etc.

Let's analyze: two years from May 1949 - this is May 1951. And with overfulfillment, just the beginning of 1951. If some houses do not have time to radio, it does not matter: the neighbors will raise the alarm.

Fortunately, the Soviet leadership did not dare to announce Den-M. But is it possible to imagine how events in the Third World War could unfold? This is what the next chapter is about. 13. THE

NUCLEAR WAR WHICH DID NOT HAPPEN So we

come to the chapter where it is the right place to present information from the Soviet military plans of the late 40s and early 50s. Unfortunately, they have not yet been declassified, although similar American plans have long been known. Maybe there were no Soviet

plans at all? How was it not? What did the headquarters of the two Soviet military ministries do? There were plans, but so far one can only speculate on their contents. Moreover, there is material for assumptions.

First, you can start with the declassified American command and staff exercises: 1) The

Padron War Game, held in May-July 1948.

US Army Headquarters to test Halfmoon's work plan.

2) And the war game "Stanner", held in October-November 1948 to test another American plan of action in the third world war "Fleetwood".

Information about them was published in "VIZh" Nos. 3 and 5 for 1996. Translation and commentary on them were made by V.I. The article is called "WHY G. TRUMAN 'SPARED' THE USSR".

However, a reasonable question may arise to such an idea: how much can one trust any military research of the other side? I think it's possible to some extent. The rules of strategy and tactics of warfare at a certain historical moment are practically the same for generals of different countries. Another thing is what forces are at their disposal, i.e. what they can count on.

Here we can recall the command and staff exercises of the Soviet military leadership, held on the eve of the war. Then the future Marshal Zhukov "fought" for the "blue" (ie, for the Germans). And he "fought" practically the way the generals of the Wehrmacht actually acted later. The textbook "HISTORY OF THE USSR" of 1990 on page 14 says the following:

"... a number of military leaders clearly imagined the possible options for the actions of the enemy [Germany] in the event of a war. This was shown by the operational-strategic games on the maps of the top command staff of the Red Army, held at the end of 1940. One side, the "blue", played for the enemy, the other, "red", - for the Red Army. Many of its moments were repeated in the real conditions of the initial period of the war. " There is another

creepy (in my opinion) example. Somehow, in the memoirs of a Soviet prisoner during the war, I read that in the camp where he was, former teachers of the General Staff Academy were kept (Marshal Vasilevsky was their student). They followed the reports of the Sovinformburo, after logging in their free time on the ground they drew situations with twigs in different sectors of the front and made forecasts for the coming 2-3 months. The author of the memoirs was surprised that, firstly, their predictions usually came true. And secondly, why were such specialists kept in the camp? They wrote letters asking to be allowed to serve in the army. But for some reason they were not released. One general, however, was later sent to the front. As

confirmation of the reality of such a story, I can more specifically cite a fragment of a somewhat similar fate - Lieutenant General Vasily Vasily Efimovich. In January 1938 he was arrested and ended up in a camp. At the end of 1942 he was released, fully rehabilitated and sent to the front. He commanded the 138th Carpathian division, corps, was mentioned 14 times before the end of the war in the orders of the High Command. (Newspaper "Privatnoe Delo", October 23-29, 1994, article by Grigory Kipnis "SUCH A LONG LOVE"). Of course, the quality and quantity of ALL available information about the enemy (and not just intelligence data) greatly affects the results of general games. But I think that the American generals had certain qualifications.

Now let's briefly discuss the question: was it relevant for American politicians to hold such games in 1948? There is only one answer - there was a need. At that time, the Berlin crisis was in full swing, the communists came to power in Czechoslovakia, which allowed the USSR to quickly close the gap between East Germany and East Austria, where Soviet troops were located. By this time, the split of the world into blocks was already quite clearly defined. Anti-American propaganda was unfolding in the USSR, and so on. The Berlin crisis (associated with the monetary reform in West Germany) generally raised the question point-blank about the use of American military power. And before making a final decision on it, holding a war game was extremely necessary. So, what conclusions did American analysts come to?

In his commentary on the translation of the Pedron game, V.

Batyuk writes: Despite the touch of propaganda rhetoric aimed at accusing the Soviet Union of striving for world domination and justifying the planned destruction of the largest Soviet administrative and industrial centers, the report [based on the results of the Pedron game] reveals a number of important circumstances, due to which the implementation of the above plan [of air-nuclear strikes against the USSR] seemed to the Pentagon headquarters, although politically expedient and hypothetically possible, but an extremely risky step. We are talking about a whole set of closely intertwined political and military-technical problems, among which in the first place was the inability of the US ground forces to fulfill the tasks stipulated by the Halfmoon plan. So, it turned out that these troops were not able to protect American bases in the Mediterranean, in the Middle and Far East,

from which strategic bombers were supposed to take off to strike targets in the USSR. In addition, Pentagon analysts came to the conclusion that American divisions would be able to resist the Soviet armies victoriously marching across Western Europe for a maximum of two weeks, after which they would leave the European allies at the mercy of the winner and evacuate from the continent.

... It was precisely this delicate circumstance from the point of view of allied relations, apparently, that served as one of the reasons why the Halfmoon plan and the materials of the staff game held to test it were not made public for a long time.

The results of the war game "Stanner" (October-November 1948) turned out to be about the same: "On the fifth day of the war, Soviet troops with 26 divisions went to the Rhine, and on the seventh they crossed it with large forces. There was no talk of stubborn defense of the line along the Rhine, it was made conclusion that "US forces must immediately leave the defended positions and retreat to the West under the cover of darkness in order to save at least some of the people and equipment."

The following areas of warfare were assumed by the Americans: 1) Continental

Western Europe. 2) Great Britain. 3)

Middle East oil-

producing regions (Iran, Iraq). 4) Mediterranean countries

(Greece, Turkey, Italy, Egypt). 5) Alaska and nearby islands. 6)

Korea.

The rationale for US military weakness was as follows: arguments (included as notes to the article by V. Batyuk):

1) After the war, the size of its land army was sharply reduced (to about 600,000 people). Only from the beginning of the war in Korea (June 1950) did it begin to increase, and by June 1951 it had reached almost 2 million people. In addition, after the war in the United States, forced conscription into the army was abolished, in connection with which, from 1948, American generals had to seek the resumption of conscription, at least on a limited scale.

For comparison: according to American intelligence, the total number of Soviet armed forces in February 1948 was 2 million 750 thousand people. Moreover, only in East Germany (according to the same American intelligence) in October 1947 there were 5 Soviet armies (3rd shock, 8th guards, 1, 3 and 4 guards mechanized), numbering 324 thousand people. (i.e., half the size of ALL US ground forces), and, since 1949, the Soviet army began to increase again.

2) Up to half of the strategic air command bombers could not take off on alert due to lack of spare parts and poor maintenance, but even those crews that took to the air were often unable to solve the assigned tasks. During exercises over Dayton (Ohio) in 1948, none of the strategic bombers involved completed the combat training mission. 3) In the middle of 1948, the US Air Force was armed with only 32 B-29 aircraft as carriers of atomic bombs. In December 1948, their number reached 60, and by June

1950 - 250. 4) In 1947, the total number of nuclear bombs in the American arsenal did not exceed two and a half dozen, and even those needed to be collected for a long time.

Only after the Berlin crisis in 1948 did the American nuclear arsenal begin to grow at an accelerated pace. By May 1949 it had grown to 140, and by the summer of 1953 it had reached a thousand bombs. 5) The US Air Force had problems with maps of the USSR, especially on a small scale. Due to the fact that geographic maps in the Soviet Union had been classified

since the mid-1930s, the Pentagonists had to rely on cartographic materials preserved from pre-revolutionary times, as well as captured German aerial photography data.

6) A certain concern of US political leaders was the problem of interaction between the commands of various branches of the armed forces.

7) Etc.

Did the Soviet leadership know about this? There is evidence that Soviet intelligence in the United States worked much better than American intelligence in the USSR. There are many publications about this, for example, the already mentioned Ph.D. V. Batyuk in his article "THE CIA CONSIDERED JV STALIN'S SUCCESSOR" ("VIZH", No 1, 1997). He cites data that Soviet intelligence officers obtained documents that existed even in one copy, incl. for the American nuclear project. As for the military

command of the Soviet Union, VIZh No. 5 for 1996 on p. 72 admits that it nevertheless

developed plans for a "just" attack on others: "With regard to ground operations by the armed forces against states on whose territory American Soviet forward-based facilities were located, it should be noted that it was with the Berlin Crisis of 1948 that the revision of the passive defensive strategy adopted after the defeat of the fascist aggressors began. At the turn of the 1940s and 1950s, the concept of offensive operations began to take shape, which from the very beginning American analysts attribute to the Soviet side - the suppression of US military (primarily air) bases in Eurasia and the interception of communications between the North American and Eurasian continents. It was the "passive defensive strategy" of the Soviet leadership after the war that Soviet historians were talking about when it was necessary to say something about Soviet post-war army planning. It was the defensive plans of

1946-1948 that they usually cited as an example, as if 1948 was the last year for drawing up any military plans. And as all the previous chapters of this study have shown, the Stalinist leadership of the USSR was not going to recklessly start a new world war. It CAREFULLY AND CONSISTENTLY PREPARED her. True, Hitler set an example that too thorough preparation is not required. You can stop at a sufficient minimum,

for example, there were about 50 submarines in the German fleet in September 1939. And this number was "enough" to unleash a world war. For comparison: according to American intelligence, the Soviet Union had 335 submarines in the late 1940s. What is this for? To fight for peace? It has already been said above that Stalin could have been thinking about a new war since 1943. And the most visible steps towards its approach were his great efforts already in 1945 to create a future Far Eastern hotbed of tension (Korea, China, Hokkaido). Why there?

To answer this question, it is useful to move from flat maps to a round globe. By the way, Nikita Khrushchev once remarked that Stalin "led the globe", hinting at his superficial approach to

solving many problems. I think the conclusion is wrong. It's not about being superficial. Just for the preparation of some plans, flat maps with a curved surface are no longer suitable. We need a GLOBE! And he was in

Stalin's office in the Kremlin! In his memoirs "GENERAL STAFF DURING THE WAR" (1968), General of the Army Sergei Matveyevich Shtemenko describes not only the tasks being solved at that time, but also his relationship with Stalin, including: the daily routine he established, the order of reports and the atmosphere of his office. (p. 117). Reports to the Supreme were usually made three times a day. The first two - by phone, and the final day (with showing the situation on maps at a scale of 1: 200,000) was done at night in Stalin's Kremlin office, ending at 3 - 4 in the morning.

The cards were unfolded on a long rectangular table, behind the end of which, in the corner, stood a large globe. However, Shtemenko notes that in hundreds of visits to the Kremlin, he never saw operational issues being considered there. But this does not prove that they were not used at all. A large globe cannot be in the WORKING ROOM as furniture: you cannot sit on it, put or put something on it - too. For beauty, an aquarium, paintings or sculpture are better suited. Some of this list was in Stalin's office: a plaster death mask of Lenin, large portraits of Suvorov and Kutuzov, and oak paneling of the walls. And why did the big globe take its place? First, it makes it possible to accurately calculate long distances when dealing

with global strategic issues (which Stalin increasingly had to address from 1945 onwards). As for Korea, when it is day in Europe, it is night and vice versa. Is the hint not clear? Will explain. Imagine 11 pm CET. Unexpectedly, the officers of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany are raised

on alarm, moreover, after two or three months of conducting exercises in conditions of high combat readiness and with a propaganda campaign about provocations from a possible enemy. By 0-00 o'clock in the night, the officers were gathered and they were informed: in the Far East, the Americans attacked Chinese and Soviet territories. Apparently, this is to be expected here as well. IN

as a counter-preparation, the Soviet leadership decided to take preventive measures. In particular, for pilots: to carry out the bombing of predetermined airfields; tankers: withdraw equipment to predetermined (source) areas and be ready for an attack; gunners: readiness to open fire - 4-00! Etc. And someone would try to refuse! And here, for some reason, the warehouses turned out to be ready for the issuance of ammunition! Only one thing remains: forward to the impregnable enemy! But how to check if there was an American attack or not? And no way to check. Everything was set up for this occasion. By the way, the shelling by American aircraft of the Soviet airfield in the Dry River area near Vladivostok on October 8, 1950 took place! But then the Soviet Union did not move its troops in Europe, fortunately for all progressive and other mankind, IN ANSWER. They limited themselves to a note of protest. (Moreover, American diplomats refused to accept it, advised to contact the UN command. I had to send a note by mail).

I will not give a more detailed analysis of the possible course of the war here. In terms of the directions of hostilities, it is quite possible to agree with the information of the American military games (only by clarifying it with other regions of the Arctic). Moreover, the list of possible theaters of war available in it almost completely coincides with the list of "enemy" or "occupied" territories, which Zhdanov brought at a meeting of representatives of some communist parties in Poland at the end of 1947. But it turned out that in Soviet

fiction there are a kind of "memoirs about the failed atomic war" written by the Strugatsky brothers in the late 60s - this is Section 17 of their story "INHABITED ISLAND" (Moscow, publishing house "Children's Literature", 1971, with a note: "For middle and senior school age"). These "memoirs" describe in sufficient detail the methodology for preparing a "just" invasion, the customs in the Soviet Army of those years, and, in addition, artistically shows what is hidden behind the new tactics adopted in 1949 to break through the defenses of an atomic enemy. In general, here is the time to present the ENTIRE 17th section of the Strugatsky

story, it is written superbly! But for a number of reasons, unfortunately, we have to make cuts and changes.

The advantage of the section is a large number of "transparent" allusions to reality. For example, a train with a penal tank brigade is moving to the front even before the start of hostilities and without tanks. Some years ago, the future enemy was an ally in some kind of world war, and after it, he set up a line of mine-atomic fields on his border. Penal boxes are made up of former prisoners, who are divided into criminals and political. They are transported in freight cars with bunks, crookedly knocked down from unplanned boards. There is almost no food on the road. Boiled water columns at intermediate stations remain the most accessible food. Instead of boots, they have boots with windings. The brigade

unloaded early in the morning, when there was fog and drizzling light rain. The first attempts to build it were unsuccessful. But soon there were guards with machine guns at the ready. Under their "cover" the brigade was built and its commander (a former colonel, demoted for trading in state-owned fuel on the black market), delivered a parting speech: - Soldiers! ... I am not

mistaken, I am addressing you as soldiers, although all of us - including myself - are still ordinary dregs of society ... Be grateful that you were allowed to go into battle now. In a few hours, almost all of you will die, and that will be good, but those of you who survive will heal like a god in his bosom. Soldier soldering, alcohol, etc. Now we will move into position, and you will get into the cars. Complete nonsense - to walk one and a half hundred kilometers on tracks ... Tankers from you are like a hammer from a bottle, you yourself know, but everything you get to is yours ... There is no way back, but there is a way forward. Who moves back - I will burn on the spot! This is especially true for drivers... No questions! Br-r-rigada! Right! ...Deal in fours!... Listen to the command! Sha-gom... ma-a-rsh! Damn it!..." The protagonist of the story (Maxim) for

some time ended up next to the ex-colonel. He was drunk. The battalion commanders turned out to be drunk as well. tanks were assembled in advance. All the way along the edges of the road every 50-100 meters one could see black figures of guards with machine guns at the ready. Penalmen walked silently, obediently, like cattle. When three

a row of tanks, then someone in front of the column shouted cheerfully and loudly: "Here

are our coffins!" To this, the platoon commander (himself a former guard) said to Maxim: "Look what they give us - these are pre-war cars, tin cans! Listen, Mac, are we going to die here? After all, this is inevitable death ... "Maxim tried to calm him down. But one of the penalty boxers remarked: "Aha! Did you wet your pants? It's not for you to count the teeth of convicts ..." There

were loudspeakers between the tanks right on the grass, from which a tape-recorded voice explained that there, behind the crest of the ravine, was an insidious enemy. "Therefore - leverage on yourself and forward! On the enemy! Only forward!"... When the column was drawn into the gap between the rows of tanks and stopped, the voice from the loudspeakers stopped for a short time, and instead the ex-colonel began to shout: "- Soldiers! Stop bazaaring! Everyone go to the cars! ... Who will be left - "and he began to wave his pistol. (The colonel stood on his all-

terrain vehicle, and the battalion held his legs). But for a short time there was a crush, even a fight, since most of the penalty boxers wanted to occupy only the tanks of the back row. But then the guards appeared and began to shoot from machine guns. Maxim with his crew quickly ran to occupy the tank in the front row. They were joined by a driver, a criminal nicknamed Hook. When everyone fit into the tank, Maxim squeezed into the

tower and leaned out. There was no one between the tanks except the guards. All engines worked, there was a terrible rumble, a thick, stuffy cloud of exhaust filled the slope. Some tanks were moving, in some places heads were sticking out of the towers: a paratrooper from a nearby car gave Maxim some signs and twisted his face. Suddenly he disappeared: the engines roared with redoubled force, and all the tanks with a noise and a howl simultaneously rushed forward and up the slope.

"It has begun," thought Maxim... His tank, shuddering, climbed onto the ridge, piles of earth flew from under the tracks. Behind, nothing could be seen behind the bluish smoke, and in front a gray clay plain suddenly opened up and flat hills on the enemy side could be seen in the distance. The tank avalanche, without slowing down, rushed there. There were no more rows, all the cars were racing, hitting each other,

pointlessly turning its turrets... One tank's caterpillar flew off at full speed; clockwork dolls, animals... People... Finally, Maxim woke up. It's time to take control. He went down... Hook... gave gas with all his might. He sang, he yelled in a voice that was not his own ... Now it was necessary somehow ... to take his

place and find in this smoke a suitable beam or some kind of hill so that there was somewhere to protect yourself from atomic explosions ... But it didn't work out that way, as expected... Guy leaned in from the side and hit Hook in the temple with a large wrench. The hook drooped, went limp, and released the levers. Maxim got angry and pushed Guy away, but it was already too late... He pulled the corpse back, sat down and took control. Almost nothing was visible through the inspection hatch: a small area of clay soil overgrown with sparse grass, and further on - a solid wall of dove-gray fire. There was no

question of finding anything in this mist. There was only one thing left to do: slow down and move carefully until the tank reached the edge of the hills. However, reducing the speed was also dangerous. If the atomic mines start to explode before they reach the hills, you can go blind and even burn out ... Meanwhile, the tank slipped through a thick stream of black smoke: someone was on fire to the left. We slipped through and had to immediately turn sharply so as not to run into a dead person. A

drooping border sign emerged from the smoke and disappeared, followed by torn, crumpled wire barriers. For a moment, a man in a marvelous white helmet looked out of an imperceptible trench, violently waved his raised fists, and at the same instant disappeared, as if dissolving into the earth. The smog was gradually dissipating ahead. Maxim saw brown round hills very close and the stained stern of the tank, which for some reason was crawling obliquely towards the general movement, and another burning tank. Maxim turned left, guiding the car into a deep, bushy saddle between two hills. He was already close when the fire burst towards him, and the whole tank roared from a terrible blow. In surprise, Maxim gave full throttle, the bushes and a cloud of smoke above them moved sharply, white helmets flashed, twisted

hatred of the face, raised fists, finally, under the caterpillars something iron crackled, breaking. Maxim clenched his teeth, took a sharp turn to the right and drove the car away from this place, on a slope, and finally drove into a narrow hollow overgrown with young trees.

Here he decided to stop. He opened the hatch, leaned out to the waist and looked around. The location was right. From all sides the tank was surrounded by high brown slopes. Maxim turned off the engine... He got out of the tank and ran up the hillside. Somewhere engines roared, caterpillars squeaked, cannons occasionally fired. A shell whistled high in the sky. Maxim, crouching down, ran to the top, squatted down in the bushes and once again praised himself from the bottom of his heart for such a good choice of place.

Below - within reach - there was a wide passage between the hills, and this passage, emerging from the plain filled with smoke, huddling together, caterpillar to caterpillar, tanks moved in a continuous stream - low, flattened, powerful, with large flat towers and long guns. They were no longer penalized, it was the regular army. For several minutes, Maxim, stunned and dumbfounded, watched this spectacle, terrible and improbable, like a historical movie. The air swayed and shuddered with a wild roar and roar, the hill trembled underfoot like a frightened animal, and yet it seemed to Maxim that the cars were moving in a gloomy, threatening

silence...

When the last tanks passed, Maxim looked back down, and his tank seemed to him a miserable tin toy, a decrepit parody of a real combat mechanism. Yes, a FORCE passed below to meet with another, even more terrible FORCE, and, remembering about it, Maxim hurriedly rolled down to the tank.

Bypassing it, he stopped... And at that moment, that other FORCE made a retaliatory blow. Maxim caught his eye. He screamed in pain, closed his eyes with all his might and fell down ...

When the surrounding world again became possible for human perception, consciousness returned. It probably took a very short time, a few seconds, but Maxim woke up, all covered with profuse sweat, with a parched throat. And his head was ringing, as if he had been hit in the ear with a plank.

Everything around changed, the world turned crimson, the world was abandoned with leaves and broken branches, the world was filled with hot air, uprooted bushes, flaming bushes, piles of hot dry earth fell like rain from the red sky. And there was a painfully ringing silence. The living and the dead were scattered in all directions. Guy, covered with leaves, lay face down for ten paces. Zeph sat next to him. With one hand he continued to hold on to his head, and with the other he closed his eyes. Funk rolled down somewhere. The tank was also demolished below and deployed. The dead

Kryuchok sat with his back to the caterpillar and grinned merrily ... Maxim got up, scattering the fallen branches. He ran up to Guy, grabbed him, lifted him up, looked into his glassy eyes, leaned his cheek against cheek, cursed and cursed this world three more times, in which he is so lonely and helpless ...

Apparently, he cried, beat his fists on the ground, trampled on the white helmet, and then Zef began to scream in pain, and then he woke up and, without

looking around, feeling nothing but hatred and a desire to kill, he went up again to his observation post ... Here, too, everything changed. The bushes were gone, the baked clay smoked and crackled, the north-facing hillside burned. In the north, the crimson sky merged with a solid wall of black-brown smoke, and under it grew, swelling before our eyes, bright orange oily-fat clouds. And there, where thousands of tons of red-hot ash, incinerated to atoms, hopes to survive and live, rose under the firmament, which was split from impact, into this incinerated furnace,

arranged by unfortunate fools for unfortunate fools, stretched from the south, as if in a blower, a light moist wind ... I remind you once again that the message about the adoption of just such a tactic of breaking through the defense of an atomic enemy by Soviet generals by 1949 I read after I had read the book by the Strugatskys. And it struck me. But in addition to the option of starting an atomic war, there are other interesting situations in the story "INHABITED ISLAND": a flight on a Tu-95 strategic bomber; visiting a nuclear submarine stuck aground; life in a radioactively contaminated

weapons systems; disarmament attempts; the inability of the government to deal effectively with problems in the economy; the inability of the opposition to suggest better ways of development; ecological problems; inflation, etc. As far as I understand, in this work the Strugatskys portrayed their vision of the future life in the USSR in the context of continued confrontation with the West and an arms race based on the scientific and technological revolution. Indeed, the understanding of the falsity of the slogan "the decay of capitalism" and the appearance of the stability of the socialist ideology in the absence of reform could well lead to such a future.

However, Soviet science fiction writers rarely turned to the topic of nuclear war or the topic of a sober economic forecast. More often developed the fight against spies. But writers in the West turned to the "atomic future" much more widely, especially since the end of the 1940s in the conditions of the Cold War that was flaring up. A good overview of this topic is given in the book by V. Gakov "ULTIMATUM: NUCLEAR WAR AND A NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD IN FANTASIES AND REALITY" (Moscow, POLITIZDAT, 1989). Here are the titles of some books by American authors:

Murray Leinster - "MURDER OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" (1946)

Leonard Engel and Emmanuel Piller - "THE WORLD IN FIRE (Russian American War of 1950)" (1947)

Judith Merrill - "SHADOWS OVER THE HOUSE" (1950)

(Canada) Theodora Dubois - "SOLUTION

T-25" (1951) The famous special issue of the magazine "COLIERS" for 10/27/1951

Guy Richards "TWO RUBLES TO TIMES

SQUARE" (1956) Many, very many similar stories and short stories were printed in the countries of the bloc led by the USA. According to the plot, most of them are similar to each other: after armed border incidents ("provocations"), a large-scale war begins with atomic bombings, massive offensives, and the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. As a result, Western civilization perishes, Russians "come" to the Western Hemisphere and arrange a totalitarian regime, the collapse of the economy, special camps, a general and constant shortage of food and industrial

goods. All authors cited the Cold War as the main reason for the appearance of such literature. And before laughing at their "paranoia", I think it would be useful to know that preparations for a new world war were in full swing. And not only technical. People died in various local "preparatory" conflicts. Losses, as in the 2nd World War, can be counted in the millions. And in conclusion of the chapter, I

would like to quote from the book of the former correspondent of the newspaper "PRAVDA" in France, Y. Zhukov "USSR-USA: A ROAD LONG FOR SEVENTY YEARS, or a STORY ABOUT HOW SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS DEVELOPED" (M., "Politizdat" , 1988): The situation in Europe quickly heated up.

While working in Paris, I clearly saw how the general fear of the possibility of these local armed conflicts (Korea, Southeast Asia) escalating into a third world war was growing. This fear was fueled by the bourgeois press, which continued to inflate the myth of the "Soviet threat." The weekly "CARREFOUR" went so far as to conduct a survey on the topic "What will you do when the Red Army enters Paris?" The faint-hearted couldn't resist. When the war in Korea began, a long line of frightened people lined up at the Spanish embassy every day, hurrying to get visas in order to take refuge behind the Pyrenees (from a New Year's article by 1951 by Yu. Zhukov). Speaking of France. In the journal "AVIATION AND COSMONAUTIKA", 1990,

No 12, on page 33 there is a color drawing showing a Soviet MIG-15 with stars on its sides, shooting down a twin-engine jet aircraft with a French flag on its tail. Actually, the drawing was made as an illustration of the memories of the participation of Soviet pilots in the Korean War. So the artist accidentally depicted Soviet stars instead of the identification marks of North Korea.

And another great proof that the new world war was actively prepared by the Soviet Union in 1945-1953 can be the events after March 5, 1953, which can be classified as "post-war". By the way, General Shtemenko in his memoirs explicitly states that the Soviet General Staff worked in wartime until the death of Stalin (p. 119) o'clock in the morning).

In other words, for the Soviet General Staff "post-war" as early as March for the Soviet 1953. And not only for him, but the time has come ... peasants, diplomats, police, prisoners, etc., which is discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 14. "POST-WAR" TIME To begin with, let's recall in

chronological order some of the events that have occurred since March 5, 1953. On March 5, 1953, Chairman

of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Generalissimo of the Soviet Union, Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU I. V. Stalin died. The session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was scheduled for March 14. On March 15, she passed the Law on the Transformation of Ministries. Many of them were liquidated through a merger, incl. the Military Ministry and the Naval Ministry were merged into a single Ministry of Defense. And although from 08/24/1953 the ministries gradually began to separate again, the Ministry of Defense remained united until the end of the existence of the

USSR. In connection with the formation of a single Ministry of Defense, the Naval General Staff was

abolished in March. In March 1953, the Council for Collective Farm Affairs under the Council of Ministers of the USSR was abolished. August 8, 1953 the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted the Law "On Agricultural Tax",

which eased the situation of the Soviet peasants. On April 23, 1953, the Ministry of Defense carried out a reorganization of the military command structure in the Far East, in particular, the command of the Commander-in-Chief of all troops was liquidated, and the Far Eastern military districts were merged into one. At the same time, the 5th and 7th Pacific Fleets

were merged into one Pacific Fleet. In May 1953, the East Siberian and Gorky military district. In November, Donskoy was disbanded.

On May 30, 1953, the Soviet government renounced its claims to Turkey. On June 6,

1953, the Soviet government came up with a proposal to exchange ambassadors with Yugoslavia. In the USSR, the organization of Yugoslav emigration was dissolved, and anti-Yugoslav propaganda was stopped. On May 26, 1955, the party leader of the USSR N. Khrushchev traveled to Belgrade.

On July 27, 1953, an armistice was signed in Korea. In September 1953, the "Special Meeting" of the NKVD was abolished (Ministry of Internal Affairs, MGB) extrajudicial punitive body.

In December 1953, the political departments of the MTS in the western regions of the Ukraine were liquidated. On March

18, 1954, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council ratified the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide (dated December 9, 1948).

On April 17, 1954, the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces ratified Geneva Conventions of 08/12/1949 for the protection of victims of war.

On July 12, 1954, the Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "On the abolition of personal ranks and insignia for employees of civilian ministries and departments" was issued. He abolished the introduction of personal titles in 11 civilian sectors (in state control, procurement, finance and banking, geology, coal, oil and gas industries, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, and some others). For 10 industries, personal ranks and insignia were introduced from 09/10/1947 to 05/24/1951.

In 1954, the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR and the BSSR became members of UNESCO (UNESCO) - the United Nations organization for education, science and culture. On January 25, 1955,

the USSR Armed Forces adopted a decree on the termination of the state war between the Soviet Union and Germany.

On May 15, 1955, the State Treaty on the Restoration of an Independent and Demilitarized Austria was signed in Vienna. The withdrawal of troops was completed on October 25, 1955. On July 31, 1955, the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal Zhukov G.K. issued an order to reduce the strength of the USSR Armed Forces "by the number of troops being withdrawn from Austria." On May 14, 1955, the Warsaw Pact was finally signed on the

creation of a military bloc of Eastern European countries. On August 13, 1955, the Soviet government decided to reduce the number of troops by

12/15/1955 by 640,000 people (some explain that it was Marshal Zhukov who decided to dismiss the political officers of the company). In addition, the decision to reduce troops was taken by other Eastern European countries. In total, the troops of different countries were reduced by 808,000 people.

In 1955, the Soviet government recognized the Hague Conventions on the Laws and Customs of War, adopted in The Hague in 1899 and 1907. In May 1955, the USSR withdrew its troops and returned the

naval base in Lushun (Port Arthur) to the government of the PRC free of charge. In 1955, the USSR refused ahead of schedule, and in January 1956 returned to Finland its naval base on the

Porkkala-Udd peninsula, taken in 1944 for 50 years. (The Porkkala-Udd road with depths of 14-26 m makes it possible to receive a significant number of warships and large displacement ships).

December 1955 - The 4th and 8th Navy were merged into a single Baltic Fleet. In 1955, the USSR joined the Inter-Parliamentary Union (founded in 1899 and encouraging contacts between parliamentarians in order to strengthen

"democratic institutions, as well as in the defense of peace and cooperation between peoples").

participating countries

With

In December 1955, the members of the UN finally mutually agreed to accept into their ranks Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, as well as Austria, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Spain. April 1956 - Tavrichesky and Belomorsky were disbanded

military districts. On

April 19, 1956, the unconstitutional terrorist decree of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of December 1, 1934, issued the day after Kirov's assassination, was canceled. In accordance with it, cases of "terrorist acts" were ordered to be carried out in an expedited manner, petitions for pardon to be rejected, and sentences of capital punishment to be brought immediately. By the way, there is information about the loss of life caused by various "legislative initiatives" of Stalin, for example, in the book "GREAT TERROR" by Robert Conquest (volume 2, Riga, "Rakstnieks", 1991, pp. 369-370): With all caution taking as an average for the period 1936-50 a figure of 8 million prisoners and a figure of 10% of annual mortality, we arrive at a total of 12 million deaths. To them should be added another million executed; the figure is by no means exaggerated. There were

losses even before the beginning of the Yezhovshchina, in the period 1930-36, covering three and a half million victims

collectivization, plus the same number of prisoners and

special settlers who practically died out in subsequent years; Again, this is the bare minimum. As a result, all this amounts to 20 million, and this figure is probably underestimated ... On May 14, 1956, the Soviet

government decided to reduce its armed forces by another 1,200,000 people until May 1, 1957 (over 640,000 in 1955). Part of the military schools was also disbanded, and 375 warships of the navy were put into conservation. In the summer of 1980, during a construction practice, I heard from a veteran an officer saying that was common at that time: "three by two hundred, a court of honor and a million two hundred" (in the sense - "I drank three glasses of 200 grams of vodka, passed the court of honor due to the consequences of a drunk debauchery and ended up in the front ranks for dismissal as a punishment"). On January 15, 1960, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted another Law "On a new significant reduction in the Armed Forces of the USSR", according to which the Soviet Army and Navy were reduced once again by 1,200,000.

On October 19, 1956, the Joint Declaration on ending the state of war between the Soviet Union and Japan.

In 1956, the political agencies on the railway line were liquidated. transport.

The production of gas generating cars was discontinued and locomotives.

And there were other events that are typical only for the period after the war. It can also be considered in detail it also has a lot of interesting things, but apparently, this is a topic for another conversation.

However, one point should be considered in more detail here. We are talking about repression - rehabilitation. Based on materials from the open press of the late 50s - early 60s, as well as the late 90s, it is known that in the period of the 30s - early 50s, "repressions" against Soviet citizens were carried out in the USSR. This was expressed in the mass arrests of civilians and military people on trumped-up charges. In the late 50s, many of them (especially those who had survived by this time) were "rehabilitated". Here we can recall the different stories presented in Chapter 8 of this study. And although this topic, one might say, was widely considered in the media

information, but there was no intelligible explanation of "repression", and especially "rehabilitation", was not. They still tried to somehow explain the "repressions" by the "bloodthirstiness" of the Stalinist regime, its desire for absolute power, and so on. And the topic of "rehabilitation" was hardly touched at all, as if they saw in it only a completely "normal" process after the "totalitarian regime has passed into the past." Only sometimes attention was paid to the inconsistency of some "rehabilitations", in the sense that such and such were rehabilitated, but some others associated with them were not.

But I would like to draw attention to something else: WHO carried out the work on "rehabilitation"? For example, the future professor, doctor of geographical sciences Yu. March 1953 But it was an amnesty. Moreover, many witnesses of those years pay attention to the fact that according to the Decree of 03/27/1953, first of all, criminals were amnestied, and the turn of political ones came later (since 1954). But on December 8, 1955, Chirkov was "completely rehabilitated for lack of corpus delicti." His rehabilitation was carried out by a review of the case by the MILITARY TRIBUNAL of the Moscow Military District. Strange. Why was the MILITARY TRIBUNAL dealing with the case of a CIVIL? By the way, the military tribunals also dealt with the rehabilitation of other amnestied (men, women, civilian or military). Why not civil courts? First, let's look at the time:

judging by the memories, the rehabilitation was massively carried out in 1955-1956, having been started in 1954. And now let's remember what consequences the removal of a criminal record from a person by a civil court should have? First, the restoration of his former place of work. Secondly: such a citizen had the right to receive monetary compensation for the entire time of illegal imprisonment, based on the average

monthly earnings. The release of people "just like that", and even by military authorities, is carried out only in the period AFTER THE END OF THE WAR and only in relation to PRISONERS OF WAR! Hint

understandable? I do not want to discuss this situation in detail. The heart becomes eerie. But what the military tribunals were doing is a clear example of how the Stalinist leadership treated its own citizens as enemies in the war! As an illustration, below is a duplicate of the model certificate that Y. Chirkov received from the tribunal during rehabilitation.

MILITARY TRIBUNAL OF THE MOSCOW MILITARY
DISTRICT December
10, 1955

No N-4102/

OS Moscow, Arbat,
37 C R A V K

A The case on the charge of C I R K O V

A Yury Ivanovich, born in 1919, was reviewed by the
Military Tribunal of the Moscow Military District on
December

6, 1955. Resolutions of special meetings under the
NKVD of the USSR of July 20, 1935, July 10,
1938 and under the Ministry of State Security of
the USSR of August 22, 1951 in relation to CHIRKOV

Yu.I. were canceled and the
case was dismissed for lack of corpus delicti. ZAM. THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE
MILITARY TRIBUNAL OF THE

MVO COLONEL OF JUSTICE (stamp) (signature) /N.GURINOV/

Let's analyze: a civilian Chirkov Yu.I. At the age of 16, he was convicted for NOTHING by some extrajudicial body. Of the next 20 years, I spent most of it in prison in an environment where every day could be the last. And then he received a certificate from the MILITARY TRIBUNAL that he was free. Not even an apology. But if we consider him as a prisoner of war, then the logic is observed.

Thus, it turns out that in the USSR, not only ideological weapons, but also quite ordinary ones were used against their own in the 30s - early 50s. (But for the bulk of the citizens, light small arms were enough - pistols, rifles and machine guns).

There is another fact that confirms the above idea about the attitude of the Stalinist leadership of the USSR towards its own: in December 1941, Stalin severed relations with the International Red Cross. All Soviet servicemen who were captured by the Germans automatically became traitors to the Motherland. On December 27, 1941, a GKO decree was issued on checking former Red Army servicemen in special special camps (i.e., strict regime prisons). Somehow I came across the memory of a former Soviet intelligence officer. He cited the case of their group being captured by the Germans. To the question "how were they captured?", he answered: "As we took, so they took us." But they put them in some house and put the "old man" as a guard. They managed to "take it off" and return to their own. So he specifically emphasized in his memoirs that they swore an oath to each other not to say a word anywhere, that they spent several hours in captivity with the Germans. According to the

newspaper "KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA" (04/04/1995, p. 5), there were 5,300,000 Soviet prisoners of war in Nazi captivity (of which about 4 million were in the first 7 months of the war). So, in 1956 they were also amnestied, but not rehabilitated. The decree on rehabilitation was signed by the President of Russia on January 31,

1995. We can also recall the restoration of the rights of some peoples who were massively evicted in the 30s - early 50s (Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingush, Crimean Tatars, etc.). However, in the second half of the 50s, full rehabilitation with the restoration of administrative entities (autonomous republics and regions) was not carried out for all previously repressed peoples. Only two and a half months before the August "putsch" of 1991, the government of the USSR adopted Decree No. 336 (06.06.1991) "ON THE CANCEL OF THE DECISIONS OF THE FORMER STATE COMMITTEE OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR AND THE DECISIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USSR REGARDING THE SOVIET PEOPLES THAT SUBJECTED TO REPRESS IYAM AND FORCED RESETTLEMENT". Its main meaning is: ... The Cabinet of Ministers of the USSR decides: to cancel the resolutions ..., according to the attached list. Signature: Prime Minister V. Pavlov. And the attached list (with the removal of the secrecy stamp) contained 47 resolutions by date, starting from 01/23/1936 and ending with the beginning of the 50s.

But this act can be attributed to the end of the legal process of rehabilitation of the repressed peoples. It began in the mid-50s, being a sign of the POST-WAR PERIOD.

Engaged in amnesty and rehabilitation of innocently convicted citizens, entire peoples and prisoners of war (both their own and others), the Soviet government was OBLIGED since 1955 after the ratification of the Geneva and other conventions. And it did it. Moreover, citizens were rehabilitated through military tribunals. As it should be AFTER THE WAR. By the way, the

return of German prisoners of war was also completed around this time, for example, Field Marshal von Paulus (1953) or the former Soviet intelligence officer, the German Johann Wentzel (May 1955). Only in 1955 did the Soviet government make a special decision to return to their homeland all German prisoners of war who were in the USSR, except for over 9 thousand people convicted of war crimes (on which an agreement with the government of the FRG was reached only in 1957)

Question: When is the time after the war? Answer: usually after the Victory Day or the Day of Defeat (Surrender). What can be attributed to March 5, 1953? From the point of view of common sense, universal interests, the interests of each individual inhabitant of the planet, this is Victory Day. But from the point of view of the "World Revolution", the tasks of spreading communist ideology, March 5, 1953 is the Day of Defeat (although not capitulation yet, but a strategic defeat, as the further course of history showed). In a peaceful competition, communism could not win, adhering to the dead end path of confrontation with the rest of the world until its very end. Our discussion will end with considerations on this subject. CONCLUSION I don't know how the reader feels

after reading this entire book. Personally, I felt terrible for periods, although I received information about that time in portions and over several years. But it's time to sum up. Concluding a detailed story about the actions of only one side in the Cold War, I would like to note that Stalin reacted very qualitatively to the implementation of the main goal of the Communist Party - the accomplishment of the World Revolution, which was reflected in all party programs. AND

although the first two focused on seizing and consolidating power in one country - Russia, then in the third it was supposed to be the main goal. But why make assumptions if this program was actually adopted? Indeed, it was adopted, but for some reason the process of its adoption dragged on for many years and included the development of several options.

One version was prepared in 1948, but at the end of that year it was sent to the archive. Moreover, there is information (magazine "QUESTIONS OF THE CPSU HISTORY", No 7, 1990, article by Yu. Aksenov "THE WAY TO COMMUNISM: UTOPIAS AND REALITY") that the 19th Congress of the CPSU, held in 1952, was planned to be held earlier (in 1947 or at the beginning of 1948). The reasons for the postponement are not indicated in the journal, but it is said that in 1948 a resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On the norm of representation and the procedure for elections to the 19th All-Union Conference of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks" was prepared. However, even then it was not carried out. About the reasons for the refusal to hold a congress, a conference and adopt a new program of the CPSU (b) at that time, the journal of the Central Committee of the CPSU (!) Expresses only some assumptions.

In particular, the interrelation of the new party program with the development of the draft general economic plan of the USSR for 1946-1965, the implementation of which was supposed to mean the entry of the Soviet Union into communism, is assumed. This work was supervised by N. Voznesensky, Deputy Chairman of the Government of the USSR (i.e. Stalin). But it was not completed (in 1948 the plan was sent to the archive). And Voznesensky himself suffered a terrible fate - from August 1949, various charges began to be brought against him, on 10/27/1949 he was arrested, and at the end of 1950 he was executed. He was executed according to the results of the so-called. "Leningrad case", in which a whole group of senior civilian leaders of the USSR was sentenced to death, incl. former secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and head of the Personnel Department of the Central Committee A. A. Kuznetsov (who was relieved of these posts at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee on February 15, 1949 - information from the collection "THEY WERE NOT SILENT", compiled by A. V. Afanasyev, Moscow, Politizdat, 1991). For a short time, A. Kuznetsov was chairman of the newly created Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for the Far East. But in early March 1949, the decision to create it was cancelled. At the beginning of March 1949, Marshal of the Soviet Union N. A. Bulganin

leaves the post of Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR and completely goes to work as deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (to replace N. Voznesensky?). On March 5, 1949, Stalin met with Kim Il Sung, after which the training of North Korean troops was intensified. By this time, factories under the combat atomic program were already operating in the Soviet Union, and preparations for the first atomic explosion had reached the final stage. So why, then, did they refuse to adopt the

new program of the CPSU(b)? (As well as from a new long-term forward plan?) References to the war and post-war economic recovery are not entirely convincing. For comparison, we can recall that the Soviet communists adopted their second program in very terrible conditions of civil war and devastation - in March 1919 at the 8th Congress of the RCP (b). At that time, the troops of the tsarist general Denikin had not yet been defeated. And nothing, they found both transport and time, gathered 403 delegates and solemnly adopted the new program! And what could interfere in 1948? Later comments on this issue linked the new party program with the economic plan for building a communist society in the USSR. Actually, this

connection manifested itself in 1961, when the 22nd Congress of the CPSU finally adopted it. But is the connection between the third program of the CPSU and the economic plan for building communism in the USSR so obvious? Weird question? And if it is clarified as follows: is the connection of the third program of the CPSU ONLY with the economic development plan of the country obvious? With what else? Let us read a quote from the book "BANNER OF THE FIGHTING PARTY (Essay on the history of the CPSU Program)", Moscow, Politizdat, 1986, p. 131: in its resolution: "The Congress instructs the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to revise the program of the party on the basis of the program of the Communist International adopted by the Sixth World Congress and the successes of

socialist construction in the USSR." This was the first decision to prepare a new Party Program.

In 1939, at the 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a commission was formed to revise the Party Program. She was instructed to submit to the next party congress a draft of the new Program of the CPSU(b).

The outbreak of the Great Patriotic War forced the preparation of this document to be postponed for a long

time ... "By the way, in this book there is no mention of the preparation of a draft of a new program in 1948, based on an unaccepted long-term economic plan. And there is also no explanation why, after Stalin's death, they did not continue work on new program, the decision on which was adopted at the 19th Congress of the CPSU in 1952. Strange, but it turns out that from 1930 to 1953 they tried several times to revise the party program, but something constantly interfered, something

broke. What? I think, before answering this question, it should first be noted that the first decision to prepare a new program of the CPSU (b) connected it with the successes of socialist construction in the USSR in the second place! First, the program of the Communist International was mentioned! And he was engaged in the "World Revolution", the military prospects of which were observed until the mid-50s! That's when they decreased to hypothetical, the third program from 1956 was developed and adopted in 1961 as a program for building communism in the Soviet Union. But, again, secondarily. The plan for building communism in the USSR constituted the second (most) half of the third program and had the heading: "Part Two. TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION TO BUILD A COMMUNIST SOCIETY." The first (slightly smaller) half of the program ("Part One") was dedicated to the same WORLD REVOLUTION!, only it was called more peacefully: "TRANSITION FROM CAPITALISM TO COMMUNISM - THE WAY OF HUMANITY DEVELOPMENT". (Moreover, if you read it more soberly, then the thought will arise that this is not a program in the strict sense, but a set of facts, wishes and "scientific" spells, akin to shamanic ones).

What, then, COULD BE the third program of the CPSU(b) of the early 1940s? Judging by the plans developed, in 1941 the "liberation" campaign of the Red Army was to begin, as a result of which the power of communist parties could be established in almost all European countries, incl. in France. Accordingly, all its colonies fell into the camp of socialism. Then the countries of Asia, especially the colonial ones, could undergo "liberation". About it

one can guess, for example, from the already cited memoirs of the former employee of the General Staff, General Shtemenko, in which he writes that he spent the end of May and most of June 1941 in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In Tbilisi, he participated in the command-staff game to deploy the front (it is not specified against whom). In the role of commander was Lieutenant General P. I. Batov, chief of staff, Major General F. I. Tolbukhin. After debriefing the exercises, Shtemenko went to Turkmenistan, where he also held some kind of staff game, during which he "managed, in order to study the theater [of military operations], drive along the border from Serakhs to Ashgabat and further through Kizyl-Atrek to Gasan-Kuli ". (And this is almost the entire border of the USSR with Iran to the east of the Caspian Sea). In addition, Shtemenko openly declares that before the war there was a "plan to cover the Transcaucasus", which, apparently, had Turkey as an adversary, because, after the entry of troops into Iran in 1941, it was clarified. It was possible to clarify it only in the direction of Turkey. At that time, there was no talk of atomic weapons. Therefore, the prospect of "liberating" America could also arise. In other words, the "World Revolution" could well have spread throughout the globe. And this case cannot be left without a theoretical justification. And in the period of a successful "liberation" campaign, it is natural to ask for a congress of "winners"

already on a world scale with the adoption of an appropriate program. But it all fell apart. Stalin had to repeat the preparation again. And until his death, he did not refuse to "push" the "World Revolution". However, his heirs were forced to slow down their activity in such a policy in the face of the threat of thermonuclear destruction of mankind. But there was a need to adopt a new party program, because, the former has long since been completed. I had to somehow bring it to its logical end. However, in the adopted version, the idea of the "World Revolution" remained in the first place, although the prospects for its accomplishment were no longer visible. And it is quite logical that in the memory of Soviet people the third program of the CPSU was remembered for the content of its second part - the program for building communism in one country - the USSR. It just ended with the phrase: "THE CURRENT GENERATION OF

The deadlines have passed, communism has not appeared. I had to redo the program. And in its new edition, adopted on March 1, 1986 at the 27th Party Congress, the phrase about life under communism was omitted. I think in vain. In the light of newly discovered facts, it would be useful to leave it in a modified form: "THE PRESENT AND OTHER GENERATIONS OF SOVIET PEOPLE WILL LIVE!" Although it can be seen that there is nowhere to leave it - the third program of the CPSU, born after repeated painful attempts,

ultimately turned out to be stillborn. And even the very fact of its rewriting proves that, first of all, it had a focus on the international situation. The collapse of capitalism, declared "natural", did not come. The arms race, on the origins of which Stalin spent enormous efforts, hit like a boomerang on the economy of the Soviet Union itself. The emergence of new, socialist-oriented countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America did not resolve the issue. On the contrary, it increased the expenses of the USSR. As a result, the implementation of the first part of the third program was pushed back into a completely indefinite future. And along with this, the "arrival" of communism in the Soviet Union became problematic. All this made it necessary to "scientifically" substantiate "the need for a long stage of developed socialism" (which, however, could only last a few years after the adoption in 1986 of its substantiation in the new version

of the third program of the CPSU). Thus, according to the history of its adoption and rewriting, one can judge its main goal - the "World Revolution". With great difficulty, peace on Earth found a place in it, and even then, with various reservations and already without Stalin! Even after his death, for some time ideologies continued to call for increased vigilance of the

Soviet people. Here, for example, are the titles of some books of that period: 1)

"ON THE POLITICAL VIGILANCE OF A COMMUNIST", Gospolitizdat, 1953 2) N. Zubov "BE ALIGENT IN ANY SITE AND IN ANY

SITUATION", Gospolitizdat, 1953 (50,000 copies), 1954 (100,000 copies) 3) M. Smirnov and P. Sharikov "On the vigilance of the Soviet

08/27/1953, circulation 200,000 copies. And here is a quote from the

book: "Deploying peaceful construction," I.V. Stalin wrote in an order on May 1, 1946, "we must not for a minute forget about the intrigues of international reaction, which is hatching plans for a new war ..." What is it? The remains of some process, performed "by inertia"?

By the way, there are a number of memories that speak of an attempt in 1953 to repeat the events of 1937. For example, in his book "PROLONGED RECOVERY (1953-1985)" (1991, International Relations), G. A. Arbatov cites the words of one of his former journalist colleagues - B. M. Afanasyev, who until 1948 and a short time after his death Stalin served in intelligence agencies. He told Arbatov that "from his short" second "work in the KGB he knows for certain: at the beginning of 1953, orders were received to increase the" capacity "of prisons and camps in connection with the upcoming "influx" of prisoners and to prepare for transportation

prisoners additional rolling stock ... In ~~a word~~ word, in the last months of Stalin's life, the punitive apparatus was preparing for a new wave of mass repressions. "Why? Maybe to increase the number of" black jackets "? After all, it is impossible to infinitely increase the

size of the army in peacetime without frightening the enemy. In addition, the economy will not survive, and in connection with atomic weapons, most of the troops still turn into suicide bombers, especially the first echelon (so why spend money on them?) And if Stalin was really preparing the next "Day-M" for 1954, then such an explanation may well be

place.

There is also evidence of Stalin's desire to organize another "shake-up" with repressions among his entourage. At the same time, the names of Molotov and Mikoyan were called. Did not have time...

What did he seek? He owned unlimited power on 1/6 of the land. After 1945 he added a number of countries to it. And it could well capture Western Europe. What stopped him? Earlier it was said about the crisis of strategic

bombers. But they were required only for the war with the United States! It turns out that it's easy to supplement the USSR with some countries after 1945 to Stalin

there were few. It turns out that he was not interested in "extra" tens of thousands of square kilometers! He needed something more!

In the book "The LAST REPUBLIC" V. Suvorov analyzed the main goal of the "World Revolution": to accept the "last republic" into the USSR. And in the early 50s, such a prospect could arise only in one case: if it were possible to "fill up" the USA! Did not work out...

By the way, so who stood in the way of whose expansionist aspirations? And where does the opinion come from that it makes no sense to study that period of history in too much detail? I think all of the above material shows the very important need for such a study. And I would like to draw your attention to the title of G. Arbatov's book: "A DELAYED RECOVERY (1953-1985)". And also to recall that since 1985 the term "socialism with a human face" has been used. In this regard, I would like to ask the question: "What kind of face did socialism have before? An animal grin?"

But some readers may notice that in times of "stagnation" life was better in some ways than it is now. Agree. Somewhere I even read such a definition: "since the 60s, the standard of living of socialism tried to rise, but could not resist and fell face down in the mud." Why

did it happen? Was it really impossible to create the best in the world, for example, a vacuum cleaner or a refrigerator? After all, the world's best tank or front-line bomber - products are much more complex and expensive! Moreover, they were able to create the best object in the world, less complicated than a refrigerator - a Kalashnikov assault rifle!

But the quality of military products is shown in battle. And the quality of peaceful ones is in the competition for the consumer, when there is something to compare with. And this implies an open economy, currency regulation, production efficiency, minimal military spending, and so on. etc., i.e. something that was denied for a long time by the theory of the class struggle and already existed before 1917. It can be objected that in 1917 the "benefactors of the people" decided to eliminate social inequality. In other words, they promised to make social protection a top priority. The idea is tempting! And millions responded! But why was it only after 1953 that the rise in the standard of living was remembered? For a long time this was explained by the need to create a powerful industry. Let's say, but

why, until the very end of the USSR, the highest quality civilian goods or their components were purchased abroad? What then was the "most peaceful in the world" Soviet industry doing?

As history has shown, the elimination of social inequality on the basis of the idea of class struggle and total leveling is a dead end. At least - in terms of the world's best quality and economic costs. And social protection can, it turns out, be carried out without fomenting a "world revolution." But the return to the already achieved world level of relations cannot be easy and painless. But this is a topic for another conversation. And this time to

end, although some questions still remain. Very big, from my point of view, remains the problem of covering the course of the war from June 1941 to January 1943 in the light of "newly determined circumstances." Particularly interesting should be the analysis of the events of the Kharkov operation in May 1942. Some participants in those battles believed that there could not have been without betrayal. But that's from their point of view. There are suggestions that the whole tragedy and the whole magnitude of the feat that occurred at that time have not yet been fully appreciated. Moreover, there is a hypothesis that it was at this time that Stalin gained a very important experience as a strategic player in the international arena, which he used after the war. Yes, this cannot be taken away from him - Stalin really turned out to be an unsurpassed player on a planetary scale, whose actions can be devoted to more than one book. May 1994 - January 2002